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Abstract
The digitalization of all parts of modern society makes life simpler and more convenient
for many people. Yet, the underlying technological and economic systems become ever
more complex. In many domains, this results in old or simplistic solutions being employed
for new and complex problems. Consequently, much of the potential of digital markets
remains untapped. In this thesis, I focus on two domains at the very center of any digital
society: cloud computing markets and software markets. Using tools from microeconomics,
operations research and computer science, I analyze these domains, identify inefficiencies
and propose innovative market design solutions.
A first issue I focus on is that large amounts of capacity in cloud computing centers
stand idle because they are reserved for purposes that do not actually require their
continued use (e.g., for maintenance or for users with long-term contracts). As a potential
solution to this problem, I focus on preemptible spot markets where users directly bid
for capacity in a continuous auction. I model the cloud provider’s profit optimization
problem by combining queuing theory and game theory to analyze the equilibria of the
resulting queuing system. I show that a provider can, under a mild condition, increase
her profit over only offering a fixed-price market by also offering a spot market.
In a second research strand, I focus on the cluster admission control problem: Many
modern cloud workloads are characterized by resource demands that change over time.
Cloud resources are typically organized in compute clusters consisting of a few ten
thousand compute cores and any request for more capacity of an existing workload has
to be satisfied in the same cluster. A provider thus has to continuously decide whether
she can add additional workloads to a given compute cluster. I formalize this problem as
a constrained partially observable Markov decision process, which I then systematically
relax to design fast heuristic admission policies. I fit the cluster admission model to a
real world data trace and through simulations show substantial performance gains for
the new policies compared to industry standards. I show how better prior information
can further increase these gains and propose the use of variance-based pricing to improve
priors. Using a duopoly market model, I analyze the competitive effects of such a pricing
rule and show that employing variance-based pricing constitutes a competitive advantage.
Lastly, I focus on consumer software markets and study whether offering subscription
licenses for a single product in addition or as an alternative to perpetual licenses can be
used to increase a provider’s revenue. I present a game-theoretic model where each user
faces a simple Markov Decision Process when deciding whether he buys or subscribes. I
derive the user equilibrium strategies and state the publisher’s optimal pricing strategies.
I show through numerical evaluations in the sub-domain of video games that it is typically,
but not always, in a publisher’s interest to offer subscription licenses alongside perpetual
licenses. I further show that a publisher can often obtain a mild revenue increase by
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1 Motivation and Overview of Results1
1.1 Market Design for Digital Markets
The idea of trading goods and services is at least as old as human civilization, and, having
been observed among animals (Noë and Hammerstein, 1995), likely predates humankind
altogether. And with trade came marketplaces that each followed their own implicit
and explicit rules. Over the ages, as human civilization evolved and production chains
became ever more involved, so did markets (McMillan, 2003). One constant through the
ages is that while new markets teem with potential, what worked before might not be
optimal anymore. Those market participants that do not evolve with the markets are
soon outcompeted and left in the dust.
Today, markets evolve faster than ever. The continuously increasing digitalization of
all parts of modern society not only makes life simpler and more convenient for many
people, it also causes the underlying systems to become ever more complex, both from a
technological and an economic point of view. In many practical domains, this results in
old or simplistic solutions still being applied to new and complex problems. Consequently,
much of the potential of digital markets and systems remains untapped. In this thesis, I
employ techniques from game theory, artificial intelligence, data science and operations
research to develop new solutions to tap into some of this potential for two different
domains at the center of any digitalized society: cloud computing and software markets.
1.1.1 Cloud Computing
Computers, smartphones, and apps are an integral part of modern life. Over the years,
they have gotten ever more prevalent, their uses ever more sophisticated, and the devices
themselves ever more portable. A development that, despite improvements in hardware,
would not have been possible without the proliferation of cloud computing. The basic
idea of cloud computing is that, instead of using local hardware, most computation should
be run remotely on specialized server hardware. This not only means that consumers
have to worry less about the computing power of their devices, but also allows companies
and researchers to move their workloads out of local servers and into more efficient data
centers, saving 20% to 50% of their IT costs in the process (Wauters et al., 2016). Using
1I liberally borrow from my own prior work (Dierks and Seuken, 2020a, Dierks, Kash and Seuken,
2019, Dierks and Seuken, 2020b,c) for parts of this chapter.
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cloud resources further has manifold advantages beyond cost savings, such as on the spot
scalability and flexibility, easy remote access and improved system security.
The low cost of cloud computing resources for customers is the result of a highly
competitive market where cloud providers like Amazon EC2, Microsoft Azure and Google
Cloud constantly strife to improve their offers. Nonetheless, most cloud clusters currently
run at very low average utilization. This is problematic as a large part of the overall
costs of running a cloud computing center is paid upfront when hardware is supplied and
is therefore independent of usage. This low utilization is caused by various factors, such
as technical limitations (i.e., the need to reserve capacity for node failures, maintenance
etc.), outside factors (eg., fluctuations in overall demand), or inefficiencies in scheduling
procedures, especially if virtual machines (VMs) might change size or do not use all
of their requested capacity (Yan et al., 2016). Another cause is the nature of many
modern workloads: highly connected tasks running on different VMs should be run on one
cluster to minimize latency and bandwidth use (Cortez et al., 2017), making it important
to keep enough free capacity in a cluster through the use of some kind of admission
controller. While some of these technical factors, for example scheduling inefficiencies,
are very well researched and understood, for others research is still at very early stages.
Particularly lacking is research that merges the technological particularities of the domain
with economic considerations and studies how particular market structures could be
employed to increase the utilization. In this thesis, I apply market design techniques to
increase the utilization and profit of cloud computing systems by either reselling idle
capacity or reducing the need for idle capacity altogether.
1.1.2 Consumer Software Markets
Consumer software is an indispensable part of many peoples’ lives. Be it productivity
software (e.g., word processors or digital assistants), education software (e.g., language
training programs), information software (e.g., maps or news), video games or other
multi-media applications, almost every person utilizes some form of software in their
daily lives.
Being only a few decades old, the markets for consumer software nonetheless already
went through a large transformation from physical media like CDs and DVDs to purely
digital forms of distribution. This transformation, combined with software markets
growing into new domains like mobile phones, gave rise to many new business models
and monetization schemes like in-app advertisement (Burns, Roseboom and Ross, 2016),
microtransactions (i.e., the sale of many mini-upgrades for small amounts of money) or
lootboxes (i.e., randomized microtransactions (Chen et al., 2020)). This rich domain has
not seen much attention from market designers yet and the strategic implications of the
different monetization schemes are not yet well understood. In this thesis, I embark on a
foray into this domain by formally analyzing the revenue potential of subscription licenses
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as an alternative or addition to traditional perpetual licenses for software products.
1.2 Background, Problem Statements and Research Questions
In this section, I give an overview of the background for the two domains I work on in
this thesis and formulate my specific research questions.
1.2.1 Reducing Idle Capacity in Cloud Computing
The overarching goal of my work on cloud computing is to increase the utilization of cloud
computing centers in ways that also increases the provider’s profit. I have approached this
from two different, yet complementary, directions: reselling capacity that is necessarily
idle for its primary purpose on a secondary market and reducing the need for idle capacity
altogether.
Reselling Idle Capacity
Cloud providers must constantly run many idle instances (virtual machines, compute
containers, etc.), for example to guarantee service level agreements of long-term contracts,
for maintenance, as fail safe redundancy, or simply as a buffer for future growth (Yan
et al., 2016). While further advances in technology might in the future be able to
reduce the need for this idle capacity, they cannot eliminate it. Instead, it might be
more prudent to rent out the capacity to users as long as it is idle, but take it back
whenever it is required for its primary purpose. As this capacity might be required for its
primary purpose at a moment’s notice, it cannot be sold on a standard cloud computing
market. In today’s cloud computing markets, instances are most commonly rented out
via fixed-price offerings where users pay a fixed price per time unit and the provider
aims to offer enough instances to be able to almost instantly satisfy all user requests.
This approach is simple and reliable, satisfies the requirements of most users and is
therefore widely used in practice. But as users in these markets expect to be able to
use assigned resources as long as they want, idle capacity that might have to be taken
back at a moments notice cannot be sold on there. Instead, a natural approach is to sell
idle compute instances on a preemptible secondary market where users directly bid for
capacity in a continuous auction and that is offered in addition to a cloud provider’s
primary fixed-price market. In such a market, any user that gets outbid is preempted and
has to wait until the market price drops below his bid again. While this would clearly
improve a cloud computing center’s utilization, whether it would be in a provider’s overall
interest is not immediately clear.
Research Question 1 When can a provider utilize a spot market of idle capacity to
increase her profit?
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Reducing the Need for Idle Capacity
While there are many reasons for capacity to be idle, I focus on one that is relatively
new and therefore has not yet gotten much attention: the nature of modern workloads.
Today, workloads consist of ever more highly connected tasks running on different virtual
machines (VMs) that need to communicate almost constantly and should be run on one
physical compute cluster to minimize latency and bandwidth use (Cortez et al., 2017).
Most cloud providers therefore offer this kind of service by bundling different VMs of
a user together into a deployment of interdependent workloads. When the workload
of a deployment changes, it can request a scale out in the form of additional VMs or
shut some of its active VMs down. Scale out requests should almost always be accepted
on the same cluster, as denying them would impair the quality of the service, possibly
alienating customers. Providers consequently have to hold some parts of any cluster as
idle reserves to guarantee that only a very low percentage of these requests is denied.
Current practice for this typically just sees a fixed percentage of the cluster reserved.
This may seem reasonable at first glance, as the law of large numbers might seem to
suggest that with many jobs in a large cluster the current utilization would be a good
guide to future utilization. But as Cortez et al. (2017) have shown, a relatively small
number of deployments account for most of the utilization. This suggests that the types
of deployments (i.e., small/large, fast/slow scaling, short/long lived etc.) currently in a
cluster have a larger impact on the failure probability than is apparent, and policies that
only take the current utilization into account are suboptimal: vast quantities of resources
are reserved in anticipation of scale outs that will probably never happen. The amount
of reserved capacity could be greatly reduced if information about deployments’ future
behavior would be taken into account to predict how many scale outs will occur.
Research Question 2 How can cluster admission policies be improved to take the
scaling behavior of active deployments into account?
As information about deployment behavior might not be readily available, this research
question also includes a learning and elicitation aspect. The elicitation approach I propose
requires that the price a user pays for resources is partially based on the long-term variance
of his deployments. Using such a pricing rule raises a broadly connected follow-up question
about its general economic value that is distinct from its ability to help elicit information.
In cloud computing and a number of other domains (e.g., mobile data or electricity
markets), providers’ costs are largely driven by how much buffer capacity they must
keep in reserve. The providers’ provisioning costs thus depend on how variable each
user’s demand is. Employing a variance-based pricing rule to (approximately) pass these
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costs on to user seems natural. It has the advantage that low-variance users pay lower
prices and are thus impacted less by the buffer requirements (which are mainly caused
by high-variance users). This is not only fairer, but importantly, it incentivizes users to
reduce their variance, which in turn reduces the provider’s costs. Thus, in a monopolistic
setting, the provider can obviously use variance-based pricing to increase his profits over
what can be achieved with the industry standard of fixed per-unit prices. However, in
a competitive market environment, the effects are less clear. The competitive pricing
pressure by other providers may limit what a provider can achieve with variance-based
pricing or lead to bad equilibria.
Research Question 3 Is variance-based pricing viable in competitive settings?
1.2.2 Subscription Licenses in Consumer Software Markets
While there are many emerging business models in software markets, in this thesis I focus
on the revenue potential of one in particular: subscription licenses. Whereas a classic
perpetual license, once bought, allows a user access to the product for as long as he
desires (or, in some more recent cases, as long as the publisher supports it), a subscription
license only allows access to the product for as long as the user pays a (typically monthly)
recurring fee.2 While in recent years, subscription licenses have become common for
cloud-based Software-as-a-Service offerings (where their main selling point is access to
cloud hardware), most products that do not come with significant cloud hardware are still
only sold through perpetual licenses (though some publishers have recently experimented
with subscription models (PC Gamer, 2020a,b)). In general, it is still unclear whether
subscription licenses for consumer software could be used to noticeably increase revenue
or whether the cannibalization of the market for perpetual licenses makes offering them
suboptimal.
Research Question 4 Can a software publisher increase his revenue by offering sub-
scription licenses alongside, or instead of, perpetual licenses.
1.3 Related Work
While the research questions in this thesis are all broadly situated in the field of market
design (Roth, 2008), they fall into two methodological categories. Most of my research
2This is distinct from subscription services that give access to constantly changing bundles of products
(e.g. Xbox Game Pass).
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questions are microeconomic in nature and directly concern pricing rules as a way to
increase profits (research questions 1, 3 and 4), while one research question focuses on
technical considerations and utilizes pricing only as a supportive tool to enable information
elicitation (research question 2).
Studying the viability of pricing rules is fundamentally a question of revenue manage-
ment (Gallego and Van Ryzin, 1994, Chen, Farias and Trichakis, 2019, Schlosser et al.,
2018). More specifically, one provider or publisher offering two slightly different versions
of the same product to all users (i.e., spot and fixed-price instances or perpetual and
subscription licenses) constitutes a form of product differentiation (Shaked and Sutton,
1982, Maskin and Riley, 1984, Desai, 2001). For example for posted price mechanisms
with monotonically increasing marginal costs, it is known that some degree of product
differentiation is typically profit optimal (Moorthy, 1984, Mussa and Rosen, 1978), though
it is not directly clear how these results translate to the more complex types of product
differentiation I analyze. For spot markets in cloud computing, Abhishek, Kash and Key
(2017) have conversely shown that offering a spot market often decreases a provider’s rev-
enue, though they do not make any statement about profits. Separately, previous authors
(e.g., Subramanya, Rizk and Irwin (2016)) have argued that spot markets will become
unattractive once they become congested, as preemptions might become commonplace
and destroy the value proposition of spot instances. The revenue effects of subscriptions
have been studied for some other domains like ancillary services of a repeatedly sold core
product (e.g., additional baggage for airline tickets) (Wang, Dada and Sahin, 2019) or
professional Software-as-a-Service offerings (where, importantly, subscriptions provide
scalable hardware while buy options do not, and utilities take a very different form than
for consumer software) (Rohitratana and Altmann, 2012). Chawla et al. (2016) effectively
studied a kind of subscription service with a free trial period for software products, but
they restricted themselves to a single user type and evaluated their mechanism compared
to extracting all expected value from the user.
Contrasting product differentiation stands price discrimination (Varian, 1989, Blat-
tberg and Wisniewski, 1989, Gallego et al., 2006), where different users get offered the
same product at different prices. Variance-based pricing lies at the intersection of these
two concepts: while all users seemingly get offered the same product at different prices,
the differences in provisioning costs caused by different user behavior mean that, from the
provider’s perspective, each user can be seen as obtaining a different product. Other ap-
proaches for dealing with varying demand include dynamic pricing and congestion-based
pricing (Muratori and Rizzoni, 2015, Rong, Qin and An, 2018, Truong-Huu and Tham,
2014). These approaches focus on flattening demand peaks. A big downside is that these
pricing rules make it unpredictable for users whether they can obtain the product at a
given price when they need it. This puts providers who serve risk-averse users or users
with relatively uniform but inelastic demand at a competitive disadvantage.
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In difference to the other research questions, improving cluster admission policies
is not primarily a question of pricing or revenue management, but of scheduling and
matching users to hardware (Ashlagi et al., 2019, Ma and Simchi-Levi, 2019, Behnezhad
and Reyhani, 2018, Assadi, Khanna and Li, 2017). While a lot of research has been done
on scheduling inside the cluster (Schwarzkopf et al., 2013, Verma et al., 2015, Tumanov
et al., 2016, Zhao et al., 2016) or on how multidimensional resources can be fairly divided
among deployments (Ghodsi et al., 2011, Hindman et al., 2011), the admission problem
has not been well studied before.
1.4 Publications Contained in This Thesis
This thesis consists of four papers, each addressing one of the research questions. This
section restates the research questions and provides a list of the papers that address the
respective research question.
Research Question 1 When can a provider utilize a spot market of idle capacity to
increase her profit?
Publications
• Cloud Pricing: The Spot Market Strikes Back, Ludwig Dierks and Sven
Seuken, Forthcoming in Management Science; previously appeared as an extended
abstract in the Proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Economics and Com-
putation, 2019.
Research Question 2 How can cluster admission policies be improved to take the
scaling behavior of active deployments into account?
Publications
• On the cluster admission problem for cloud computing, Ludwig Dierks,
Ian Kash and Sven Seuken, Working Paper, 2020; previously appeared as a 6-page
extended abstract in the Proceedings of the 14th Workshop on the Economics of
Networks (NetEcon’19), 2019.
Research Question 3 Is variance-based pricing viable in competitive settings?
Publications
• The Competitive Effects of Variance-based Pricing, Ludwig Dierks and
Sven Seuken, Working Paper, 2020; an early version previously appeared in the
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intel-
ligence (IJCAI’20), 2020.
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Research Question 4 Can a software publisher increase his revenue by offering sub-
scription licenses alongside, or instead of, perpetual licenses.
Publications
• Revenue Maximization for Consumer Software: Subscription or Perpet-
ual License?, Ludwig Dierks and Sven Seuken, Working Paper, 2020.
1.5 Summary of Contributions
This section provides a brief summary of all four papers and explains how they answer
the four research questions.
1.5.1 Cloud Pricing: The Spot Market Strikes Back
The first paper (Chapter 2) treats the first research question and provides a mild and
easy-to-check condition under which a provider can increase her profit by offering a spot
market.
To arrive at this result, I combine methods from queuing theory and game theory to
analyze the equilibrium behavior of the users. I model the spot and fixed-price markets
as distinct queues that arriving users can choose from, a modeling framework well studied
for classical service systems (Hassin and Haviv, 2003, Hassin, 2016, Banerjee, Riquelme
and Johari, 2015) and previously applied to cloud computing (Abhishek, Kash and Key,
2012, 2017, Gao, Iyer and Topaloglu, 2019).
In contrast to prior work, I specifically model all costs of the provider and the users
that are required to perform a profit analysis. In my model, I assume that the provider
incurs fixed costs for each instance in the fixed-price market and therefore only offers a
finite number of fixed-price instances. For the spot market, I assume that the provider
has a finite number of instances that she can offer without incurring any fixed costs (since
she uses existing idle instances). For my main results, I assume that the provider takes
those spot instances from a pool of idle resources that is distinct from the fixed-price
instances (e.g., she instead takes them from long-term reserved instances, maintenance
capacity, etc.), though I also show how the results translate to providers who want to
use idle fixed-price instances (instead of some other, distinct pool of idle instances) for
their spot market. For any instance (in the fixed-price or spot market), I assume that
the provider incurs load-dependent costs whenever a job is running on it. Furthermore,
I assume that a user has costs for waiting until his job is completed. Thus, his payoff
consists of his value for job completion minus his incurred waiting cost and payment.
Importantly, the model also includes preemption costs that a user incurs when his job is
preempted. This takes the form of additional time required for the user’s computation to
again reach the point at which his job was preempted.
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On the way towards answering the first research question, I first provide a full
characterization of the user equilibria, i.e., I show how users will react depending on
the provider’s strategy. Any user equilibrium can be classified as one of four distinct
types. In addition to equilibria where all users join the fixed-price market or all users
join the spot market, there are two types of equilibria where users join both types of
markets. These “hybrid equilibria” differ in whether the spot market is inherently faster
or slower than the fixed-price market for users who submit a very high bid. I then give a
characterization for which equilibrium a given provider strategy will result in based on
how congested a “pure” spot market (i.e., without offering a fixed-price market) would
be in relation to the chosen price in the fixed-price market.
With this equilibrium analysis in hand, I then derive a lower bound on the fixed-costs
a provider saves when users move from the fixed-price to the spot market. Additionally,
I upper bound the average time jobs require to run in the spot market, including time
lost through preemptions. This bound makes use of the fact that, perhaps counter to
intuition, users in the spot market can on average not be preempted more than once by
another user. Given these two bounds, I then derive the central condition under which
any provider who only offers a fixed-price market can increase her profit by also offering
some of her idle instances on a spot market. Additionally, I show that a profit increase
can always be combined with a Pareto improvement for the users. Informally, this
condition requires that the idle capacity used for the spot market has to be sufficiently
reliably idle and individual preemptions have to be sufficiently inexpensive compared
to the ratio between fixed and load-dependent costs. Finally I illustrate the theoretical
results through numerical examples that show the potential of sizable profit gains when
offering spot markets.
In practice, these results can provide managerial guidance for cloud providers, in
particular because the condition is easy to check and does not contain any queuing
theoretic formulas. It is also mild enough to be satisfied for most cloud providers.
1.5.2 On the cluster admission problem for cloud computing
The second paper (Chapter 3) treats the second research question and provides new
heuristic policies that cloud providers can employ to increase cluster utilization.
To derive these policies, I formalize the cluster admission problem as a constrained
Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) (Smallwood and Sondik, 1973)
where each deployment behaves according to some stochastic process and the cluster
tries to maximize the number of active compute cores without exceeding its capacity.
Since the exact stochastic processes of individual arriving deployments are not known to
the cluster, it has to reason about the observed behavior. Because optimally solving this
POMDP is not feasible, I next propose a strategy for constructing heuristic policies via a
series of carefully chosen simplifying assumptions. These assumptions reduce the highly
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branching look-ahead space for the POMDP down to the approximation of a random
variable using its moments. I then present the currently used threshold policy that
does not take probabilistic information into account as well as two new policies. These
new policies continuously refine their belief about the types of deployments currently in
the cluster. When deciding whether a new deployment can be admitted, these policies
utilize tail bounds to take successively higher moments of each deployment’s stochastic
processes into account. While the first policy approximates the risk of running over
capacity using only the first moments (i.e., the expected values) of the processes with
Markov’s inequality, the second policy also takes the second moments (i.e., the variances)
into account and to that end employs Cantelli’s inequality, a one-sided refinement of
Chebyshev’s inequality.
To evaluate the impact of these policies, I fit a model to data from a real-world cloud
computing center (Microsoft Azure internal jobs (Cortez et al., 2017)). Via simulations, I
show that the higher moment policies produce a 30% improvement over current practice,
which would translate to hundreds of millions of dollars a year in savings for large cloud
providers.
As relatively little is known about arriving deployments, the observed performance
gains from the more sophisticated policies are mainly driven by taking information about
the current state of the cluster into account. I next examine how the utilization of
the cluster can be further increased if more precise prior information about arriving
deployments is available. To study the value of prior information, I introduce a simple
framework to express the quality of information available in the form of samples from
the true distributions underlying the deployment’s stochastic processes. Through addi-
tional simulations, I quantify how the policies benefit from this additional information.
Depending on the quality of information available, I find that the resulting gains increase
to 50%− 65% relative to current practice.
Finally, given the importance of the quality of this information, I design a new
information elicitation mechanism. The goal of this mechanism is to improve the
cluster’s utilization without requiring undue sophistication from the users. Users in cloud
computing value simple and predictable pricing schemes. Requiring them to carry the
risk of accidental misclassification or “unlikely” realizations goes against the very idea
of simple cloud markets. Additionally, many users do not fully know the behavioral
distributions of their own deployments. This makes using classic elicitation schemes such
as scoring rules (Gneiting and Raftery, 2007) that are based on the report of behavioral
distributions infeasible. Instead of explicitly asking users to describe the behavior of
their deployments, I propose that cloud providers provide them with the opportunity to
group their deployments into user-defined categories, each consisting of deployments with
broadly similar characteristics. The cloud provider then takes on the task of estimating
the behavior of each category for his admission policy and sets a small portion of the fee
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for a deployment based on the variance of resource demands of deployments in a category.
I show that such variance-based pricing provides users with the right incentives to (a)
label their deployments properly (into, e.g., high and low variance deployments) and (b)
structure their workloads in a way that helps the cluster run more efficiently. I lastly
provide some additional simulations to quantify the benefits of an accurate labeling.
1.5.3 The Competitive Effects of Variance-based Pricing
The third paper (Chapter 4) treats the third research question and shows that introducing
variance-based pricing typically constitutes a competitive advantage, even when no
elicitation effects are taken into account.
To show this, I analyze a duopoly of providers who compete for a continuum of user
types with stochastic demand. An important particularity of the domains I study for
this research question is that each provider has to always provision enough resources to
satisfy the total demand of his users with high probability. To keep the model concise,
this is abstractly modeled through cost functions that are monotonically increasing in the
demand variance of the respective provider’s users. For domains with roughly constant
long-term user bases and providers that are interested in their long-term profit, this
is a reasonable abstraction. I assume that each provider either conservatively employs
constant per-unit prices or is willing to innovate and employ per-unit prices that linearly
depend on each user’s variance. I only consider linear prices because their simplicity
makes them most plausible and marketable in practice.
I first analyze the Bayes-Nash equilibria when both providers are conservative and
only charge constant prices. In this case, the problem becomes similar to a classic
Bertrand competition and the provider that is more cost efficient for the whole set of user
types can extract the cost difference to the second provider as profit. I then show that,
as long as the cost functions of both providers are reasonably close, unilaterally switching
to variance-based pricing can be used to obtain a higher profit. While no Bayes-Nash
equilibria exist in this case, as one of the two providers always has an advantageous
deviation, the innovating provider can typically “force” the conservative provider to react
in a way that results in higher profit for the innovator than any constant equilibrium. One
way to think about this is through the lens of Stackelberg equilibria, i.e., an equilibrium
concept where one provider, the leader, first commits to a strategy and the other provider,
the follower, then reacts with his own strategy. Under some mild cost conditions and
assuming the other provider only plays constant strategies, I show that there always
exists a Stackelberg equilibrium where the leader innovates to variance-based prices and
obtains higher profit than he could obtain when playing constant pricing strategies. If
the other provider is willing to also employ variance-based pricing, I show that, as long as
splitting a provider’s population of users between symmetric copies of the same provider
would strictly increase costs, well chosen variance-based prices will not lead to less profit
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than constant prices. But as an innovative provider now loses much of the power his
larger strategy space gave him against a purely conservative provider, a strict profit
increase can no longer be guaranteed. For example, the provider cannot achieve non-zero
profit when both providers have the same cost function.
I then characterize all Bayes-Nash equilibria that arise if both providers employ
variance-based pricing. As long as providers are not symmetric in their cost functions, the
profits of both providers here often increase, as they can specifically attract user types
that they can better serve due to their respective cost functions. Finally, I show that the
social welfare of the market may decrease if only one provider employs variance-based
pricing, but that it at least weakly increases over the constant price equilibria if both
employ variance-based pricing. Overall, this work shows that variance-based pricing is
a viable approach in most competitive settings and I recommend providers to further
explore it as an option for their markets.
1.5.4 Revenue Maximization for Consumer Software: Subscription or
Perpetual License?
The fourth paper (Chapter 5) treats the fourth research question and shows that offering
subscription licenses alongside classical perpetual licenses can typically be used to increase
a software publisher’s revenue.
There are a few important particularities of the domain that have to be taken into
account when trying to show the revenue potential of subscription licenses. Software as a
purely digital good neither has a limited stock nor marginal costs. Instead, the quality
of the product in the eyes of users continuously decays (Mao et al., 2018) and any user
might separately lose interest at some point. Additionally, optional paid upgrades3 are
often employed to counteract this relative quality decay and rekindle lost interest.
To properly take account of these particularities, I introduce a tailor-made model that
takes the form of a two-step game. In the first step, the publisher chooses his pricing
strategy, setting the prices of perpetual licenses for his product and one upgrade, as well
as the per-timestep price of subscription licenses. Given these prices, the users then act
inside a discrete time sub-game where they dynamically arrive over time. While each
user arrives with demand for the product, he has a certain chance of losing this demand
over time. Losing demand sets the user’s future utility for having access to the product
to zero. Once a user has lost demand, only the release of a new upgrade has a chance
to rekindle his interest. Additionally, the value of the product in the eyes of each user
decays with a user-dependent rate over time. For this sub-game, I show that there are
only five distinct classes of user equilibrium strategies, which significantly aids in our
analysis. Based on this, I derive the publisher’s revenue as a function of his pricing
strategy and show that only offering a subscription option can never be optimal, though
3In the domain of video games, such upgrades are typically called “downloadable content” (DLC).
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it can be far better than only offering perpetual licenses.
To get an impression of the impact we can expect in practice, I then turn to a data
trace consisting of price, ownership and activity data from the domain of video games.
This data was obtained from the website Steam Spy 4, which collects publicly available
data from the large video game storefront Steam5 and uses it to statistically estimate
the number of owners of video games over time and what percentage of them actively
used the game recently (i.e., in the last two weeks). As this data does not contain any
information about user preferences or users that did not buy the product, it unfortunately
does not allow us to directly validate our model. As even the available information is
somewhat unreliable, I chose not to directly fit the model to the data for any single
game. I instead use the dataset to inform a reasonable generic parametrization. I then
numerically compare offering the different license types for this parametrization and find
that while subscription licenses slightly outperform perpetual licenses, but are in turn
significantly outperformed by offering both types of licenses.
Performing comparative statics starting from this generic parametrization, I then
show that as long as there is sufficient heterogeneity in the expected time until users
lose interest, offering both types of licenses can lead to revenue increases between 10%
and 40% for the provider. Importantly though, this is not mainly achieved by attracting
additional users. Instead, the additional revenue is to a large part the result of better
utility extraction from users through product discrimination. When offering both types
of licenses, the provider can charge a higher buy price from long-term users, because
users that only expect to use the product for a short time can switch to subscribing. If no
subscription licenses are offered, such higher prices instead would lead to short-term users
not obtaining the product at all. Typically, the social welfare of the system consequently
slightly decreases when offering both licenses with revenue optimal prices. That said, if
the publisher desires, I show that a modest revenue increase over only offering perpetual
licenses can typically be achieved without decreasing the utility of any user.
1.6 Conclusion and Future Work
Modern digital markets all have distinct traits and interactions with the underlying
technological systems that often make classic economic approaches suboptimal. Instead,
a rigorous analysis of these markets is required to find tailored strategies that can realize
their full potential. In this thesis, I have analyzed two modern digital markets: cloud
computing and software markets. I have shown some of the inefficiencies inherent to
current practices and proposed new approaches to alleviate them. For cloud computing,
I have shown that offering a spot market of idle capacity can be used to increase a




based pricing rules, can greatly increase the utilization of a cloud computing center.
Additionally, I have shown that variance-based pricing rules are a viable strategy in
competitive settings with long-term provisioning costs such as cloud computing markets.
Lastly, for software markets, I have shown that software publishers can typically utilize
subscription licenses to greatly increase their revenue.
Future Work
I see a number of promising future research threads in both domains. First, in cloud
computing, it would be interesting to compare dynamically priced secondary spot markets
to alternatively offering a secondary fixed-price market. Such a secondary fixed-price
market would offer instances at a lower price than the primary market and also include
preemptions when the instance is required for it’s primary purpose. While this would
produce less profit than a spot market when preemptions are completely lossless, the
higher rate of preemptions in spot markets might mean that it is still desirable in practice.
It would be very interesting to derive a condition for when either type of market produces
higher profit, though the required queuing theoretic formulas are highly complex. Further
simplifying assumptions compared to the model I employed to analyze spot markets in
this thesis might therefore be required.
A second interesting question in cloud computing would be to extend the analysis
of the cluster admission problem to the more general cluster assignment problem, i.e.,
the question to which of multiple clusters an arriving deployment should be assigned.
The work included in this thesis implicitly assumes that each cluster employs the same
admission policy and gets sent deployments from the same population mix of deployments.
While this is consistent with industry practice, optimizing over multiple clusters at the
same time might yield even better results. As finding optimal cluster admission policies
is already infeasible, there is little hope to optimally solve the cluster assignment problem.
But this does not preclude further advances over the status quo. In an ongoing project
with Jacob LaRiviere, Ishai Menache, Aadharsh Kannan and Thomas Moscibroda from
Microsoft I am already investigating whether dedicating different clusters to different
sub-populations of deployments could improve the achievable utilization. Even with
simple threshold policies, we find gains of up to 10% over only employing a single type of
cluster.
For software markets, there are also a number of interesting future research directions.
While I have looked at a first monetization scheme for consumer software markets in this
thesis, this barely scratches the surface of this domain. Among the many monetization
schemes that recently appeared in practice, few have gotten much attention from market
designers. One particularly interesting direction would be to analyze the incentive
structure and revenue implications of bundled subscription services such as Microsoft’s
Xbox Game Pass or Sony’s Playstation Now. Similarly to music or video streaming
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platforms, bundled software subscriptions allow users to pay a small monthly fee and
obtain access to a constantly changing library of titles, often from multiple publishers.
While the advantages for users are relatively apparent, it is less clear under what
circumstances it is in a publisher’s interest to add their product to such a service and
what the resulting equilibria are. It would be especially interesting to see how the
widespread adoption of subscription services changes the value proposition of products
not sold on it, i.e., whether it would lead to an increase or decrease in equilibrium prices
for these products.
Another interesting question in the domain of consumer software markets is the effect
of microtransactions on the incentives for product design. Microtransactions effectively
split a product into a menu of smaller items. Instead of having to buy the whole product,
users can just buy the parts they value highly enough. For a given product, as long
as users are sufficiently heterogeneous, this product differentiation can yield a stark
revenue increase for the publisher. But it also influences the publishers’ incentives when
designing a new product, as design choices that enable certain types of microtransactions
might reduce the appeal for other users compared to the optimal monolithic product. A
monolithic product needs to pose a good value proposition to a relatively large part of
the user base at the same time, as they all pay the same price. A menu-based product
thus faces a quite different optimization problem. It would be interesting to formally
analyze these differences in a game-theoretic model to see how they affect social welfare in
equilibrium. As the equilibria are likely to vary greatly depending on whether a product
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Cloud computing providers must constantly hold many idle compute instances available (e.g., for maintenance,
or for users with long-term contracts). A natural idea, which should intuitively increase the provider’s profit,
is to sell these idle instances on a secondary market, for example, via a preemptible spot market. However, this
ignores possible łmarket cannibalizationž effects that may occur in equilibrium as well as the additional costs
the provider experiences due to preemptions. To study the viability of offering a spot market, we model the
provider’s profit optimization problem by combining queuing theory and game theory to analyze the equilibria
of the resulting queuing system. Our main result is an easy-to-check condition under which a provider can
simultaneously achieve a profit increase and create a Pareto improvement for the users by offering a spot
market (using idle resources) alongside a fixed-price market. Finally, we illustrate our results numerically to
demonstrate the effects the provider’s costs and her strategy have on her profit.
1 INTRODUCTION
Providers of cloud services like Amazon EC2 or Microsoft Azure rent out computing capacity
to millions of users. These cloud services generate billions of dollars in yearly revenue and the
market for these services is still growing exponentially.1 While some users enter into year-long
contracts, many prefer to obtain resources on-demand (i.e., just when they need them and without
long-term commitments). Today, on-demand compute resources (i.e., CPU, RAM, bandwidth, etc.)
are most commonly combined into compute instances (e.g., virtual machines) and rented out via
fixed-price markets. In these markets, users pay a fixed price per time unit and the provider aims to
keep enough instances available to be able to almost instantly satisfy all requests. This approach is
considered to be simple, reliable, and to satisfy the requirements of most users; it is therefore widely
used in practice.2 At the same time, all cloud computing centers always contain many idle instances:
for example, to guarantee the service level agreements of long-term contracts, for maintenance, as
fail-safe redundancy, or simply as a buffer for future growth (Yan et al. 2016). In effect, a sizable
number of instances do nothing at any given time. However, low utilization rates are inherently
undesirable, because most of the overall per-instance costs are independent of utilization (Barroso
et al. 2018). A lot of research has been done to increase these utilization rates, e.g., by allowing
advance reservation of resources (Azar et al. 2015, Babaioff et al. 2017), by predicting future usage
(Cohen et al. 2019, Cortez et al. 2017, Dierks et al. 2019, Jyothi et al. 2016) or by incentivizing users
to reduce the variance of their demand (Dierks and Seuken 2020). However, any cloud computing
center will always have a non-negligible number of idle instances.
Naturally, a cloud provider may also want to sell those idle instances; but unfortunately, they
are only łtemporarilyž idle. Whenever an instance is needed for its primary purpose (e.g., for
maintenance or for a user with a long-term contract), then the job that is currently running on the
instance must be preempted, i.e., the job is shut down. Of course, getting preempted and restarting
a job on a different instance is not lossless for a user; for example, because a new instance may
not be immediately available, because unsaved progress to completion may be lost, or because it
may require some time to reconfigure the new instance. For this reason, idle instances cannot be
∗This paper is accepted and forthcoming in Management Science. Some of the ideas presented in this paper were also
described in a one-page abstract that was published in the conference proceedings of EC’19 (Dierks and Seuken 2019).
1https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/Investor/earnings/FY-2018-Q2/press-release-webcast
2For example: https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/pricing/on-demand/ or https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/offers/pay-as-you-go/
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sold on the regular fixed-price market where users are guaranteed the continued (non-preemtible)
usage of their resources. However, researchers (e.g., Abhishek et al. (2017) and Hoy et al. (2016)) as
well as cloud providers (e.g., Amazon EC2 Spot instances and Microsoft Azure Low Priority VMs)3
have considered to instead sell the idle instances on a secondary (cheaper) market where the users
know that their jobs may be preempted. A user would use this market with the understanding that,
when his job is shut down, he can restart the job once another instance becomes available.4
Given that the supply of idle resources changes over time, łdynamic pricingž is a natural choice
for the secondary market.5 Since in any secondary market consisting of idle instances the users
have to cope with preemptions by the nature of the instances, additional preemptions caused by
dynamic pricing do not qualitatively change the user experience. We focus on dynamic pricing
that is implemented as a preemptible spot market. This means that users bid for resources and are
served whenever the current market price is lower than their bid. If the market price rises too far
while their job is running, they are preempted until the price drops again. Note that the idea of
using preemptible spot markets for unused resources is not new: similar spot markets have also
recently been proposed for the power capacity in multi-tenant data centers (Islam et al. 2018).
At first sight, it may seem obvious that the provider should offer idle instances on such a
secondary (spot) market Ð after all, these instances seem łfreež for the provider and selling them
(at essentially any price) generates revenue. However, this thinking ignores two important points.
First, putting otherwise idle instances under load causes additional load-dependent costs for the
provider, which can be much larger in a preemptible secondary market than in a non-preemptible
market. Second, it ignores possible łmarket cannibalizationž effects that may occur in equilibrium,
i.e., that users may choose to move from the more expensive fixed-price market to the cheaper spot
market. Indeed, Abhishek et al. (2017) have shown that certain cannibalization effects can occur,
at least in terms of revenue. Intuitively, market cannibalization becomes particularly problematic
when the preemption costs on the spot market are large (i.e., when the users get preempted often
and need to re-run large parts of their jobs), because then most users are only willing to pay very
little for joining the spot market.
In this paper, we ask the following research question: when can a cloud provider offer a spot market
in addition to a fixed-price market to increase her profit? Note that a provider trying to maximize
her profit faces two basic questions: (1) what price should she ask for instances in the fixed-price
market, and (2) how many (possibly zero) spot instances should she offer? Her profit then depends
on the users’ actions, given the offered markets. To answer our research question, we combine
queuing theory and game theory to analyze the equilibrium behavior of the users. We model the
two different markets as distinct queues that arriving users can choose from, a modeling framework
well studied for classical service systems (Banerjee et al. 2015, Hassin 2016, Hassin and Haviv 2003)
and previously applied to cloud computing (Abhishek et al. 2012, 2017, Gao et al. 2019). While such
a queueing-theoretic approach is not the only viable approach to model cloud markets (Hoy et al.
2016, Kash and Key 2016, Zhang et al. 2016), it is particularly well suited to model the temporal
nature of users continuously arriving and departing.
In contrast to prior work, we present a significantly more realistic model for the cloud domain
that also captures all relevant costs of the provider and the users (Section 3), enabling us to perform
3See https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/spot/ and https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/batch/. Note that, Agmon
Ben-Yehuda et al. (2013) collected evidence, suggesting that, at some point, the EC2 spot market (despite its name) may not
actually have used real spot pricing.
4To distinguish the provider from the users, we use łshe/herž when referring to the provider and łhe/hisž for a user.
5Note that there are alternative pricing mechanisms for the secondary market that are also plausible. For example, the
secondary market could also use fixed prices and this would likely increase the provider’s profit as well. Future work should
compare the two alternatives; but before we can do so, we first need to analyze the spot market case.
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a profit analysis. First, we assume that the provider incurs fixed costs for each instance in the
fixed-price market and therefore only offers a finite number of fixed-price instances. For the spot
market, we assume that the provider has a finite number of instances that she can offer without
incurring any fixed costs (since she uses existing idle instances). We assume that the provider takes
those spot instances from a pool of idle resources that is distinct from the fixed-price instances (e.g.,
long-term reserved instances, maintenance capacity, etc.). For most large cloud providers, a sizable
pool of such instances exists (Yan et al. 2016), and these instances are more łreliably idlež than most
instances on the fixed-price market.6 We assume that, for any instance (in the fixed-price or spot
market), the provider incurs load-dependent costs whenever a job is running on it. Furthermore, we
assume that a user has costs for waiting until his job is completed. Thus, his payoff consists of his
value for job completion minus his incurred waiting cost and payment. Importantly, our model
also includes preemption costs that a user incurs when his job is preempted. This takes the form of
additional time required for the user’s computation to again reach the point at which his job was
preempted.
On the way towards answering our research question, we first provide a full characterization of
the resulting user equilibria depending on the provider’s strategy (Section 4). Our main result is a
condition (see Definition 5.3 in Section 5.2) under which any provider who only offers a fixed-price
market can increase her profit and simultaneously create a Pareto improvement for the users by
also offering some of her idle instances on a spot market (Sections 5.1 and 5.2).7
In practice, our results can provide managerial guidance for cloud providers, in particular because
our condition is easy to check (Section 5.3). Our condition is also mild enough to be satisfied for
most cloud providers. Furthermore, we discuss how a cloud provider may increase her profit even
if she is unable to compute her optimal strategy.
To illustrate our theoretical results, we numerically calculate equilibria for multiple examples
where users arrive according to a Poisson process and require exponentially distributed service
times (Section 6). We use these examples to study the effect that different cost structures have on
the profitability of offering a spot market, and how the provider’s strategy impacts her profit. In
particular, we illustrate our main result, i.e., how a profit increase can be combined with a Pareto
improvement for the users. Further, we show that even under relatively pessimistic conditions for
a spot market, sizeable profit increases can still be attainable.
2 RELATED WORK
Offering a spot market is a form of product differentiation (Desai 2001, Maskin and Riley 1984,
Shaked and Sutton 1982), where a provider offers differentiated products to appeal to different users.
This contrasts with standard price discrimination, where typically identical or very similar products
are sold at varying prices (Varian 1989). In their seminal paper on product differentiation, (Mussa
and Rosen 1978) first formalized the relationship between prices and a user’s obtained quality level,
similar to results (Myerson 1981) later obtained for optimal auctions. For posted price mechanisms,
(Mussa and Rosen 1978) further showed that optimal pricing policies can result in the segmentation
of users into some segments where all users obtain the same product (as in our fixed-price market),
while for all other users (who do not balk), the obtained product quality increases monotonically in
6In Appendix D, we provide intuition for why the fixed-price market, even if it is large, might not have a lot of reliably idle
instances. In D, we also show how our results translate to providers who nevertheless want to use idle fixed-price instances
(instead of some other, distinct pool of idle instances) for their spot market.
7The ability to combine the profit increase with a Pareto improvement for the users is particularly important in practice,
where the competition between providers like Google, Microsoft, or Amazon is fierce. Thus, any strategy for increasing a
provider’s profits must guarantee that users are not worse off than before to ensure that they do not migrate to competing
providers.
Ludwig Dierks and Sven Seuken 4
their type (as in our spot market). (Moorthy 1984) later extended the model of (Mussa and Rosen
1978) to non-linear user preferences (for discrete user types), showing that limiting the number of
offered quality levels is often profit-optimal. These classic product differentiation papers give hope
that offering a spot market alongside a fixed-price market may be profit increasing in some cases.
However, because their analysis only considers simple posted price mechanisms (where users have
no direct effect on each other) it does not apply to our cloud computing setting where users’ actions
have more complicated effects. In our problem, the values of the users for łobtaining a productž (i.e.,
running a job in a particular market) are not fixed but depend on the user equilibrium. Furthermore,
the costs of the provider for offering a product are also not fixed but again depend on the user
equilibrium. This is why we need to combine queuing theory and game theory (see, e.g., Hassin and
Haviv (2003)) to answer the question when offering a spot market increases profits. An example
of combining these techniques for revenue management is the work by Afèche (2013), who used
a single server queue to show that it is often revenue optimal to introduce artificial delays when
selling a product to time sensitive customers.
The work most related to ours is (Abhishek et al. 2012, 2017), who like us study cloud computing
markets. Interestingly, the authors found that offering a spot market often decreases the provider’s
revenue. However, this does not contradict our results: their model was tailored towards a revenue
analysis and therefore could assume an infinite number of fixed-price instances and did not need to
model the provider’s costs. Given this, they could not make any statements about profits. Gao et al.
(2019) used a similar modeling approach to study the competition between two firms, where one
firm only offers a fixed-price market of fixed finite size (i.e., that is not necessarily large enough for
demand) while the other firm only offers a spot market.
Recently, a series of papers has studied the problem of selling resources throughmore complicated
auction and pricing mechanisms that take individual requirements of jobs into account, including
deadlines (Zhou et al. 2017), multi-dimensional resource requirements (Shi et al. 2014, Zhang et al.
2014), and the provider’s opportunity cost for scheduling a given job (Boodaghians et al. 2019, Kash
et al. 2017). However, in contrast to our model, these papers do not consider the following important
business constraint: in practice, any provider who wants to keep her market share must also offer a
non-preemptible fixed-price market alongside any other offerings, because many users want access
to a fixed-price market. Furthermore, most of the prior work on cloud spot markets (including
the papers cited above) do not consider the users’ preemption costs. However, preemption costs
are an important factor to analyze the profitability of the spot market, and previous authors (e.g.,
Subramanya et al. (2016)) have even argued that spot markets may become too unattractive once
they become congested. However, we show that the costs incurred due to preemption are bounded,
such that even congested spot markets remain attractive for the provider.
3 MODEL
In this section, we introduce our model. Before starting with the formal definitions, we provide
some brief intuition for our framework. To analyze the profit a cloud provider obtains from running
the different markets, we need to consider how her decisions affect the actions of potential users.
To this end, we define a two-step model that is reminiscent of a Stackelberg game (Maharjan et al.
2013) with an important difference. As in a Stackelberg game, in a first step, the cloud provider
chooses her actions (i.e., what markets to offer). This defines the parameters of the game the users
will play in the next step. In the second step, with the provider’s strategy fixed, the users then play
the resulting game only with each other; i.e., they decide which market to join and potentially
what to bid. In contrast to a Stackelberg game, the sub-game in the second step takes the form
of a queuing system in steady state and therefore has no fixed set of users. Instead, users with
certain parameters continuously arrive and depart. We assume that the users act rationally; thus,
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the provider’s strategies can be fully analyzed by backwards induction from the equilibria of the
steady state of the queuing system.
Remark. As we analyze the queuing system in steady state, our model works directly on the
stochastic processes and not on individual realizations. Thus, all outcomes of interest, such as the
provider’s profit or the users’ waiting times and payments (which we will introduce in the next sections),
are always łin expectation,ž even if we do not always explicitly denote them accordingly.
The remainder of this section is structured as follows: First we introduce the models for the
provider (Section 3.1) and for the users (Section 3.2). Then we present the models for how the
fixed-price and spot markets work in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, respectively.
3.1 Provider Model
The type of a provider is defined by a tuple (𝜅𝐹 , 𝜅𝐿,𝑇 , 𝑙,𝜓𝐸). Here, 𝜅𝐹 denotes the fixed costs an
instance causes per time unit in the provider’s cloud computing center, i.e., the total fixed costs
the instance causes over its lifetime amortized per time unit. We can think of this as mainly
hardware, infrastructure, and maintenance costs that are independent of the actual utilization.
Conversely, 𝜅𝐿 denotes all load-dependent costs that an instance causes per time unit it is running.
This overwhelmingly consists of increased electricity costs. We call the sum of fixed and load-
depended costs the instance costs 𝜅 := 𝜅𝐹 + 𝜅𝐿 . 𝑇 is an internal SLA (Service Level Agreement) for
the fixed-price market that ensures a satisfactory quality of service. The SLA is said to be satisfied
if the expected time until a newly arriving job in the fixed-price market starts running is below 𝑇 .8
In practice, the choice of 𝑇 is influenced by many factors outside our model. We therefore assume
𝑇 to be exogenously given and not to be part of the provider’s strategy space, but our results hold
for any 𝑇 . The number of idle instances the provider has available for the spot market, and thus
the maximum number of instances she could sell on the spot market, is denoted by 𝑙 . We assume
that the provider draws these idle instances from any part of the cloud computing center (e.g.,
maintenance instances, long-term reserved instances), except from those instances offered on the
fixed-price market.9 As these instances are already part of the provider’s cloud computing center,
they do not incur fixed costs 𝜅𝐹 a second time when offered on the spot market but they still incur
load-dependent costs 𝜅𝐿 .
Since the steady state analysis is only concerned with mean service times, we do not specifically
model a process by which idle capacity becomes available and unavailable. Instead, we let any
𝑙 ′ ≤ 𝑙 denote the 𝑙 ′ idle instances with the lowest individual probabilities to become unavailable.
𝜓𝐸 (𝑙
′) then denotes the expected number of times an instance randomly selected from among these
𝑙 ′ instances becomes unavailable per time unit. Note that this makes𝜓𝐸 (𝑙
′) weakly increasing in
𝑙 ′. We set 𝜓𝐸 (0) = 0 by convention. Obviously, whenever an instance that is currently running
becomes unavailable, a user gets preempted. We call 𝜓𝐸 (𝑙
′) the number of external preemptions
because it only encompasses preemptions caused by the unreliable availability of idle instances.
In addition to this, there are internal preemptions caused by changes in the current market price
(which we introduce in Section 3.4).
8Note that the SLA can also take different shapes in practice and our model can easily be modified such that, instead of a
limit on the expected queuing time𝑇 , some threshold on the percentage of rejections has to be met. Another possibility is
to assume that users who cannot be served instantly simply do not join at all. Neither of these modifications change our
main results.
9In Appendix D, we also provide an analysis for the case where the provider instead draws the idle instances from the
fixed-price market. This introduces additional cross channel effects between both markets. Specifically, the number of
available instances for the spot market as well as the external preemptions then directly depend on the users who choose
the fixed-price market.
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The choices of the provider define the setting in which the users find themselves. A strategy
for the provider consists of a tuple 𝜌 = (𝑝𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 ). We let 𝑝𝐹 denote the price any user joining the
fixed-price market has to pay per time unit his job is running. 𝑙𝑆 < 𝑙 is the number of instances
the provider decides to offer on the spot market.10 𝑙𝑆 = 0 denotes that she decides to only offer
a fixed-price market. For simplicity, we assume that the provider does not set a reserve price for
the spot market. Introducing a reserve price would only strengthen our results as it expands the
provider’s strategy space to make the spot market more profitable.
Note that while the number of fixed-price instances 𝑙𝐹 could technically be seen as part of the
provider’s strategy, the fixed-price market must satisfy the SLA 𝑇 . This bounds the number of
fixed-price instances from below. To keep our arguments simple, we assume that the provider will
always offer the smallest number of fixed-price instances for a given user strategy profile 𝜎 (as
defined in Section 3.4) such that the SLA is satisfied, as this minimizes her costs.11 Consequently,
in our model, 𝑙𝐹 is not itself part of the provider strategy, but given as a function 𝑙𝐹 (𝜌, 𝜎) of the
provider strategy 𝜌 and user strategy profile 𝜎 .
Given provider strategy 𝜌 and user strategy profile 𝜎 , we let 𝑅𝐹 (𝜌, 𝜎) denote the revenue from all
fixed-price instances and𝐶𝐹 (𝜌, 𝜎) denote the costs from all fixed-price instances. Similarly, 𝑅𝑆 (𝜌, 𝜎)
and 𝐶𝑆 (𝜌, 𝜎) denote the revenue and cost from all spot instances. The provider’s (expected) profit
per time unit is then defined as the sum of her revenues minus her costs, i.e.,
Π(𝜌, 𝜎) := 𝑅𝐹 (𝜌, 𝜎) + 𝑅𝑆 (𝜌, 𝜎) −𝐶𝐹 (𝜌, 𝜎) −𝐶𝑆 (𝜌, 𝜎). (1)
3.2 User Model
We model the resulting game for the users, given provider strategy 𝜌 , as a queuing system. We
assume this system to be in steady state (i.e., the state probabilities do not change over time). Thus,
there is no fixed set of players, because users arrive and depart over time. This allows us to analyze
strategies for every parameter set a user’s job could have instead of having to artificially enumerate
each individual user. Queuing theory provides us with tools to analyze (a) the time a newly arriving
user has to wait until he gets to run his job and (b) his expected payment.
Formally, let there be𝑛 job classeswith fixed values 𝑣 = (𝑣1, . . . , 𝑣𝑛) for completion where 𝑣𝑖 > 𝑣𝑖+1
for all 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛 − 1}. New jobs from each class arrive sequentially according to a memoryless
arrival process.12 The arrival rates of the different job classes are 𝜆 = (𝜆1, . . . , 𝜆𝑛); i.e., in expectation,
𝜆𝑖 jobs of class 𝑖 arrive per time unit. Each individual job requires exactly one instance to run and is
associated with a distinct user. Users are only identified by the parameters of their jobs; the terms
łuserž and łjobž can thus be used interchangeably. The service time for each job (i.e., the time it
has to run on an instance assuming it is not preempted) is independently drawn according to a
distribution with expectation 1
𝜇
. To keep our expositions and proofs concise, we assume that all
classes of jobs have the same mean service time. Our main results do not require specific service
processes, as they only make use of the first moments of the distributions.13 For every job of class 𝑖
that arrives, a waiting cost 𝑐 is independently and privately drawn from a distribution 𝐹𝑖 (𝑐). This
10To keep the exposition simple and avoid special handling of corner cases, our formal model allows fractional instances (in
both markets). As the cost of a single instance is negligible in realistic settings, this is a reasonable abstraction.
11Note that in practice, cloud providers can approximately follow such a cost minimization strategy because of the high
turn-over rate of their hardware.
12This assumption is natural, especially for large cloud computing centers, and is supported by empirical studies (Zaharia
et al. 2010, Zheng et al. 2016).
13The queuing theory literature often denotes this combination of memoryless arrival and general (independent) service
processes as M/GI/łnumber of instancesž.
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distribution has a strictly positive PDF 𝑓𝑖 (𝑐) on [0, 𝜇𝑣𝑖 ].
14 The waiting cost is incurred once per
time unit until job completion. Every time a job is preempted, its user further incurs preemption
costs in the form of an additional expected time loss 𝜏 . Concretely, this means that the expected
payoff of a user with waiting cost 𝑐 decreases by 𝑐𝜏 for every expected preemption. Again, to keep
the proofs concise, we assume that 𝜏 is independent of the job class. Note that when 𝜏𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 ) ≥ 1,
then the time loss due to preemption per time unit is larger than one time unit (during which the
job can again be preempted), such that (in expectation) the job will need an infinite amount of time
to run to completion. Since that would trivially make offering a spot market of size 𝑙𝑆 meaningless
(as no user ever joins), we assume w.l.o.g. 𝜏𝜓𝐸 (𝑙) < 1 (recall that 𝑙 denotes the maximum number
of spot instances the provider can offer). As is common in queuing theory, we assume that each job
is infinitesimally small and does not affect the system dynamics on its own. We call the tuple of
exogenous parameters and functions (𝑛, 𝑣, 𝜆, 𝜇, 𝐹 , 𝜏, 𝜅𝐹 , 𝜅𝐿,𝑇 , 𝑙,𝜓𝐸) a setting. The setting is assumed
to be fixed and known by the provider and all users.
For any single user, a possible strategy consists of the tuple (𝛼, 𝛽). 𝛼 ∈ {F ,S,B} represents
the decision whether to join the fixed-price market F , the spot market S or to balk B (i.e., not
to join any market and obtain zero payoff). To simplify notation, we assume that the action S is
equivalent to balking when there is no spot market, i.e., when the provider sets 𝑙𝑆 = 0. Further, any
user submits a bid 𝛽 for the spot market (which, if he joins the spot market, determines how quickly
he gets an instance and how much he has to pay). For users who do not join the spot market, this
bid has no effect, and thus, w.l.o.g., is set to be equal to their waiting cost 𝑐 . The current state of
the queues (i.e., which other users are currently in the system) is unobservable for users and thus
cannot influence their strategies. A strategy profile 𝜎 encodes the strategies for any possible user.
It consists of functions 𝜎𝑖 : [0, 𝜇𝑣𝑖 ] → {F ,S,B} × R, one for each class of jobs 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛}, that
map waiting costs 𝑐 to strategies (𝛼, 𝛽). Whenever a provider strategy 𝜌 is given, a strategy profile
with an asterisk (i.e., 𝜎∗) denotes a corresponding equilibrium strategy profile for the users.
For any user, we now denote by 𝑞(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎) the expected queuing time (i.e., the time he spends in
a queue without running his job on an instance) when he plays strategy (𝛼, 𝛽), assuming provider
strategy 𝜌 and that all other users play according to the strategy profile 𝜎 . By 𝑟 (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎) we
denote the expected running time a user requires, i.e., the total time the user’s job has to run on
an instance until completion. 𝑟 (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎) is the sum of the user’s łnormalž service time 1
𝜇
and the
additional time his job requires because of preemptions. The expected total waiting time until job
completion is the sum of queuing time and running time:𝑤 (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎) := 𝑞(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎) + 𝑟 (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎).
The user has to pay some amount of money for using an instance. We denote this expected payment
𝑚(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎). Overall, the expected payoff for a user of class 𝑖 with waiting cost 𝑐 is then given by
𝜋𝑐𝑖 (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎) := 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑐𝑤 (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎) −𝑚(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎) for joining a market, and zero for balking.
Remark. Our motivation for the notational separation of the 6 parameters of the payoff function
𝜋𝑐𝑖 (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎) is as follows. The parameters 𝑖 and 𝑐 fully identify an individual user, where 𝑖 denote this
user’s job class and 𝑐 denotes this user’s realized waiting cost. The remaining parameters (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎)
all represent strategies.
3.3 Fixed-price Market andQueue
The fixed-price market consists of a queuing system where users pay a fixed price 𝑝𝐹 for every




users do not get preempted in the fixed-price market, their running time is equal to their service
time, i.e., 𝑟 (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎) = 1
𝜇
. In contrast to Abhishek et al. (2017), we assume that sometimes, users
14Note that jobs with waiting costs 𝑐 > 𝜇𝑣𝑖 could only ever expect a negative payoff, even if they run instantly and pay
nothing, and thus do not have to be considered.
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have to wait until their job finds a free instance and begins running, leading to a short (expected)
queuing time 𝑇 > 0 .15 Recall that 𝑇 is the SLA, which is given exogenously.
Remark. An (expected) queuing time of𝑇 = 0 is not attainable with any finite number of instances.
An infinite number of instances would not be realistic and makes any profit analysis meaningless, as
the costs would also be infinite.
The expected payoff of a user of class 𝑖 with waiting cost 𝑐 that joins the fixed-price market is
thus equal to:
𝜋𝑐𝑖 (F , 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎) = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑐𝑤 (F , 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎) −𝑚(F , 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎) (2)







Note that, in the fixed-price market, the user’s payoff (i.e., Equation (3)) is independent of the
actions of other users because it only depends on the provider’s choice for the price 𝑝𝐹 .
The provider’s revenue 𝑅𝐹 (𝜌, 𝜎) in the fixed-price market is straightforwardly given by the
arrival rate of users into the market, while the costs 𝐶𝐹 (𝜌, 𝜎) additionally depend on how many
instances she has to offer in order to guarantee the SLA 𝑇 :





















+ 𝜅𝐹 𝑙𝐹 (𝜌, 𝜎) (5)
3.4 Spot Market andQueue
Following Abhishek et al. (2017), we model the spot market as a preemptible priority queue where
both payments and the order in which jobs are run depend on the users’ bids. The preemptible
priority queue consists of 𝑙𝑆 instances, running jobs in a priority-based order, where 𝑙𝑆 is set as
part of the provider’s strategy. A job’s priority is set by the bid given on arrival. A running job
may be preempted for two different reasons. First, the job may be outbid by a job with a higher
bid (internal preemption). Second, the instance the job is running on may become unavailable for
some exogenous reason (like the instance being required for its primary purpose), independent of
the job’s priority (external preemption). The expected number of external preemptions per time
unit𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 ) is independent of bids or other users and only depends on the provider’s strategy. In
contrast, how often a user’s job gets internally preempted depends on the arrival rate of users
with higher bids. We let𝜓𝐼 (𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) denote the expected number of times a user with bid 𝑐 in the
spot market gets internally preempted, i.e., outbid by other users during a time unit. Note that
𝜓𝐼 is fully determined by the queuing model and thus, in contrast to 𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 ), it is not part of the
setting. To summarize, a user’s running time also depends on how often he gets preempted and
how much time he loses with each preemption. The following proposition formally shows all of
these dependencies.
Proposition 3.1. A user’s running time with bid 𝑐 is





1−𝜏 (𝜓𝐼 (𝑐,𝜌,𝜎)+𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 ))
for 𝜏 (𝜓𝐼 (𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) +𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 )) < 1
∞ otherwise
(6)
15Note that it does not influence the equilibrium structure nor our results that jobs are queued and serviced in a first-come,
first-served order. The same results are obtained if users instead continuously resubmit their jobs until they get a free
instance (and are therefore effectively served in random order), because the expected service time would be the same.
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Proof. During any time unit where his job is running, a user is on average preempted (𝜓𝐼 (𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎)+
𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 )) times, causing him to require an additional running time of 𝜏 (𝜓𝐼 (𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) +𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 )). During
this additional running time he is then on average again preempted 𝜏 (𝜓𝐼 (𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) +𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 )) times.




















1−𝜏 (𝜓𝐼 (𝑐,𝜌,𝜎)+𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 ))




Note that in any equilibrium, the running time of all jobs is trivially finite. Going forward, we
can therefore safely ignore the case 𝜏 (𝜓𝐼 (𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) +𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 )) ≥ 1. A user’s expected total waiting time
when joining the spot market is therefore given by




1 − 𝜏 (𝜓𝐼 (𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) +𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 ))
. (9)
Payments in the spot market are set according to some spot market mechanism which we do not
explicitly model, as we are only interested in the expected payment in equilibrium. Abhishek et al.
(2017) showed that it suffices to analyze a Bayes Nash Incentive Compatible (BNIC) spot market
mechanism for which a user’s bid 𝛽 only consists of a revelation of its true waiting cost 𝑐 , i.e. 𝛽 = 𝑐 .
In the following, we therefore use the terms bid, waiting cost and priority interchangeably.
From Lemma 5 of Abhishek et al. (2017), which is an adaptation of Myerson’s famous Lemma
(Myerson 1981) to spot markets, we know that for any BNIC market mechanism employed in the
spot market, the expected payment has to be:
𝑚(S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) =
∫ 𝑐
0
𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝑑𝑥 − 𝑐𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) (10)
We always assume that the provider employs a market mechanism whose payment rule for the
spot market satisfies Equation (10). With such a payment rule, each user has to pay the difference
between the overall cost caused by waiting he would incur at the mean waiting time of lower bids
and the cost he incurs with his bid.
The total waiting time and the expected payment thus both depend on the number of users
joining the spot market as determined by the strategy 𝜎 . For any user of class 𝑖 with waiting cost 𝑐
who joins the spot market the expected payoff can now be formulated as:




𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝑑𝑥. (12)
The provider’s revenue 𝑅𝑆 (𝜌, 𝜎) from the spot market now consists of the average payments
users make. The costs 𝐶𝑆 (𝜌, 𝜎) are more complex, as a user getting preempted is also costly for the
provider, since any job that loses time through preemption effectively has a longer running time
and therefore causes more load-dependent costs. This means that the cost of the provider 𝐶𝑆 (𝜌, 𝜎)
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also depends on the number of preemptions:






𝑚(S, 𝑥, 𝜌, 𝜎) 𝑓𝑖 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥 (13)









1 − 𝜏 (𝜓𝐼 (𝑥, 𝜌, 𝜎) +𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 ))
𝑓𝑖 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥 (14)
4 EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the resulting Bayes Nash equilibria (BNEs) of the user game given
a provider strategy 𝜌 . A provider strategy can result in three basic types of equilibria: (a) pure
fixed-price equilibria, where no user joins the spot market, (b) pure spot equilibria, where no user
joins the fixed-price market and (c) real hybrid equilibria, where each market is chosen by some
users. In the following, we first individually characterize the three types of equilibria (Sections 4.1,
4.2 and 4.3). In Section 4.4, we then show how to identify the type of equilibrium in which any
given provider strategy 𝜌 would result.
4.1 Pure Fixed-price Equilibria
As we have shown in Section 3.3, the payoff of a user in the fixed-price market does not depend on
the actions of the other users. When no spot market is offered, the strategy of any user is therefore






for submitting a job
is a monotonically decreasing function of the waiting cost 𝑐 for every job class. We can therefore
easily show that all equilibrium strategy profiles take the form of threshold functions.
Proposition 4.1. For any provider strategy 𝜌 = (𝑝𝐹 , 0), the users’ equilibrium strategy profile in
any BNE takes the form 𝜎∗ = −→𝑐 𝐹 . Here, overloading our previous notation, 𝜎 = −→𝑐 𝐹 denotes that all
users of class 𝑖 with waiting cost 𝑐 < 𝑐𝐹𝑖 join the fixed-price market, i.e., they play 𝛼 = F , and all users
of class 𝑖 with waiting cost 𝑐 > 𝑐𝐹𝑖 balk and obtain zero payoff. The cutoff vector
−→𝑐 𝐹 = (𝑐𝐹
1
, . . . , 𝑐𝐹𝑛 ) is








∀𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛} (15)
Proof. Whenever 𝑙𝑆 = 0, it directly follows that any equilibrium strategy profile is defined by a
cutoff vector 𝜎∗ = −→𝑐 𝐹 by the monotonicity of the payoff 𝜋𝑐𝑖 (F , 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎) in 𝑐 . The expression for 𝑐
𝐹
𝑖
follows via simple algebra by setting 𝜋
𝑐𝐹𝑖









Remark. With a strategy profile of the form 𝜎 = −→𝑐 𝐹 , users whose jobs have waiting costs 𝑐 = 𝑐𝐹𝑖
can join the fixed-price market or balk and obtain zero payoff either way. We do not need to use
a tie-breaking rule because these users constitute a set with measure zero and do not influence the
provider’s profit or any user’s payoff. The same holds for all future strategy profile characterizations
we present using cutoff vectors.
4.2 Pure Spot Equilibria
Pure spot equilibria arise when at least some spot instances are offered and no user joins the
fixed-price market. If the provider chooses the price per time unit for fixed-price instances too
high, every user either joins the spot market or cannot obtain a positive payoff in either market
and balks. For settings without preemption costs, these equilibria have previously been studied in
Abhishek et al. (2017). We now provide an analogous result for settings with preemption costs.
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Proposition 4.2. For any provider strategy 𝜌 = (𝑝𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 ) with 𝑙𝑆 > 0, in any BNE of the user game
where no user joins the fixed-price market, the equilibrium strategy profile has the form 𝜎∗ = −→𝑐 𝑆 .
Here, 𝜎∗ = −→𝑐 𝑆 denotes that all users of class 𝑖 with waiting cost 𝑐 < 𝑐𝑆𝑖 join the spot market, i.e., they
play 𝛼 = S and truthfully bid 𝑐 , and all users of class 𝑖 with waiting cost 𝑐 > 𝑐𝑆𝑖 balk and obtain zero
payoff. The cutoff vector −→𝑐 𝑆 = (𝑐𝑆
1




𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌,−→𝑐 𝑆 )𝑑𝑥 = 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛} (16)
The proof of Proposition 4.2 can be found in Appendix A.2. Intuitively, the existence of a cutoff
vector −→𝑐 𝑆 follows because, for any fixed strategy profile 𝜎 , the payoff of a user of class 𝑖 , i.e.,
𝜋𝑐𝑖 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎), is monotone decreasing in his waiting cost 𝑐 .
4.3 Hybrid Equilibria
We now analyze hybrid equilibria that arise when the provider plays 𝑙𝑆 > 0 on the spot market and
some users still join the provider’s fixed-price market. These equilibria can again be subdivided
into two cases. In the first case, jobs in the spot market incur relatively high preemption costs
and (independent of their bid) take longer until completion than in the fixed-price market, i.e.,
𝑤 (F , 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) ≤ 𝑤 (S, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗), where 𝛽 denotes a bid that is higher than any other bid in 𝜎∗.








To understand the second case, note that the jobs with the highest bids are started instantly in the
spot market, while they always have to wait some small time 𝑇 > 0 in expectation to start running
in the fixed-price market. When spot instances are very reliably idle, this can in theory lead to
situations where the spot market requires a shorter time until completion than the fixed-price
market for jobs with very high bids (i.e.𝑤 (F , 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) > 𝑤 (S, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗)). While in practice, this is
unlikely to happen, we still need to include this case in the equilibrium analysis.
In the following, we first analyze the case where the spot market is slower than the fixed-price
market. We then present the equilibrium analysis for the more exotic case where the spot market is
faster for a small number of user.
4.3.1 Case 1: Spot Market Slower Than the Fixed-price Market.
If the overall time lost through external preemptions with the highest bid (i.e., without ever getting
internally preempted) is higher than the expected queuing time in the fixed-price market, then
no user is willing to pay more in the spot market than in the fixed-price market. As the overall
costs (i.e., the costs for waiting plus the payment) of a user who has arrived into the system do not
depend on his class, there exists a waiting cost for which both markets result in the same payoff,
independent of a job’s class. Below that waiting cost users prefer the spot market and above it they
prefer the fixed-price market; though in either case they might still balk if their value is too low
(leading to a negative payoff in both markets). This again allows us to state the equilibrium strategy
profiles as cutoff vectors, this time with two vectors −→𝑐 𝑃 (P for payoff equivalence) and −→𝑐 𝐵 (B for
balking).
Proposition 4.3. For any provider strategy 𝜌 = (𝑝𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 ) with 𝑙𝑆 > 0 and 𝑤 (F , 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎
∗) ≤
𝑤 (S, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗), in any BNE of the user game where any user joins the fixed-price market, the equilibrium
strategy profile is of the form 𝜎∗ = (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵). Here, 𝜎 = (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵) denotes that a user of class 𝑖 with
waiting cost c joins the spot market when 𝑐 < 𝑐𝑃𝑖 ≤ 𝑐
𝐵
𝑖 and the fixed-price market when 𝑐
𝑃
𝑖 < 𝑐 < 𝑐
𝐵
𝑖 ;
when 𝑐 > 𝑐𝐵𝑖 , he balks and does not join any market. The cutoff point 𝑐
𝑃
1
and the cutoff vector −→𝑐 𝐵 are
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𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵))𝑑𝑥 (17)











𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵))𝑑𝑥
}
∀𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛} (18)





The proof of Proposition 4.3 can be found in Appendix A.3. In words, −→𝑐 𝑃 denotes until which
waiting cost the payoff in the spot market is higher than either balking or joining the fixed-price
market. The second vector (i.e., −→𝑐 𝐵) denotes above which waiting cost neither market allows users
to obtain a positive payoff anymore. Note that there are often some classes 𝑖 for which 𝑐𝑃𝑖 = 𝑐
𝐵
𝑖 , i.e.,
no user from those classes joins the fixed-price market.
4.3.2 Case 2: Spot Market Faster Than the Fixed-price Market.
When the spot market for very high bids is faster than the fixed-price market, i.e.,𝑤 (S, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) <
𝑤 (F , 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗), then some users are willing to pay more in the spot market than what they would
in the fixed-price market. However, most users in the spot market still have to wait longer, and
are therefore not willing to pay as much as in the fixed-price market. As a result, we obtain the
following equilibrium strategy profiles, now with three cutoff vectors: −→𝑐 𝐿 (L for lower bound of
the fixed-price market), −→𝑐 𝑈 (U for upper bound of the fixed-price market) and −→𝑐 𝐻 (H for hybrid).
Proposition 4.4. For any provider strategy 𝜌 = (𝑝𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 ) with 𝑙𝑆 > 0, in any BNE of the user game
where any user joins the fixed-price market and where it holds that𝑤 (S, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) < 𝑤 (F , 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗),
the equilibrium strategy profile is of the form 𝜎∗ = (−→𝑐 𝐿,−→𝑐 𝑈 ,−→𝑐 𝐻 ). Here, 𝜎 = (−→𝑐 𝐿,−→𝑐 𝑈 ,−→𝑐 𝐻 ) denotes
that a user of class 𝑖 with waiting cost c joins the spot or the fixed-price market if and only if 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝐻𝑖 ;
out of those users that join any market, almost all (i.e., all besides possibly a set of measure zero that
does not influence system dynamics) choose the fixed-price market if and only if 𝑐𝐿𝑖 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐
𝑈
𝑖 and
choose the spot market otherwise. The cutoff points 𝑐𝐿1 , 𝑐
𝑈
1 and the cutoff vector
−→𝑐 𝐻 are the unique
























𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, (−→𝑐 𝐿,−→𝑐 𝑈 ,−→𝑐 𝐻 ))𝑑𝑥 = 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛} (21)











The proof of Proposition 4.4 can be found in Appendix A.5. In words, −→𝑐 𝐻 denotes the waiting
costs of each class above which users cannot obtain a positive payoff in either market and balk.
Of those users that do not balk, only users of class 𝑖 whose waiting cost 𝑐 lies between 𝑐𝐿𝑖 and 𝑐
𝑈
𝑖
join the fixed-price market, while every other user whose waiting cost 𝑐 lies below 𝑐𝐻𝑖 joins the
spot-market.
4.4 Equilibria Resulting From Provider Strategy
So far, we have analyzed different forms of equilibria for the user game. We now analyze what kind
of equilibrium a given provider strategy 𝜌 results in. Because users with very low waiting costs
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always join the spot market, pure fixed-price equilibria can only result when no spot instances
are offered, i.e., when the provider plays 𝑙𝑆 = 0. Going forward, we call such provider strategies
fixed-price strategies. Conversely, we call all strategies where the provider offers any spot instances
(i.e., where she plays 𝑙𝑆 > 0) hybrid strategies.
Given a hybrid strategy 𝜌 , it is easy to differentiate which of the two different hybrid equilibria the
strategy 𝜌 potentially results in by simply checking whether a congestion free spot market is faster







. But it is not directly apparent
whether a hybrid strategy results in a łrealž hybrid equilibrium or degenerates the market into a
pure spot equilibrium where no user joins the fixed-price market. Fortunately, we can formulate a
simple condition that, as we will show, distinguishes these two types of equilibria.
Definition 4.5 (Proper Hybrid Strategy). For any 𝜌 with 𝑙𝑆 > 0, let 𝜎 =
−→𝑐 𝑆 be a strategy profile
satisfying Equation (16). Recall that, with such a strategy profile 𝜎 , no user joins the fixed-price
market and 𝜎 would be an equilibrium strategy profile (of the spot market) if no fixed-price market
existed. We say that 𝜌 is a proper hybrid strategy (or proper) if one of the following holds:
(1) 𝑤 (F , 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) ≤ 𝑤 (S, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) and the payoff for users with waiting cost 𝑐𝑆
1
is higher in the
fixed-price than in the spot market (and thus a beneficial deviation from 𝜎 = −→𝑐 𝑆 exists), or
(2) 𝑤 (S, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) < 𝑤 (F , 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) and, under strategy profile 𝜎 = −→𝑐 𝑆 , there exists a waiting cost
𝑐 ′, such that (a) the total waiting time with bid 𝑐 ′ in the spot market is equal to the waiting
time in the fixed-price market, and (b) the payoff for a user with waiting cost 𝑐 ′ is higher in
the fixed-price market than in the spot market (and thus a beneficial deviation from 𝜎 = −→𝑐 𝑆
exists).
Informally, a proper hybrid strategy only requires that users with one specific waiting cost (i.e., 𝑐 ′)
prefer the fixed-price market over the spot market. The definition is well defined because Eq. (16)
always has a solution and thus allows us to calculate the strategy profile −→𝑐 𝑆 . We now show that
this definition enables us to determine whether or not a given provider strategy results in a BNE
where some users join the fixed-price market.
Lemma 4.6. Let 𝜌 = (𝑝𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 ) be a hybrid strategy, i.e., a provider strategy with 𝑙𝑆 > 0. In any BNE 𝜎
∗
of the user game, some users join the fixed-price market (i.e., 𝜎∗ = (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵) or 𝜎∗ = (−→𝑐 𝐿,−→𝑐 𝑈 ,−→𝑐 𝐻 ))
if and only if 𝜌 is proper.
The proof of Lemma 4.6 can be found in Appendix A.6.
With this result, we can now give a full equilibrium characterization result based purely on the
provider strategy 𝜌 .
Theorem 4.7. For any provider strategy 𝜌 , the equilibrium strategy profile of the users is
(1) 𝜎∗ = −→𝑐 𝐹 if and only if 𝜌 is a fixed-price strategy, i.e., 𝑙𝑆 = 0.
(2) 𝜎∗ = (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵) if and only if 𝜌 is a proper hybrid strategy and it holds that 𝑤 (F , 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) ≤
𝑤 (S, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗).
(3) 𝜎∗ = (−→𝑐 𝐿,−→𝑐 𝑈 ,−→𝑐 𝐻 ) if and only if 𝜌 is a proper hybrid strategy and it holds that𝑤 (S, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) <
𝑤 (F , 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗).
(4) 𝜎∗ = −→𝑐 𝑆 otherwise.
Proof. We show the łifž direction of each case in turn. Once the łifž direction for all cases have
been shown, the łonly ifž direction immediately follows for each of them.
(1) Assume that 𝑙𝑆 = 0, then 𝜎
∗
=
−→𝑐 𝐹 follows from Proposition 4.1. For 𝑙𝑆 > 0 at least users with
waiting costs in some small neighborhood around zero will trivially prefer the spot market.
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(2) Assume that 𝑙𝑆 > 0,𝑤 (F , 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎
∗) ≤ 𝑤 (S, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) and the strategy is proper. By Lemma 4.6
some users join the fixed-price market. By Proposition 4.3 it follows that 𝜎∗ = (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵).
(3) Assume that 𝑙𝑆 > 0,𝑤 (S, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎
∗) < 𝑤 (F , 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) and the strategy is proper. By Lemma 4.6
some users join the fixed-price market. By Proposition 4.4 it follows that 𝜎∗ = (−→𝑐 𝐿,−→𝑐 𝑈 ,−→𝑐 𝐻 ).
(4) Assume that 𝑙𝑆 > 0 and the strategy is not proper. By Lemma 4.6 no users join the fixed-price
market. By Proposition 4.2 it follows that 𝜎∗ = −→𝑐 𝑆 .
□
5 PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: PROVIDER PROFIT AND USERWELFARE
In the previous section, we have derived the user equilibrium strategy profiles 𝜎∗, given different
provider strategies 𝜌 . As these uniquely define the provider’s costs and revenue, we can now bound
how a provider’s costs change when she offers a spot market. Using these bounds, we then assemble
a condition that only depends on the setting and show that, when this condition holds, a provider
can always simultaneously increase her profit and achieve a Pareto improvement for the users by
also offering a spot market alongside her fixed-price market.
5.1 Bounding the Provider’s Costs
Towards deriving our results, we now bound the costs of the spot and fixed-price markets. First,
we state a condition to formally bound the fixed-cost savings a provider can obtain by offering spot
instances. Second, we derive a lemma to bound the average running time in the spot market. We
then use these to bound the provider’s costs. We begin with bounding the reduction in fixed-price
instances. Going forward, we denote as 𝜎∗
0
the user equilibrium resulting from a provider strategy
with 𝑙𝑆 = 0 spot instances to distinguish it from the user equilibrium 𝜎
∗ resulting from another
strategy.
Lemma 5.1. For any fixed-price strategy 𝜌0 = (𝑝
0
𝐹
, 0) and any hybrid strategy 𝜌 = (𝑝0
𝐹
, 𝑙𝑆 ) with
the same price 𝑝0
𝐹
, denote by Δ𝑙𝐹 (𝑙𝑆 ) := 𝑙𝐹 (𝜌0, 𝜎
∗
0
) − 𝑙𝐹 (𝜌, 𝜎
∗) the reduction in required fixed-price
instances and by 𝜆𝑆 (𝑙𝑆 ) the arrival rate of all users who join the fixed-price market under 𝜌0 but move
to the spot market if the provider offers 𝑙𝑆 spot instances. Then it holds that
Δ𝑙𝐹 (𝑙𝑆 ) ≥
1
𝜇
𝜆𝑆 (𝑙𝑆 ) . (22)
Proof. Given that the arrival process into the system (i.e., before users take an action) is memo-
ryless (i.e., the number of arrivals in any time interval is distributed as a Poisson random variable),
the arrival process into the fixed-price market for any strategy profile 𝜎 is also memoryless. Further-
more, the number of users who choose the fixed-price market in equilibrium is strictly decreasing
in the number of offered spot instances 𝑙𝑆 . Thus, in equilibrium, the fixed-price markets under
any 𝜌0 and 𝜌 can be seen as two queues 𝑄1, 𝑄2 with the same queuing time, Poisson arrival rates
𝜆1 > 𝜆2, the same service process, and 𝑙1, 𝑙2 instances, respectively. To keep the notation simple,
w.l.o.g., we assume that the service time is normalized to 1
𝜇
= 1. The statement of the lemma is
therefore equivalent to the difference between the number of instances of any such 𝑄1, 𝑄2 being
larger or equal to the difference between the arrival rates, i.e., 𝑙1 − 𝑙2 ≥ 𝜆1 − 𝜆2.
Since 𝜆1 > 𝜆2, we can write 𝜆1 = 𝜆𝐴 + 𝜆2 for some 𝜆𝐴 > 0. Since the arrival process into 𝑄1 is
memoryless, we can further see it as a mix of two independent arrival processes 𝐴 and 𝐵 with
rates 𝜆𝐴 and 𝜆𝐵 = 𝜆2. Now, for the sake of contradiction, assume that 𝑙1 − 𝑙2 < 𝜆1 − 𝜆2 = 𝜆𝐴. Since
the number of instances 𝑙1 is finite, some users will sometimes have to wait to be served. Thus,
at any randomly chosen point in time, there are, in expectation, strictly more than 𝜆𝐴 users that
arrived from arrival process 𝐴 in 𝑄1. Given that 𝑙1 − 𝜆𝐴 < 𝑙2, there are, at any random point in
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time (in expectation) less than 𝑙2 instances available to serve the users from arrival process 𝐵 in
𝑄1. Given that the arrival processes are memoryless, the distribution of the states of the queue
at a random point in time is the same as whenever a random user arrives.16 Therefore, there are
also, in expectation, less than 𝑙2 instances available for users from process 𝐵 whenever a random
user from process 𝐵 arrives. This implies that when a random user arrives from process 𝐵 into
𝑄1, in expectation, there are strictly fewer idle instances available in 𝑄1 than when a random user
arrives into 𝑄2. It follows that users from arrival process 𝐵 (in expectation) have a longer queuing
time in 𝑄1 than users have in 𝑄2. Since 𝑄1 is a FIFO queue with memoryless arrivals, every user
in 𝑄1 has the same expected queuing time independent of whether he arrives by process 𝐴 or 𝐵.
Consequently, the queuing time of any user in 𝑄1 is longer than the queuing time of any user in
𝑄2, a contradiction to our definition of 𝑄1 and 𝑄2. Thus, it must hold that 𝑙1 − 𝑙2 ≥ 𝜆1 − 𝜆2. □
Note that Equation (22) from Lemma 5.1 immediately implies a lower bound on the fixed costs
the provider saves by offering a spot market. This is the case because the provider’s fixed costs
only depend on 𝜅𝐹 and the number of fixed-price instances required in equilibrium.
Next, we bound the average running time in the spot market.
Lemma 5.2. The average running time in the spot market (i.e., the left-hand side of the following















1 − 𝜏𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 )
(23)
Proof. First, note that in any queue that is stable, i.e., where every user has a finite waiting time,
(on average) the exact same number of users arrive and depart per time unit. Now assume that any
arriving user preempts one other job through its arrival. Obviously, this is an upper bound, as no
job can preempt more than one job due to its arrival. Since the average number of arrivals is the
same as the average number of departures, after a job arrives and causes a preemption, another
job has to depart (in expectation) before the next preemption. Thus, (on average) a job cannot
be internally preempted more than once during its whole running time. Denoting the number of










Now note that the full running time of a job can be split into the running time it would require
without internal preemption and any additional running time 𝑟𝐼 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) needed because of
internal preemption (caused either directly, or indirectly via additional external preemptions that
occur during the additional running time), i.e.,




1 − 𝜏𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 )
) + 𝑟𝐼 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎). (25)
While the time lost directly through internal preemptions is given by 𝜓𝐼 (𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝑟 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝜏 ,
additional external preemptions can occur during this time. By the same argument as for the
16This is called the PASTA (Poisson Arrivals See Time Averages) property (see (Wolff 1982)).
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running time in Proposition 3.1 (i.e., viewing it as a geometric series) it follows that
𝑟𝐼 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) =
∞∑
𝑘=0
𝜓𝐼 (𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝑟 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝜏 (𝜏𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 ))
𝑘 (26)
=𝜓𝐼 (𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝑟 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝜏
1
1 − 𝜏𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 )
. (27)







































1 − 𝜏𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 )
. (31)
Here, the inequality in (31) follows by plugging (30) into Inequality (24). It now directly follows for








































1 − 𝜏𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 )
+
𝜏







1 − 𝜏𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 )
. (35)
□
Lemma 5.2 immediately implies a bound on the load-dependent costs incurred from offering a
spot market by combining Equation (23) with the definition of the costs 𝐶𝑆 (𝜌, 𝜎) in Equation (14).
5.2 Well-behaved Settings: Increasing Provider Profit and User Welfare
In this subsection, we use Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 to derive a very mild condition on the setting
under which we then show our main result. First, recall that the average running time in the
fixed-price market is equal to the service time 1
𝜇
. As we have shown in Lemma 5.2, the average




. This immediately implies an upper








. The following condition puts this bound (after normalizing by the service time
1
𝜇
) in relation to the ratio between the provider’s fixed and load-dependent costs.
Ludwig Dierks and Sven Seuken 17
Definition 5.3. We call a setting (𝑛, 𝑣, 𝜆, 𝜇, 𝐹 , 𝜏, 𝜅𝐹 , 𝜅𝐿,𝑇 , 𝑙,𝜓𝐸) well-behaved if there exists a number
of spot instances 𝑙𝑤 with 0 < 𝑙𝑤 ≤ 𝑙 such that the following holds:
1 + 𝜏𝜇





In the following theorem, we show that, in a well-behaved setting, a provider can increase her
profit as well as achieve a Pareto improvement for the users by offering a spot market, compared to
only offering a fixed-price market.
Theorem 5.4. Given a well-behaved setting, for every fixed-price strategy 𝜌0 = (𝑝
0
𝐹
, 0) that results in
a positive profit, there exists a hybrid strategy 𝜌 = (𝑝0
𝐹
, 𝑙𝑆 ) with the same price 𝑝
0
𝐹
and with 0 < 𝑙𝑆 ≤ 𝑙
that yields a higher profit for the provider, i.e.,
Π((𝑝0𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 ), 𝜎




and the same strategy also yields a Pareto improvement for the users, i.e.,
∀𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛} ∀𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝜇𝑣𝑖 ] : 𝜋
𝑐
𝑖 (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎




∃𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛} ∃𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝜇𝑣𝑖 ] : 𝜋
𝑐
𝑖 (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎




Proof. First, we collect all required auxiliary results. Denote by 𝜆𝑆 (𝑙𝑆 ) the arrival rate of all users
who join the fixed-price market under 𝜎∗
0
but move to the spot market under 𝜎∗. Denote by 𝜆𝑁 (𝑙𝑆 )
the arrival rate of all users who balk under 𝜎∗
0
but newly join the spot market under 𝜎∗. Thus, the





𝑓𝑖 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥 = 𝜆𝑁 (𝑙𝑆 ) + 𝜆𝑆 (𝑙𝑆 ).
Recall that Lemma 5.1 directly translates to a lower bound on the difference in the fixed costs
incurred under 𝜌 and 𝜌0, i.e., 𝜅𝐹Δ𝑙𝐹 (𝑙𝑆 ) ≥ 𝜅𝐹
1
𝜇
𝜆𝑆 (𝑙𝑆 ). Denote by 𝑏 (𝑙𝑆 ) the bound on the normalized
average running time as derived in Lemma 5.2, i.e., 𝑏 (𝑙𝑆 ) :=
1+𝜏𝜇
1−𝜏𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 )
. By combining Equation (23)
with the definition of 𝐶𝑆 (𝜌, 𝜎) in Equation (14), it then follows that the increase in load-dependent
costs caused by 𝜆𝑆 (𝑙𝑆 ) users switching from the fixed-price to the spot market and 𝜆𝑁 (𝑙𝑆 ) users
switching from balking to the spot market is bounded by 𝜅𝐿
𝜇
(𝜆𝑆 (𝑙𝑆 ) − (𝜆𝑁 (𝑙𝑆 ) + 𝜆𝑆 (𝑙𝑆 ))𝑏 (𝑙𝑆 )). We













𝜆𝑆 (𝑙𝑆 ) +
𝜅𝐿
𝜇
(𝜆𝑆 (𝑙𝑆 ) − (𝜆𝑁 (𝑙𝑆 ) + 𝜆𝑆 (𝑙𝑆 ))𝑏 (𝑙𝑆 ))(40)






(1 − 𝑏 (𝑙𝑆 ))) − 𝜆𝑁 (𝑙𝑆 )
𝜅𝐿
𝜇
𝑏 (𝑙𝑆 ) (41)
Lemma A.3 in the appendix shows that for every 𝜀 > 0, there exists an 𝑙𝑆 such that the average
payment of the users that join the spot market ?̄?(S, (𝑝0
𝐹
, 𝑙𝑆 ), 𝜎
∗) is at least the expected payment
in the fixed-price market minus 𝜀, i.e.,






For any 𝑙𝑆 ≤ 𝑙
𝑤 that satisfies Equation (42) for a given 𝜀, the revenue difference between 𝜌 and
𝜌0 can therefore be bounded as follows:
𝑅𝑆 ((𝑝
0
𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 ), 𝜎
∗) + 𝑅𝐹 ((𝑝
0
𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 ), 𝜎
∗) − 𝑅𝐹 ((𝑝
0




= (𝜆𝑆 (𝑙𝑆 ) + 𝜆𝑁 (𝑙𝑆 ))
[
?̄?(S, (𝑝0𝐹 , 𝑙𝑠 ), 𝜎
∗)
]
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Combining the bounds on revenue and costs for any 𝑙𝑆 ≤ 𝑙
𝑤 that satisfies Equation (42) for a
given 𝜀, the profit difference between the hybrid strategy 𝜌 = (𝑝0
𝐹




, 0) can now be bounded as follows:
Π((𝑝0𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 ), 𝜎











(1 − 𝑏 (𝑙𝑆 )) − 𝜀
]











To see that this expression is positive for correctly chosen 𝜀 and 𝑙𝑆 , note that for well-behaved






(1 − 𝑏 (𝑙𝑆 )) > 0. (48)
Since offering more spot instances causes a higher external preemption rate, the left-hand side











𝑏 (𝑙𝑆 ). (49)
Thus, for 𝜀 small enough, any strategy 𝜌 = (𝑝0
𝐹
, 𝑙𝑆 ) with 𝑙𝑆 satisfying Equation (42) increases the
profit compared to the fixed-price strategy 𝜌0 = (𝑝
0
𝐹
, 0). Since the price 𝑝0
𝐹
did not change, the users
still have access to the same fixed-price market as before, but additionally now also have access to
a spot market (which some users prefer), which leads to a Pareto improvement for the users. □
Theorem 5.4 shows that in any well-behaved setting, a provider can increase her profit and at
the same time achieve a Pareto improvement for the users by playing a hybrid strategy compared
to playing a fixed-price strategy. The following corollary follows immediately.
Corollary 5.5. In any well-behaved setting, the provider’s profit-optimal strategy is a hybrid
strategy.
Remark. Note that the strategies characterized by Theorem 5.4 and Corollary 5.5 are typically
not the same. In particular, while the strategy described by Theorem 5.4 simultaneously increases the
provider’s profit and leads to a Pareto improvement for the users, the profit-optimal strategy described
by Corollary 5.5 may increase or decrease user welfare.
5.3 Discussion
Our results show that, in a well-behaved setting, a cloud provider can increase her profit by offering
a spot market consisting of idle capacity in addition to offering her existing fixed-price market.
Informally, well-behavedness guarantees that the additional load-dependent costs incurred due to
running a spot market are lower than the fixed costs saved through utilizing idle capacity. For a
setting to be well-behaved, the idle capacity used for the spot market has to be sufficiently reliably
idle and individual preemptions have to be sufficiently inexpensive compared to the ratio between
fixed and load-dependent costs. In practice, a cloud provider can easily check this, as the required
condition is independent of internal preemptions and only depends on setting parameters. The




and the rate of external preemptions𝜓𝐸 (i.e., how reliably idle the provider’s capacity is) do not
depend on the dynamics of the queue. Whether a setting is well-behaved can therefore directly be
evaluated without having to use any queuing-theoretic formulas or equilibrium calculations.
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Our well-behavedness condition is quite mild and most cloud providers should find it satisfied
in practice. To see this, note that fixed costs 𝜅𝐹 are usually about 5 to 20 times higher than load-
dependent costs (Barroso et al. 2018). Even if each preemption in the spot market resulted in
an additional run time of 25% of a job’s expected service time (which is an unreasonably high
number, considering that mostly users with low preemption costs 𝜏 would use the spot market), the
condition would still be satisfied if a job on average gets externally preempted 3 times per time unit
before it finishes. Of course, some cloud providers may see the condition not satisfied: for example,
if they have very low fixed costs (e.g., by using old instances whose acquisition costs are already
amortized) or if they do not have reliably idle capacity. This demonstrates how our condition can
inform the provider’s managerial decision making process.
A provider whose setting is well-behaved might also want to compute her optimal strategy, i.e.,
the optimal price and number of spot instances. Unfortunately, directly calculating the optimal
strategy is only feasible for very few arrival/service processes (see Section 6 for examples). For
general service processes, formulas for queuing times are open problems of queueing theory.
However, this does not mean that a provider cannot find a profit-increasing hybrid strategy. In
practice, the provider can keep the same price she used when only offering fixed-price instances
and start with a relatively small spot market. According to Theorem 5.4, this already leads to a
(small) profit increase. Over time, the provider can then successively increase the size of the spot
market until she observes no further profit increase. Alternatively, she can employ a reserve price
for the spot market, starting with a relatively high price and successively decreasing it.
Note that in this work, we have analyzed the profit per time unit, and therefore our model does not
include one-time costs. However, depending on how their cloud computing centers are structured,
providers might face varying degrees of one-time costs (e.g., to set up a new marketplace and enable
offering preemptible instances). While these costs are only incurred once and therefore become
negligible over time, a provider with a shorter planning horizon might still want to take these costs
into account. Providers may also face additional costs whenever a user gets preempted (e.g., for
re-booting a machine after a preemption). As these costs can take different shapes for different
providers and do not influence the user sub-game, we did not include them in our model, but it
would be straightforward to add them. Such costs simply add another term to the well-behavedness
condition, but do not change our results in any meaningful way.
While in this paper, we only model a single provider, some insights from our theoretical results
also extend to competitive multi-provider settings. For such a setting, we would have to generalize
our well-behavedness condition to multiple providers, which is straightforward. Following a similar
argument as in the proof of Theorem 5.4, one could then show that, if none of the providers
currently offers a spot market, then any provider for whom the well-behavedness condition is
satisfied can increase her profit while simultaneously achieving a Pareto improvement for the
users by offering a secondary spot market. Since this means that offering a spot market would be a
profitable single-provider deviation from any strategy profile where none of the providers offer a
spot market, there cannot be an equilibrium where no provider offers a spot market. We leave the
formalization of multi-provider settings and a detailed study of the resulting equilibria to future
work.
6 NUMERICAL EXAMPLES FOR MEMORYLESS QUEUES
In this section, we provide some numerical examples to illustrate the main results we have de-
rived in the previous sections. So far, we have derived all theoretical results for general service
processes. Now, we focus on fully memoryless queues, for which the well-known Erlang C formula
(e.g., (Cooper 1981)) allows us to calculate queuing times and the expected number of preemptions
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(given some additional technical assumptions). The formal model for the numerical examples and
the corresponding formulas for the waiting time are provided in Appendix B.
6.1 Set-up
In our examples, we consider a setting with two classes of jobs. The parameters of the examples
are as follows: the values for completion are 𝑣 = (1, 0.75), the arrival rates are 𝜆 = (100, 50), and
the expected service time is 1
𝜇
= 1. The waiting costs 𝑐 are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and
[0, 0.75], respectively. The SLA on the expected total waiting time for the fixed-price market is set to
𝑇 = 0.001. For any job that joins the spot market, the expected number of external preemptions per
time unit is𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 ) = 𝑙𝑆/100. We assume that the provider can at most offer 𝑙 = 100 spot instances;
however, in our examples, this limit is never reached by the provider’s optimal strategy. We set the
preemption costs to 𝜏 = 0.25 (i.e., whenever a job gets preempted it incurs additional running time
equal to 25% of its łnormalž service time 1
𝜇
). We choose these relatively high costs to demonstrate
that sizable profit increases are possible even with relatively costly preemptions.
6.2 Example 1: Varying the Instance Costs 𝜅 = 𝜅𝐹 + 𝜅𝐿
For the first example, we vary the provider’s instances costs 𝜅 = 𝜅𝐹 +𝜅𝐿 between 𝜅 = 0 and 𝜅 = 0.2.
We assume that 90% of the costs are fixed-costs 𝜅𝐹 , while the remainder are load-dependent costs
𝜅𝐿 , i.e., 𝜅𝐹 = 9𝜅𝐿 .
















Fig. 1 Profit under different strategies while
varying the instance cost 𝜅
In Figure 1, we show the profit
for different strategies, varying
the instance costs 𝜅 on the x-
axis. We plot the following four
strategies. First, the red solid
line shows the provider’s profit-
optimal strategy (denoted łhy-
bridž). Second, the dotted black
line shows the profit-optimal
strategy for when the provider
is restricted to use the price 𝑝∗0
𝐹
that is optimal when only of-
fering a fixed-price market (de-




Note that, by construction, this
strategy guarantees a Pareto im-
provement for the users compared to the optimal fixed-price strategy. This is true because the users
have access to the same fixed-price market, but additionally now also have access to a spot market
(which some users prefer). Third, the dashed blue line shows the profit-optimal strategy for when
the provider is restricted to only offering a fixed-price market (denoted łfixed-pricež). Fourth, and
as a reference, the dash-dotted green line shows the profit-optimal strategy for when no fixed-price
market exists (denoted łspot-onlyž).
Looking at Figure 1, as the instance costs 𝜅 increase, we see the expected monotonic decrease
of the profit for each of the four strategies. Note that, although the ratio between fixed and load-
dependent costs stays constant, the profit of the fixed-price strategy decreases faster than for
the other three strategies; the intuition for this is that the ratio between costs and revenue is
highest in the fixed-price market. Importantly, we see that the hybrid strategy always achieves the
highest profit among all four strategies which illustrates the main point of our paper. For very low
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instance costs, its profit almost coincides with the profit of the fixed-price strategy. But already for
moderate instance costs, the hybrid strategy leads to a significant profit increase. We also see that,
when costs are very high, then the provider’s optimal strategy is to set the price 𝑝𝐹 high enough
such that no user joins the fixed-price market (i.e., the equilibrium degenerates into a pure spot
equilibrium).17 Finally, we see that the hybrid strategy with 𝑝𝐹 = 𝑝
∗0
𝐹
obtains almost the same profit
as the (non-restricted) hybrid strategy (until the point where the hybrid strategy stops offering a
fixed-price market). This illustrates that the provider does not need to compute a new price for her
fixed-price market to achieve a sizeable profit increase via a hybrid strategy.
Overall, Example 1 illustrates our main result (Theorem 5.4): there exists a hybrid strategy (e.g.,
the hybrid strategy with 𝑝𝐹 = 𝑝
∗0
𝐹
)which simultaneously increases the provider’s profit and leads
to a Pareto improvement for the users.18
6.3 Example 2: Varying the Cost Ratio 𝜅𝐹
𝜅𝐿
For the second example, we vary the ratio between fixed costs 𝜅𝐹 and load-dependent costs 𝜅𝐿 while
keeping the sum constant at 𝜅 = 0.1. We again compare the same four strategies as in Example 1.


















Fig. 2 Profit under different strategies while
varying the cost ratio 𝜅𝐹𝜅𝐿
Figure 2 shows the profit for
each strategy, varying the ratio
𝜅𝐹
𝜅𝐿
between 0 and 20 on the x-
axis. Thus, at 0, all costs are load-
dependent, while at 20, the fixed
costs are 20 times as high as the
load-dependent costs. As we can
see in Figure 2, at 𝜅𝐹
𝜅𝐿
= 0, of-
fering no spot instances is opti-
mal. This is expected because at
0, all costs are load-dependent,
and therefore the main benefit of
using idle instances (i.e., reduc-
ing fixed costs) is gone. As the
fixed costs increase, the profits
of the top three strategies (which
at this point offer mostly fixed-price instances) first sharply decrease, even though the instance
costs 𝜅 stay constant. This happens because the fixed-price instances now also incur a fraction
of the instance costs while standing idle, whereas at 0, they only incurred costs while running.
Conversely, spot instances get more attractive as 𝜅𝐹
𝜅𝐿
increases. The hybrid strategies therefore start
using spot instances to counteract the increased costs for offering fixed-price instances, which can
be seen by the flattening of the solid red and dotted black lines.
At the point where the fixed costs are about 3 times as large as the load-dependent costs,
increasing 𝜅𝐹
𝜅𝐿
further leads to a profit increase for both hybrid strategies. This happens because,
beyond this point, both strategies offer enough spot instances such that the profit increase of the
spot market dominates the profit decrease of the fixed-price market. We also again see that the
hybrid strategy with 𝑝𝐹 = 𝑝
∗0
𝐹
achieves close to optimal profits.
17Note that this result does not imply that in practice, the provider would not offer a fixed-price market, as there are
always some users who would never join the spot market for a variety of reasons (e.g., because their jobs should never be
preempted). Instead, this result shows that the provider’s optimal strategy incentivizes all users who are willing to consider
joining a spot market to do so (by setting a relatively high price).
18Note that a Pareto improvement for the users obviously implies a welfare increase. We demonstrate this welfare increase
in Appendix C.
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Recall that, in practice, fixed costs are usually about 10-20 times as large as load-dependent costs
(i.e., 10 ≤ 𝜅𝐹
𝜅𝐿
≤ 20). Thus, this example suggests that, even when the provider incurs relatively
large costs for spot instances (e.g., 𝜅𝐹
𝜅𝐿
= 3), a cloud provider can expect to achieve a sizable profit
increase from offering a spot market in addition to her existing fixed-price market.
6.4 Varying the Provider Strategy
For the next two examples, we fix the fixed costs at 𝜅𝐹 = 0.09 and the load-dependent costs at
𝜅𝐿 = 0.01. We show how the profit changes, depending on different provider strategies 𝜌 = (𝑝𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 ).
Example 3: Varying the Price 𝑝𝐹 .











hybrid (optimal # of spot instances)
fixed-price
Fig. 3 Profit under different strategies when
restricted to different prices 𝑝𝐹
Figure 3 shows the optimal profit
under two strategies that are re-
stricted to the price 𝑝𝐹 shown
on the x-axis. The hybrid strat-
egy (solid red line) offers the op-
timal number of spot instances
𝑙𝑆 given 𝑝𝐹 . The fixed-price strat-
egy (dashed blue line) only offers
a fixed-price market with price
𝑝𝐹 .
Recall that the provider’s
profit depends on three factors:
how many users join each mar-
ket, how much they pay, and the
provider’s costs. As we can see
in Figure 3, when the price 𝑝𝐹 in-
creases, the profit for both strategies at first also increases. This happens because the users’ average
payments under both strategies go up; this is also true in the spot market because increasing
𝑝𝐹 pushes users from the fixed-price market into the spot market, which increases payments.
However, since more users balk when the price increases, the profit only goes up until the rise
in payments is dominated by the loss of users, whereafter the profit starts to fall again. Once the
fixed-price market becomes too expensive for the users, the user equilibrium under the hybrid
strategy degenerates into a pure spot equilibrium, as can be seen by the solid red line becoming
constant beyond 𝑝𝐹 = 0.62.
Example 4: Varying the Number of Spot Instances 𝑙𝑆 .
Figure 4 shows the optimal profit under three strategies that are all restricted to offering the number
of spot instances 𝑙𝑆 shown on the x-axis. The hybrid strategy (solid red line) uses the optimal price
𝑝𝐹 given 𝑙𝑆 . The hybrid strategy with 𝑝𝐹 = 𝑝
∗0
𝐹
(dotted black line) also offers 𝑙𝑆 spot instances but
uses the price that would be optimal when only offering a fixed-price market. As a reference, we
also include the spot-only strategy (dash-dotted green line) which only offers a spot market with 𝑙𝑆
spot instances.
As we see in Figure 4, as the number of spot instances 𝑙𝑆 increases, the profit for the two hybrid
strategies at first also increases. The key intuition for this is that, even though the average payments
in the spot market may decrease, now more users join the spot market, where (on average) they
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generate a higher profit than they previously did (either in the fixed-price market, or by balking). For



















Fig. 4 Profit under different strategies when
restricted to different spot market sizes 𝑙𝑆
Note that at 𝑙𝑆 = 62, we again
observe a point where the user
equilibrium under the hybrid
strategy degenerates into a pure
spot equilibrium.
Finally, Figure 4 shows that
for all numbers of spot instances,
the profit achieved by the hy-
brid strategy with 𝑝𝐹 = 𝑝
∗0
𝐹
is relatively close to the profit
achieved with the optimal price.
This suggests that, even when
the provider cannot fully opti-
mize her strategy, keeping the




approach for a cloud provider
when offering a spot market.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied whether a cloud provider can benefit from selling idle instances on
a spot market. Our main result is an easy-to-check condition under which a cloud provider can
simultaneously increase her profit and achieve a Pareto increase for the users by offering a spot
market in addition to a fixed-price market.
In contrast to prior work, we have modeled the provider’s fixed and load-dependent costs as
well as the users’ costs for preemption. As these costs are an important factor for the profitability
of any cloud market, modeling them was essential to make valid statements about the provider’s
profit optimization problem.
Our results have significant implications for practical market design. They suggest that, when
our condition is satisfied, offering a spot market alongside her fixed-price market is advantageous
for a cloud provider. Our condition is relatively mild and should be satisfied for most providers.
Furthermore, even when a provider cannot compute her profit-optimal strategy, there are viable
approaches to still achieve a profit increase by offering a spot market. Considering that the preemp-
tion costs are one of the main factors determining the profitability of a spot market, we encourage
providers to continue to evolve their technology such that the losses incurred from re-starting a
job are further reduced.
An interesting direction for future work would be to study how selling idle instances on a spot
market compares to alternative market designs, such as the provider selling her idle instances on a
preemptible fixed-price market. It is not immediately clear whether such a preemptible fixed-price
market would be able to generate more or less profit than a spot market (with a reserve price). One
would have to account for the differences in average payments, the market cannibalization towards
the fixed-price market, and the costs produced by preemptions. Further, possible competitive
advantages of one market over the other (i.e., differences in user satisfaction) would have to be
taken into account. A complete analysis of this trade-off would be very valuable.
19This profit decrease is caused by three factors becoming dominant: the reduction in average payments, the need for a
relatively larger buffer in the fixed-price market, and the unreliability of additional spot instances.
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A ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS AND PROOFS
A.1 Lemma A.1
A number of our results make use of the following technical Lemma which extends Lemma 7 from
Abhishek et al. (2017) to more general 𝑔𝑖 and𝑤 (), which includes our model.
Lemma A.1. Fix a provider strategy 𝜌 with 𝑙𝑠 > 0. Let (𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑘 ) be a weakly decreasing sequence.
For 𝑖 > 𝑘 let 𝑔𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 ), . . . , 𝑔𝑛 (𝑥𝑛) be given such that 𝑔 𝑗 (𝑥 𝑗 ) is a weakly increasing and semi-differentiable
scalar function with left derivative at most𝑤 (S, 𝑥𝑖 , 𝜌, (𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑘 , 𝑥𝑖 . . . , 𝑥𝑖 , 0𝑖+1, . . . , 0𝑛)). (Here, the
notation (𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑘 , 𝑥𝑖 . . . , 𝑥𝑖 , 0𝑖+1, . . . , 0𝑛) means that all entries 𝑘
′ with 𝑘 < 𝑘 ′ ≤ 𝑖 are set to 𝑥𝑖 .)
Further, assume that for all 𝑗 ≥ 𝑖 it holds that 𝑔 𝑗 (𝜇𝑣 𝑗 ) ≤ 𝑣 𝑗 , as well as 𝑔 𝑗 (𝑥) ≤ 𝑔𝑖 (𝑥) for all 𝑥 ∈ R.
Then there exist unique 𝑥𝑖 , . . . , 𝑥𝑛 such that for any strategy profile
𝜎 ′ = −→𝑥 = (𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑘 , 𝑥𝑖 , . . . , 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖+1, . . . , 𝑥𝑛) (50)
where any user of class 𝑗 joins the spot market if and only if his waiting cost 𝑐 is below 𝑥 𝑗 , it holds that∫ 𝑥 𝑗
0
𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌,−→𝑥 )𝑑𝑐 = 𝑔 𝑗 (𝑥) for all 𝑗 ≥ 𝑖 . (51)
Proof. To see this, assume that the claim holds for 𝑖 + 1. Then for any 𝑧 ∈ [0, 𝑥𝑘 ] there exists
𝜎 (𝑧) = −→𝑥 (𝑧) = (𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑘 , 𝑧, . . . , 𝑧, 𝑥𝑖+1 (𝑧), . . . , 𝑥𝑛 (𝑧)) (52)




𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎 (𝑧∗))𝑑𝑧. As a first step, we show that 𝑤 (𝑧) =
∫ 𝑧
0
𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎 (𝑧))𝑑𝑧 is
increasing in 𝑧. Since for any fixed 𝑥 ,
∫ 𝑥
0
𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌,−→𝑥 )𝑑𝑐 is increasing in each 𝑥 𝑗 , it follows that
𝑥𝑖+1 (𝑧) is decreasing in 𝑧. Then for any 𝑧 > 𝑧 it holds by the induction assumption that∫ 𝑥𝑖+1 (𝑧)
0
𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌,−→𝑥 (𝑧))𝑑𝑐 ≥ 𝑔𝑖 (𝑥𝑖+1 (𝑧)) (53)
and therefore∫ 𝑧
0
𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌,−→𝑥 (𝑧))𝑑𝑐 −
∫ 𝑧
0









𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌,−→𝑥 (𝑧))𝑑𝑐 −
∫ 𝑧
𝑥𝑖+1 (𝑧)






𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌,−→𝑥 (𝑧))𝑑𝑐 +
∫ 𝑧
𝑥𝑖+1 (𝑧)






𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌,−→𝑥 (𝑧))𝑑𝑐
𝑧 − 𝑧
(57)
> 𝑤 (S, 𝑧, 𝜌,−→𝑥 (𝑧)). (58)
Equation (57) is a direct result of the fact that waiting times of higher priority jobs do not depend
on the number of lower priority jobs in the queue. By taking the limit 𝑧 → 𝑧 it follows that
𝑤 ′(𝑧) > 𝑤 (S, 𝑧, 𝜌,−→𝑥 (𝑧)) ≥ 𝑤 (S, 𝑧, 𝜌, (𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑘 , 𝑧 . . . , 𝑧, 0𝑖+1, . . . , 0𝑛). As 𝑤 (0) = 0 and 𝑤 (𝜇𝑣𝑖 ) ≥
𝑣𝑖 ≥ 𝑔𝑖 (𝜇𝑣𝑖 ), the claim for 𝑖 follows.
To show the induction base case 𝑖 = 𝑛, we introduce a dummy variable 𝑥𝑛+1 with 𝑔𝑛+1 = 0. This
means that for any 𝑧 it trivially holds that 𝑥𝑛+1 (𝑧) = 0 and the statement for 𝑛 follows. □
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Any equilibrium strategy for users of class 𝑖 is trivially a threshold strategy because for any fixed
strategy profile 𝜎 , the payoff of a user of class 𝑖 , i.e., 𝜋𝑐𝑖 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎), is monotone decreasing in the
waiting cost 𝑐 . By setting 𝑔𝑖 (𝑐) = 𝑣𝑖 , the existence of the unique cutoff vector
−→𝑐 𝑆 then follows
directly from Lemma A.1. By the incentive compatibility of the payment rule, no user would deviate
from 𝜎∗ = −→𝑐 𝑆 .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Users with waiting close enough to zero always prefer the spot market, no matter how much time
they lose compared to the fixed-price market. Since some users join the fixed-price market and
both waiting time and payment are continuous in the bid 𝑐 , for any potential equilibrium strategy















𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝑑𝑥 . (59)
Since it holds 𝑑
𝑑𝑐










𝜋𝑐𝑖 (F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎), the higher a
users waiting cost, the worse the spot market compared to the fixed-price market and there cannot
exist any 𝑐 > 𝑐𝑃
1










𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝑑𝑥 . (60)
Thus, no user with waiting cost greater than 𝑐𝑃
1
joins the spot market. This means that the spot
market can be fully defined by the actions of players with 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑃
1
. Recall that −→𝑐 𝑃 denotes the
vector of cutoff points at which a job becomes indifferent between the spot market and either the













𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌,−→𝑐 𝑃 )𝑑𝑥 ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛} , (61)
which has a unique solution by Lemma A.1. Every job of class 𝑖 with 𝑐 < 𝑐𝑃𝑖 joins the spot
market, and every job with 𝑐𝑃𝑖 < 𝑐 <
𝜇𝑣𝑖−𝑝𝐹
𝜇𝑇+1 joins the fixed-price market and those with 𝑐 >
𝜇𝑣𝑖−𝑝𝐹
𝜇𝑇+1




𝜇𝑇+1 ), it is clear that every solution of (17) and (18) solves (61) and
vice-versa.
A.4 Lemma A.2
The following Lemma establishes the broad equilibrium structure when the spot market is faster at
the highest bids and shows the existence of two cutoff points in equilibrium between which almost
all users join the fixed-price market. It is used in the proof of Proposition 4.4.
Lemma A.2. For any provider strategy 𝜌 = (𝑝𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 ), in any BNE of the user game where some users








there exists an interval [𝑐𝐿, 𝑐𝑈 ], such that almost all users (i.e., all besides possibly a set of measure
zero that does not influence system dynamics) with waiting costs 𝑐 ∈ [𝑐𝐿, 𝑐𝑈 ] join the fixed-price
market or balk. For bids 𝑐 ∈ [𝑐𝐿, 𝑐𝑈 ], the total waiting time and the payment in equilibrium are
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equal in each market, i.e.:








For waiting costs 𝑐 ∉ [𝑐𝐿 , 𝑐𝑈 ] it holds that
𝜋𝑖 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎
∗) > 𝜋𝑖 (F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎
∗) ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛} , (64)
and these users join the spot market or balk.
Proof. For a job with the highest bid that does not balk, the spot market is faster than the







. Any user with such a waiting cost is therefore
willing to pay more in the spot market than in the fixed-price market. This means that he strictly
prefers the spot market in equilibrium.
Let 𝑐𝐿 be the lowest waiting cost for which a job prefers the fixed-price market over the spot
market or is indifferent between the two, and let 𝑐𝑈 be the highest such waiting cost. 𝑐𝐿 and 𝑐𝑈
have to exist for any equilibrium where users join both markets. We now show by contradiction
that the user’s payment in the spot market has to be weakly larger than in the fixed-price market
for bids above 𝑐𝐿 and that the spot market is weakly slower than the fixed-price market for bids
below 𝑐𝑈 .
Assume there exists a waiting cost 𝑐 > 𝑐𝐿 at which a user would prefer the spot market or be
indifferent between spot and fixed-price market, and for which the payment in the spot market is
less in expectation than in the fixed-price market, i.e., for which𝑚(S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) < 𝑚(F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎). Then
𝑐𝐿𝑤 (S, 𝑐𝐿, 𝜌, 𝜎) +𝑚(S, 𝑐𝐿, 𝜌, 𝜎) (65)





𝑐𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) +
𝑐
𝑐𝐿







𝑐𝑤 (F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) +𝑚(F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) + (
𝑐
𝑐𝐿







𝑐𝑤 (F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) +𝑚(F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) + (
𝑐
𝑐𝐿







𝑐𝑤 (F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) +
𝑐
𝑐𝐿
𝑚(F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎)
)
(70)
= 𝑐𝐿𝑤 (F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) +𝑚(F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) (71)
= 𝑐𝐿𝑤 (F , 𝑐𝐿, 𝜌, 𝜎) +𝑚(F , 𝑐𝐿, 𝜌, 𝜎) (72)
(66) holds because the pricing rule is BNIC; (68) holds because at waiting cost 𝑐 the spot market’s
overall cost has to be lower than the fixed-price market in order for the user to join it. Finally, (69)
holds because we assumed the spot market to be cheaper with bid 𝑐 > 𝑐𝐿 . A job with waiting cost
𝑐𝐿 would therefore also strictly prefer the spot market, a contradiction.
Assume there exists a waiting cost 𝑐 < 𝑐𝑈 at which a user would prefer the spot market or be
indifferent between spot and fixed-price market, and for which the waiting time is lower in the spot
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market than in the fixed-price market, i.e., for which𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) < 𝑤 (F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎). Then similarly
𝑐𝑈𝑤 (S, 𝑐𝑈 , 𝜌, 𝜎) +𝑚(S, 𝑐𝑈 , 𝜌, 𝜎) (73)
≤ 𝑐𝑈𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) +𝑚(S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) (74)
= 𝑐𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) +𝑚(S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) + (𝑐𝑈 − 𝑐)𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) (75)
< 𝑐𝑤 (F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) +𝑚(F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) + (𝑐𝑈 − 𝑐)𝑤 (F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) (76)
= 𝑐𝑈𝑤 (F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) +𝑚(F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) (77)
A user with 𝑐𝑈 would therefore also strictly prefer the spot market, a contradiction.
Therefore, for all 𝑐 ∈ [𝑐𝐿, 𝑐𝑈 ] the spot market can neither be faster nor cheaper than the fixed-
price market. If any users with waiting cost 𝑐 ∈ [𝑐𝐿, 𝑐𝑈 ] join the spot market they have to be
indifferent between both markets. Thus, for any 𝜎∗ to be a BNE, this means that at most a set of
measure zero of such users can join the spot market, and thus the total waiting time and payment
stay constant over the whole interval. The statement of the lemma immediately follows. □
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4.4
It follows from Lemma A.2 that any equilibrium strategy profile is of the form 𝜎∗ = (−→𝑐 𝐿,−→𝑐 𝑈 ,−→𝑐 𝐻 ):
Let the points 𝑐𝐿 and 𝑐𝑈 be as given by Lemma A.2 and let −→𝑐 𝐻 denote the waiting costs above
which users of each class cannot obtain a positive payoff anymore and balk. Define the cutoff








. Note that this implies that 𝑐𝐿1 = 𝑐
𝐿
and 𝑐𝑈1 = 𝑐
𝑈 (because at least some users from class 1 go to the portion of the spot market that is
faster than the fixed-price market). Then Equations (19), (20) and (21) immediately follow from
Lemma A.2:
(1) Equation (19): The payoff at 𝑐𝐿 has to be the same for joining the fixed-price or spot market.
(2) Equation (20): The payoff at 𝑐𝑈 also has to be the same in the fixed-price and spot market.
(3) Equation (21): Users do not balk as long as their value for joining one of the markets is greater
than 0.
We now show that this system of equations always has a unique solution using a constructive
approach. For this, we first introduce some additional notation.
Given provider strategy 𝜌 , we know that in order to satisfy Lemma A.2, jobs that pay more in the
spot market than in the fixed-price marked need to arrive at a rate such that jobs with waiting cost
𝑐𝐿 have to queue for exactly 𝑇 . Denote this arrival rate by 𝜆(𝑇, 𝜌). We now further overload our
previous notation for a user strategy profile: for any vector 𝑐 = (𝑐1, . . . , 𝑐𝑛) with 𝑐𝑖 ≥ 𝑐 𝑗 for 𝑖 < 𝑗 , we
let 𝜎 = (𝑐, 𝜆(𝑇, 𝜌)) denote a user strategy profile where every user of class 𝑖 with waiting cost 𝑐 < 𝑐𝑖
joins the spot market, but everyone else balks even if he could obtain a positive payoff in one of
the markets. Additionally, we assume that dummy jobs of maximal priority arrive with rate 𝜆(𝑇, 𝜌)
into the spot market. Thus,𝑤 (S, 𝑐1, 𝜌, (𝑐, 𝜆(𝑇, 𝜌))) = 𝑇 by definition. Combined with Lemma A.2,
this notational trick allows us to łsimulatež the impact users with waiting costs between −→𝑐 𝑈 and
−→𝑐 𝐻 have on all other users, without yet knowing −→𝑐 𝑈 and −→𝑐 𝐻 . We now need to determine which
classes of users join the fixed-price market (in the sense that there exists a 𝑐 such that a user from
that class with waiting cost 𝑐 joins the fixed-price market) and which do not. Once we know that,
we can split the system of equations into two parts that can be solved consecutively.
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To check whether the 𝑘’th class joins the fixed-price market, i.e., whether 𝑐𝐻
𝑘
> 𝑐𝐿 , we denote by
𝑐 = (𝑐1, . . . , 𝑐𝑛) (where each 𝑐𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝜇𝑣𝑖 ]) the cutoff vector solving the following:
0 = 𝑣𝑖 −
∫ 𝑐𝑖
0
𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, (𝑐, 𝜆(𝑇, 𝜌)))𝑑𝑥 ∀𝑖 ≥ 𝑘 (78)
𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑘 ∀𝑖 < 𝑘 (79)
This has a unique solution according to Lemma A.1. Note that the cutoff vector 𝑐 here carries an
implicit dependence on 𝑘 , while 𝑐𝑘 denotes its 𝑘’th element.








𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, (𝑐, 𝜆(𝑇, 𝜌)))𝑑𝑥 −𝑤 (S, 𝑐𝑘 , 𝜌, (𝑐, 𝜆(𝑇, 𝜌))), (81)
then 𝑐𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑘 would mean that not enough users join the spot market to reach the price of the
fixed-price market at the cutoff point 𝑐𝐿 . This means that for any such 𝑐𝐿 , the system of equations
defining the equilibrium cutoff vectors (i.e., Equations (19), (20) and (21)) cannot be satisfied for
any choice of 𝑐𝑈 and −→𝑐 𝐻 . It follows that in equilibrium, 𝑐𝐿 > 𝑐𝑘 . Thus, in equilibrium, no user of
class 𝑘 joins the fixed-price market, i.e., 𝑐𝐻
𝑘
< 𝑐𝐿 .
Conversely, if Equation (80) does not hold, then setting 𝑐𝐿 > 𝑐𝑘 would mean that too many
users join the spot market, and the payment in the spot market at the cutoff point 𝑐𝐿 is larger than
the payment in the fixed-price market. Thus, in any equilibrium, some users of class 𝑘 join the
fixed-price market and 𝑐𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑘 . As𝑚(S, 𝑐𝑘 , 𝜌, (𝑐, 𝜆(𝑇, 𝜌))) is monotone decreasing in 𝑘 , it follows
that either there exists a lowest class 𝑘∗ such that (81) is satisfied and for which no user joins
the fixed-price market, or all classes join the fixed-price market in which case we set 𝑘∗ = 𝑛 + 1.
Splitting the system of equations that defines the equilibrium strategy profile at this 𝑘∗, Lemma A.1
yields that









𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, (𝑐, 𝜆(𝑇, 𝜌)))𝑑𝑥 ∀𝑖 < 𝑘∗ (82)
0 = 𝑣𝑖 −
∫ 𝑐𝑖
0
𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, (𝑐, 𝜆(𝑇, 𝜌)))𝑑𝑥 ∀𝑖 ≥ 𝑘∗ (83)
has a unique solutionwith 𝑐𝑘∗ < 𝑐𝑘∗−1 and for any equilibrium (
−→𝑐 𝐿,−→𝑐 𝑈 ,−→𝑐 𝐻 ) it holds that 𝑐𝐿 = 𝑐𝑘∗−1
and 𝑐𝐻𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 for all 𝑖 ≥ 𝑘
∗.
Given the solution to (82) and (83), we can now equivalently find the highest class 𝑘∗∗ that joins




). To this end, fix any 𝑘 < 𝑘∗. Again
carrying an implicit dependence on 𝑘 , we define temporary cutoff vectors 𝑐𝑈 and 𝑐𝐻 . Set 𝑐𝐻𝑖 = 𝑐
𝐿
for all 𝑘 < 𝑖 < 𝑘∗ and 𝑐𝐻𝑖 =
−→𝑐 𝐻𝑖 for all 𝑖 ≥ 𝑘
∗. Further let 𝑐𝑈 and 𝑐𝐻𝑖 for 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 be given as the
solution to









0 = 𝑣𝑖 −
∫ 𝑐𝐻𝑖
0





𝑖 ) ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑘 + 1. (86)
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This system of equations has a unique solution for every 𝑘 < 𝑘∗ according to Lemma A.1. Intuitively,
(−→𝑐 𝐿, 𝑐𝑈 , 𝑐𝐻 ) can be seen as the strategy profile where users with waiting costs below 𝑐𝐿 play the
equilibrium strategy, no user joins the fixed-price market, and users with waiting costs above the
point where class 𝑘 + 1 would obtain zero payoff in the fixed-price market join the spot market
(if their payoff for doing so is positive). This means that under this strategy profile more users
join the spot market than would under any potential equilibrium strategy profile where 𝑐𝑈 > 𝑐𝑈
𝑘+1
.
Analogous to 𝑘∗, there now exists a lowest class 𝑘∗∗ < 𝑘∗, such that if only jobs of classes 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘∗∗
join the upper part of the spot market, there are still enough users that potentially (i.e., as long
as the fixed-price market isn’t better) join the spot market, such that the waiting time in the spot
market at 𝑐𝑈
𝑘
is at least as high as the waiting time in the fixed-price market, i.e., 𝑘∗∗ is the smallest




≤ 𝑤 (S, 𝑐𝑈𝑘 , 𝜌, (
−→𝑐 𝐿, 𝑐𝑈 , 𝑐𝐻 )) . (87)
Conversely, if users of classes higher than 𝑘∗∗ would join the upper portion of the spot market (i.e.
𝑐𝑈 ≤ 𝑐𝑈
𝑘∗∗+1
) then the waiting time in the spot market at 𝑐𝑈 is always above 𝑇 + 1
𝜇
. Consequently,
we can calculate −→𝑐 𝐻𝑖 for 𝑘
∗∗
< 𝑖 < 𝑘∗ as the solution to
0 = 𝑣𝑖 −







Then finally, we can calculate 𝑐𝑈 and −→𝑐 𝐻𝑖 for 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘
∗∗ as the solution to









𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, (−→𝑐 𝐿,−→𝑐 𝑈 ,−→𝑐 𝐻 ))𝑑𝑥 (89)
0 = 𝑣𝑖 −
∫ 𝑐𝐻𝑖
0
𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, (−→𝑐 𝐿,−→𝑐 𝑈 ,−→𝑐 𝐻 ))𝑑𝑥 ∀𝑖 ≤ 𝑘∗∗, (90)
which, given 𝑐𝐿 and 𝑐𝐻𝑖 for all 𝑖 > 𝑘
∗∗ now also has a unique solution according to Lemma A.1.
As each of the successively solved subsystems of equations was, at the time it was solved,
independent of the then unsolved parts, (−→𝑐 𝐿,−→𝑐 𝑈 ,−→𝑐 𝐻 ) solves the whole system of equations.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 4.6
For 𝑙𝑆 > 0, all users with waiting costs in some neighborhood around zero prefer the spot market.
Let 𝜌 be a provider strategy with 𝑙𝑆 > 0 that is proper. Assume we have an equilibriumwhere no one
joins the fixed-price market, i.e., where the hybrid market degenerates to the spot market. A user of

















< 𝑇 ) could then obtain a better payoff by switching to the fixed-price
market, leading to a contradiction. Any BNE therefore has some users joining the fixed-price
market.







≥ 𝑇 (i.e., when
the spot market is always slower than the fixed-price market). Proposition 4.3 gives us that any
equilibrium where some users join the fixed-price market is of the form 𝜎 = (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵). At any
waiting cost 𝑐 for which users of some class 𝑖 balk under 𝜎 = (−→𝑐 𝑆 ) but join the spot market under
𝜎 = (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵), their payoff in the spot market needs to be higher under 𝜎 = (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵), i.e.,
𝜋𝑐𝑖 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, (
−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵)) ≥ 0 ≥ 𝜋𝑐𝑖 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, (
−→𝑐 𝑆 )) . (91)
The payment and waiting time in the spot market are only changing in the bid 𝑐 at bids for which
any users go into the spot market. It directly follows that a user’s payoff in the spot market (if he
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were to choose it) is (weakly) higher for any user (and thus also for users with waiting cost 𝑐𝑆
1
)

























, 𝜌, (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵)),
(92)
i.e., users of class 1 with waiting cost 𝑐𝑆
1
would deviate from 𝜎 = (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵), contradicting that
𝜎∗ = (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵) is a BNE.







< 𝑇 (i.e., when
the spot market is faster for the highest bids). If no 𝑐 ′ exists for which the expected waiting time
in both queues is equal (i.e., for which condition (a) from Definition 4.5 holds), the spot market is
trivially faster for every user (and consequently also cheaper) and the statement follows by the


















𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝑑𝑥 (93)
for 𝑐 ′ such that 𝑇 + 1
𝜇







𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝑑𝑥 − 𝑐 ′𝑤 (S, 𝑐 ′, 𝜌, 𝜎). (94)
This means that even with bid 𝑐 ′, for which the fixed-price market has the same total waiting time
as the spot market, joining the spot market is still cheaper. We now show that, in this case, there
only exist BNEs where no user joins the fixed-price market. Since the payoff in the spot market
for every user is monotone decreasing in the number of users that join, it is enough to show that
when playing 𝜎 = −→𝑐 𝑆 , no user has an incentive to switch to the fixed-price market.
A user with waiting cost 𝑐 ′ clearly has no reason to switch. Assume that a user of class 𝑖 with
waiting cost 𝑐 ≠ 𝑐 ′ would prefer to switch to the fixed-price market. Misreporting his class as 𝑐 ′
and joining the spot market would then lead to a payoff of
𝜋𝑐𝑖 (S, 𝑐
′, 𝜌,−→𝑐 𝑆 ) = 𝑣𝑖 −
∫ 𝑐′
0








≥ 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑝𝐹
1
𝜇




= 𝜋𝑐𝑖 (F , 𝑐, 𝜌,
−→𝑐 𝑆 ) (98)
> 𝜋𝑐𝑖 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌,
−→𝑐 𝑆 ) (99)
Misreporting in the spot market would therefore be beneficial over reporting truthfully, contra-
dicting the pricing rule being Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. Consequently, no user prefers the
fixed-price market and by Theorem 4.2 it holds that 𝜎∗ = −→𝑐 𝑆 .
A.7 Lemma A.3
The proof of Theorem 5.4 requires the introduction of an additional technical Lemma. The following
Lemma establishes that the average payments in the spot market approach the payments in the
fixed-price market for small enough 𝑙𝑆 .
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Lemma A.3. For any strategy 𝜎∗ = (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵) or 𝜎∗ = (−→𝑐 𝐿,−→𝑐 𝑈 ,−→𝑐 𝐻 ), denote by ?̄?(S, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) the
average payment in the spot market, i.e., respectively

















𝑚(S, 𝑥, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) 𝑓𝑖 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥 +
∫ 𝑐𝐻𝑖
𝑐𝑈𝑖











For every setting, 𝑝𝐹 < 𝜇𝑣1 and 𝜀 > 0, there exists a (possibly fractional) number of spot instances
𝑙𝑆 ≤ 𝑙 such that for 𝜌 = (𝑝𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 ) it holds that ?̄?(S, 𝜌, 𝜎
∗) is greater than the expected payment in the
fixed-price market minus 𝜀, i.e.




Proof. For any fixed 𝑝𝐹 there exists some number of spot instances 𝑙
′ such that all provider
strategies 𝜌 = (𝑝𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 ) with 0 < 𝑙𝑆 ≤ 𝑙
′ result in an equilibrium that is either of the form 𝜎∗ =







for all 0 < 𝑙𝑆 ≤ 𝑙
′ and therefore 𝜎∗ = (−→𝑐 𝐿,−→𝑐 𝑈 ,−→𝑐 𝐻 ). To keep the proof readable, we introduce
new notation to draw all waiting costs in the spot market from a single distribution instead of first
drawing a job’s class and then its waiting cost. Note that this does not change the number of jobs
or their bids nor their waiting costs in the market. For provider strategy 𝜌 and equilibrium strategy

































with similarly constructed PDF 𝑓𝑆 (𝑐). Now consider an artificial spot market with arrival rate 𝜆𝑆 ,
where every arriving job’s waiting cost is drawn from 𝐹𝑆 and everyone joins. From the provider’s
point of view, this market is the same as the normal spot market that would result from her playing
𝜌 , including users on average having the same expected payments. To analyze the provider’s profit
from the spot market when playing 𝜌 , we can thus instead analyze this artificial market.
The per-user-average profit ?̄?(S, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) of the artificial spot market is given by taking the
expectation of the payment𝑚(S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎∗), where the expectation is taken over 𝑐 drawn from the
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PDF 𝑓𝑆 (𝑐):

















𝑚(S, 𝑥, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) 𝑓𝑆 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥 (107)
= 𝐸𝑐∼𝑓𝑆 [𝑚(S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎
∗)] (108)
Now, for any 𝑙𝑆 and any 0 < 𝜉 < 1 define 𝑐
𝑙𝑆
𝜉
as the waiting cost with 𝐹𝑆 (𝑐
𝑙𝑆
𝜉
) = 𝜉 . It then follows
by Markov’s inequality that





, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) (109)
= (1 − 𝜉)𝑚(S, 𝑐𝑙𝑆
𝜉
, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) . (110)











≤ 𝑐𝐿 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑐∈[0,𝑐𝐿] 𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎








Now observe that the cutoff point 𝑐𝐿 goes to zero as the spot market becomes sufficiently small
(i.e., 𝑐𝐿 −−−→
𝑙𝑆→0
0). Combined with Equation (113), it follows that the waiting time goes to infinity for
users with bid 0, i.e.:
𝑤 (S, 0, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) −−−→
𝑙𝑆→0
∞. (114)
As a job with bid 0 is served exactly when there is an idle instance in the spot queue (i.e., there are
fewer than 𝑙𝑆 jobs of higher priority in the spot queue), the instance utilization of the spot queue






Now fix some 𝜉 > 0. It holds that







(1 − 𝜉)1 (116)
i.e., as the size of the spot market goes towards zero, the (average) utilization of the spot instances
by jobs with priority over 𝑐𝑙𝑆
𝜉
will always at most be (1 − 𝜉). For a given 𝜉 (but independent of 𝑙𝑆 ),
this limits the total waiting time at 𝑐𝑙𝑆
𝜉
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, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) < 𝑚(S, 𝑐𝑙𝑆
𝜉
, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) trivially) or the following holds:
𝑚(S, 𝑐𝐿
1











































, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) −𝑤 (S, 𝑐𝐿
1









, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) + 𝑐𝐿
1
(?̄?𝜉 −𝑤 (S, 𝑐
𝐿
1
, 𝜌, 𝜎∗)) (121)
=𝑚(S, 𝑐𝑙𝑆
𝜉
, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) + 𝑐𝐿
1
(?̄?𝜉 −𝑤 (S, 𝑐
𝐿
1





0, it follows that, for all 0 < 𝜉 < 1 and all 𝛿 > 0 there exists an 𝑙𝑆 with
𝑚(S, 𝑐𝑙𝑆
𝜉
, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) ≥ 𝑚(S, 𝑐𝐿
1
, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) − 𝛿 and therefore
?̄?(S, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) ≥ (1 − 𝜉)𝑚(S, 𝑐𝑙𝑆
𝜉
, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) (123)
≥ (1 − 𝜉) (𝑚(S, 𝑐𝐿
1
, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) − 𝛿) (124)
Choosing 𝜉 and 𝛿 such that 1
2
𝜀 ≥ 𝜉𝑚(S, 𝑐𝐿
1
, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) + (1 − 𝜉)𝛿 and noting that by Lemma A.2 it holds
𝑚(S, 𝑐𝐿
1




?̄?(S, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) ≥ 𝑚(S, 𝑐𝐿
1










and the statement of the lemma follows.







and 𝜎∗ = (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵), we analogously (only replacing the relevant
notation) obtain
?̄?(S, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) ≥ 𝑚(S, 𝑐𝑃
1




Because users with waiting cost −→𝑐 𝑃
1















, 𝜌, 𝜎∗). Solving this for𝑚(S, 𝑐𝑃
1
, 𝜌, 𝜎∗) and substituting it
into Equation (126) yields








































− 𝑇 increases in 𝑙𝑆




0. For any 𝜀 > 0, 𝑙𝑆 small enough therefore yields the statement of the
lemma. □
B BASIS OF THE NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we give a precise description of how we calculate waiting times and preemption
probabilities for the numerical examples. In the following we let 𝜑 (𝑙, 𝜆
𝜇
) denote the probability that
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fewer than 𝑙 jobs are currently in a queue with 𝑙 instances, arrival rate 𝜆 and with expected job
service time 1
𝜇
. For memoryless queues, 𝜑 (𝑙, 𝜆
𝜇























Given this, the required calculations of the numerical example for the fixed-price queue are
straightforward, while we need to make additional simplifying assumptions for the spot queue.
B.1 Fixed-priceQueue
For a fixed-price queue, the total waiting time𝑤 (F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) and payment𝑚(F , 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) are directly
determined by the parameters of the setting. The only thing left to calculate is the minimal number
of instances 𝑙𝐹 (𝜌, 𝜎) required to serve all users in the fixed-price market while observing the upper
bound on the queuing time 𝑇 . This can easily be done using the Erlang C formula, as it is well
known that the expected queuing time 𝑞(𝑙, 𝜆
𝜇
) of a user joining a FIFO queue with 𝑙 instances,












See (Cooper 1981) for a proof. Plugging in the arrival rate into the fixed-price market for any pair
of strategies (𝜌, 𝜎) and solving 𝑞(𝑙𝐹 (𝜌, 𝜎)) = 𝑇 then yields 𝑙𝐹 (𝜌, 𝜎).
B.2 SpotQueue
For the spot queue, the total waiting time𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) and payment𝑚(S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) are not directly
determined by the setting because they depend on the dynamics of the queue. Unfortunately, we
cannot directly use the Erlang C to derive those terms because this would require that the running
times and queuing times for all users are equal (Buzen and Bondi 1983). Since with priorities, and
especially when costly preemptions are present, they are not equal, we make the following two
simplifying assumptions (for the numerical examples only). This then allows us to calculate waiting
times and preemption probabilities.
Assumption. For calculating𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎), we assume that jobs, while running, see the steady state
distribution over states of the spot queue (when looking at the queue not including itself).
Note that Assumption B.2 would be exactly satisfied if a given job ran for an infinite amount of
time. Since jobs start in a random state but end in a state in which the queue has free capacity for a
job of the same priority, jobs in practice see more "busyž states than in steady state and consequently
take slightly longer to run. Importantly, we only make this assumption when calculating any single
jobs’s runtime, but we still calculate the steady state of the queue exactly to avoid the accumulation
of approximation errors.
Assumption. Any additional running time above and beyond a job’s service time 1
𝜇
is run on
łabstractž additional instances and does not influence the spot queue’s steady state. However, while run
on these abstract instances, a job still causes load-dependent costs for the provider and is still (internally
and externally) preempted as if it was in the queue, as denoted by𝜓𝐼 (𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) and𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 ).
20See for example (Cooper 1981); a proof of the Erlang C formula can be found in (Takagi 2008).
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Effectively, Assumption B.2 dynamically gives the spot market more instances than it actually
has, to accommodate the additional running time needed due to preemptions.
Taken together, these two assumptions give us the following very useful Lemma.
Lemma B.1. During its time in the spot queue, a job with bid 𝑐 sees the steady state distribution of a
FIFO queue with arrival rate 𝜆(𝑐) and service time 1
𝜇
. Here, 𝜆(𝑐) denotes the arrival rate of jobs with a
higher priority; i.e., during any time unit, on average, 𝜆(𝑐) jobs with a higher priority than 𝑐 arrive
into the queue.
Proof. Note that jobs with a lower bid do not influence the total waiting time of a user and can
thus be ignored. As the probability that any other user in the system also has a waiting cost of
exactly 𝑐 is zero, we can assume that every other job has a strictly higher bid and thus a strictly
higher priority. Combining this with Assumption B.2, we can assume that the job, while running,
sees the steady state probabilities of the queue consisting of only those users with higher priorities
than itself. Furthermore, by Assumption B.2, these steady state probabilities are the same as the
steady state probabilities with zero preemption costs, which in turn are the same as the steady
state probabilities of a FIFO queue consisting of all users with higher priority (see Buzen and Bondi
(1983)). Taken together, the statement follows. □
Given Lemma B.1, we can now derive expressions for the waiting time and the expected number
of internal preemptions per time unit.
Proposition B.2. Given Assumptions B.2 and B.2, provider strategy 𝜌 = (𝑝𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 ), and user strategy
profile 𝜎 , the total waiting time of a user with bid 𝑐 is given by
𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) =






where 𝜆(𝑐) denotes the arrival rate of jobs with a bid higher than 𝑐 into the spot queue (given 𝜎).
Proof. Recall that the waiting time is defined as
𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) = 𝑞(S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) + 𝑟 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎). (131)
Observe that when a job with bid 𝑐 is in the spot queue, it is run whenever there are fewer than
𝑙𝑆 jobs with a higher bid in the system. By Lemma B.1, during its runtime, a jobs sees the steady
state distribution of a FIFO queue with arrival rate 𝜆(𝑐) and service time 1
𝜇
. Thus, to be running for





The statement of the Proposition now follows by noting that the running time of a job is given by
𝑟 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎). □
Proposition B.3. Given Assumptions B.2 and B.2, provider strategy 𝜌 = (𝑝𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 ), and user strategy
profile 𝜎 , the expected number of internal preemptions per time unit of a user with bid 𝑐 is given by
𝜓𝐼 (𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) =









where 𝜆(𝑐) denotes the arrival rate of jobs with a bid higher than 𝑐 into the spot queue (given 𝜎).
Proof. While a job with bid 𝑐 is running, it will be internally preempted whenever the system
contains exactly 𝑙𝑆 − 1 jobs of higher priority and another job of higher priority arrives. By Lemma
B.1, during its runtime, the job sees the steady state distribution of a FIFO queue with arrival
rate 𝜆(𝑐) and service time 1
𝜇
. Thus, given a newly-arriving job (with priority higher than 𝑐), the
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probability that this job preempts the job with bid 𝑐 is equal to the probability that the FIFO queue











(see (Cooper 1981)). Since we are interested in the preemption rate taken over the running time
of the job (as opposed to the total time the job is in the system), we normalize this term by the
probability that less than 𝑙𝑆 jobs of higher priority are in the system. Because 𝜆(𝑐) jobs with higher
priority arrive per time unit, we also multiply with 𝜆(𝑐), which yields



























Taking the expression for the waiting time from Proposition B.2, plugging in the expression
for the running time from Proposition 3.1, and lastly plugging in the expression for the internal
preemptions from Proposition B.3, we can now write the expected total waiting time𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎)
of a user joining the spot queue as
















1 − 𝜏 (








Using the iterative approach described in the proof of Proposition 4.4, we can calculate the cutoff
vectors of the user equilibrium strategies by solving a number of non-linear root searches. This
allows us to calculate payments and profits and search for the optimal provider strategy 𝜌 = (𝑝𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 ).
C USERWELFARE IN EXAMPLE 1



















Fig. 5 User welfare under different strategies
while varying the instance costs 𝜅
To help us better understand




affects the users, Figure
5 shows the user welfare for this
strategy and compares it against
the fixed-price strategy (we omit
the other two strategies because
plotting all four strategies makes
the figure very hard to read). As
we can see, for the fixed-price
strategy (dashed blue line), the
user welfare monotonically de-
creases in the instance costs 𝜅.
While the instance costs do not
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directly affect the users, they influence the optimal provider strategies. This leads to the observed
discontinuities in the welfare, since instances can only be bought in discrete units and the provider
consequently changes her strategy in discrete steps.
It is clearly visible that the hybrid strategy with 𝑝𝐹 = 𝑝
∗0
𝐹
(the dotted black line) shares many
large discontinuity points with the fixed-price strategy (the dashed blue line). This happens because
both strategies share the same price 𝑝∗0
𝐹
, which at these points increases, causing some users to balk
and making everyone that remains in the fixed-price market worse off. However, the size of the
discontinuities may differ, because under the hybrid strategy, some users might additionally move
from the fixed-price to the spot market. Perhaps surprisingly, between these shared discontinuity
points, the welfare corresponding to the hybrid strategy often increases. This happens because
the provider is restricted to 𝑝𝐹 = 𝑝
∗0
𝐹
and cannot optimally increase her price, so has to change
𝑙𝑆 instead. To understand this in more detail, consider a situation where a cost increase does not
lead to a change of 𝑝𝐹 , but where the provider still wants users to move out of the relatively less
profitable fixed-price market and into the spot market. In this situation, she then has to increase
the attractiveness of the spot market, which increases the user welfare. Finally, as expected, the
hybrid strategy with 𝑝𝐹 = 𝑝
∗0
𝐹
always leads to a higher user welfare than the fixed-price strategy,
which can be seen by the dotted black line always lying above the dashed blue line.
D USING IDLE FIXED-PRICE INSTANCES FOR THE SPOT MARKET
In this section, we consider an alternative model where the provider takes the spot instances
from the pool of currently idle fixed-price instances instead of using other idle capacity (long-term
reserved instances, maintenance capacity, etc.). In Section D.1., we first discuss the importance
of using instances that are reliably idle for the spot market and why the fixed-price market is
typically not the best source for such instances. Nevertheless, as some providers may want to use
idle instances from the fixed-price market, we then show how the new cross-channel interactions
change our results compared to our main model. In Section D.2, we first present the required
changes to the model. In Section D.3, we then show how the equilibria of the user game change.
Finally, in Section D.4, we then derive a similar condition for how a provider can simultaneously
achieve a profit increase and a Pareto improvement for the users (as we did for our main model).
D.1 The Availability of Reliably Idle Instances from the Fixed-Price Market
As preemptions are costly for the users, the łusefulnessž of an idle instance critically relies on
how reliably idle it is (i.e., for how long the instance will remain idle). Therefore, the provider
should use the most reliably idle instances for the spot market. While fixed-price markets of large
cloud providers do contain a reasonable number of idle instances on average, only few of those
instances are reliably idle and providers should not simply put any idle fixed-price instance on the
spot market. This is due to two effects: larger markets require relatively smaller buffers and these
buffers will be used more frequently the larger the market (but for increasingly shorter durations).
To see this, we now provide a simple but striking numerical example.
Example D.1. Consider two M/M/l queues, one with arrival rate 100 and one with arrival rate
1000. Assume for both an expected service time of 1
𝜇
= 1 and an SLA of 𝑇 = 0.0001. We can use
the Erlang C formula to derive that we need a buffer of 22 instances to satisfy the SLA for the
first queue with arrival rate of 100 (i.e., the provider needs 𝑙𝐹 = 122 fixed-price instances). For the
second queue with arrival rate 1000 the required buffer only grows from 22 to 55 (i.e., the provider
now needs 𝑙𝐹 = 1055 fixed-price instances).
Now assume that the provider uses up to 1 idle instance for a spot queue, i.e., 𝑙𝑠 = 1. Assume
that this idle instance comes from the first queue (with arrival rate 100) and whenever the provider
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has at least 1 idle fixed-price instance and no spot job is running, he starts a new spot job. Then a
job in the spot market would in expectation get externally preempted at a rate of𝜓𝐸 = 0.47. For
the second queue (with arrival rate 1000), the rate of external preemptions for spot jobs rises to
𝜓𝐸 = 3.07. For both queues, the high preemption rate occurs because a large queue can frequently
reach zero idle capacity while still satisfying the SLA, as it is highly likely that another instance
becomes free shortly thereafter (and because newly-arriving users are willing to wait a little bit).
However, any time this happens, the spot instance is immediately preempted. This effect becomes
more pronounced the larger the fixed-price queue, which explains the large rise of the preemption
rate for the second queue with arrival rate 1000.
In practice, the provider wants to keep the preemption rate reasonably low. To this end, she
can decide to only start spot jobs whenever the expected time until any running spot job will be
externally preempted is above some threshold 𝑡𝐸 , resulting in𝜓𝐸 <
1
𝑡𝐸
. While doing this reduces
the number of external preemptions, this of course also further reduces the supply of instances for
the spot market. For example, if the provider wanted to ensure that jobs (in expectation) run for at
least 𝑡𝐸 = 20 before they get preempted (leading to𝜓𝐸 <
1
𝑡𝐸
= 0.05), then she would have to only
start spot jobs when the fixed-price queue contains less than 105 jobs (for the queue with arrival
rate 100 and 𝑙𝐹 = 122 fixed-price instances) and less than 957 jobs (for the queue with arrival rate
1000 and 𝑙𝐹 = 1055 fixed-price instances).
21
Note that the size of the effects observed in the example are particularly large because the
example considers memoryless service processes. While real-world service processes are usually
heavy-tailed (which leads to larger and more reliably idle buffers), the observation that larger
fixed-price markets lead to less reliably idle instances remains true in practice. Thus, a provider who
wants to limit the number of external preemptions can only offer relatively few reliably idle fixed-
price instances on the spot market. Additionally, the provider has to consider the cross-channel
effects that occur when users move from the fixed-price market to the spot market, which decreases
the number of fixed-price instances but not the number of users. While a provider can nevertheless
choose to offer idle fixed-price instances on the spot market, most providers typically have access to
many alternative instances that are more reliably idle than most idle instances from the fixed-price
market. This includes instances from other business areas (e.g., long-term reserved instances),
maintenance instances (which make up 5-10% of the capacity of a cloud computing center), etc. At
least some of these alternatives are available for all current major cloud providers.
D.2 Required Model Changes
Even though most idle instances from the fixed-price market are typically not reliably idle, some
cloud providers may still want to use them for a secondary spot market. Therefore, we now show
how to adapt our model to using idle fixed-price instances. The most immediate change is that
an external preemption now happens whenever a spot user is preempted in favor of a fixed-price
user. Thus, while previously the number of external preemptions𝜓𝐸 (𝑙𝑆 ) was a function given by
the setting that only depended on the provider’s strategy 𝜌 , the number of external preemptions
𝜓𝐸 (𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) now arises from the queueing system. Specifically, it now also depends on the strategies
of all other users 𝜎 and, because lower bids get preempted first, also on a user’s bid 𝑐 . While in
our main model, 𝑙𝑆 denotes the (average) number of offered spot instances, it now denotes the
maximum number of idle fixed-price instances the provider offers on the spot market, i.e., 𝑙𝑆 is now
an upper bound on the number of offered spot instances.
21The preemption rates and the expected time until the next preemption can be calculated by solving the difference equations
of the corresponding Markov chains.
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To control the number of external preemptions and only offer sufficiently reliably idle instances
on the spot market, we introduce an additional strategy variable for the provider 𝑡𝐸 , which denotes
that the provider only starts a new spot job whenever, after starting this job, the expected time
until the next external preemption for any running spot job is above the threshold 𝑡𝐸 . Thus, given
provider strategy 𝜌 = (𝑝𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 , 𝑡𝐸), for a job to be started in the spot market, four conditions have
to be satisfied: (1) no job with a higher priority is waiting; (2) if the job started, there would be at
most 𝑙𝑆 spot jobs running, (3) there has to be an idle fixed-price instance or there is currently a
spot job with a lower priority running, and (4) if the job started now, the expected time until the
next external preemption for any running spot job would be at least 𝑡𝐸 . Note that this implies that
a spot job with low priority is not immediately preempted when a spot job with higher priority
is waiting if the expected time until the next external preemption is currently too low. Due to
the new cross-channel interactions that arise because the spot instances are now taken from the
fixed-price market, both the running time 𝑟 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) and the queuing time 𝑞(S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) in the
spot market are now highly dependent on the number of users that join the fixed-price market.
Additionally, if the threshold 𝑡𝐸 is set too high (for a given user strategy profile 𝜎), then the provider
may never start a spot job (effectively not offering a spot market). A setting in our alternative model
is now fully defined by (𝑛, 𝑣, 𝜆, 𝜇, 𝐹 , 𝜏, 𝜅𝐹 , 𝜅𝐿,𝑇 ) because the alternative model does not contain
a maximum number of available spot instances 𝑙 nor an exogenous function for the number of
external preemptions.
Because larger fixed-price markets can have less reliably idle capacity than smaller markets
(see Example D.1), we may observe the counterintuitive effect that the waiting time of the users
with the highest priority in the spot market can decrease in the number of people that join the
spot market. However, the overall costs of any user joining the spot market, i.e,
∫ 𝑐
0
𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝑑𝑥
typically increase for any fixed 𝑐 if more users move to the spot market. To see this, note that when
users move from the fixed-price market to the spot market, the total number of instances decreases,
but the number of users does not. Yet we cannot say with certainty that
∫ 𝑐
0
𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝑑𝑥 always
increases because the service discipline of the whole market is not work-conserving (i.e., there can
be an idle instance even though jobs are waiting when the time until the next external preemption is
too low) and these dynamics change whenever users move from the fixed-price to the spot market.
While this effect is typically negligible compared to the reduction in the number of instances in
the system, we cannot fully exclude the possibility that there could be some parameterizations
for which there is a 𝜎 where
∫ 𝑐
0
𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝑑𝑥 is locally decreasing in the number of users that
choose the spot market. To avoid having to handle those cases (which do not change the form of the
potential equilibria, but could in rare cases potentially lead to the existence of multiple equilibria)
we therefore make the following assumption for the rest of the paper:
Assumption. The overall cost of a user with any fixed bid 𝑐 that joins the spot market, i.e.∫ 𝑐
0
𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝑑𝑥 , increases if additional users (compared to 𝜎) move to the spot market.
D.3 Equilibria
Whenever some instances are actually offered on the spot market, we obtain an equilibrium structure
similar to the one derived in Subsection 4.3.1:
Proposition D.2. For any provider strategy 𝜌 = (𝑝𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 , 𝑡𝐸), in any BNE of the user game where
any user joins the spot market, any equilibrium strategy profile is of the form 𝜎∗ = (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵). Here,
𝜎 = (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵) denotes that a user of class 𝑖 with waiting cost c joins the spot market when 𝑐 < 𝑐𝑃𝑖 ≤ 𝑐
𝐵
𝑖
and the fixed-price market when 𝑐𝑃𝑖 < 𝑐 < 𝑐
𝐵
𝑖 ; when 𝑐 > 𝑐
𝐵
𝑖 , he balks and does not join any market. The
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cutoff point 𝑐𝑃
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𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵))𝑑𝑥 (138)











𝑤 (S, 𝑥, 𝜌, (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵))𝑑𝑥
}
∀𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛} (139)





Proof. Even users with the highest bid in the spot market have to queue longer than users in
the fixed-price market, because (by definition) a user only gets served in the spot market when the
fixed-price market has idle capacity. Thus, all users in the spot market are willing to pay strictly
less than what they would have to pay in the fixed-price market. The remainder of the proof is
equivalent to the proof of Proposition 4.3. □
While this gives us the structure of the equilibrium when some spot instances are offered and
utilized, the following proposition tells us when that is the case.
Proposition D.3. For any provider strategy 𝜌 = (𝑝𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 , 𝑡𝐸), the equilibrium strategy profile of the
users is
(1) 𝜎∗ = −→𝑐 𝐹 (i.e., no user joins the spot market, as described in Proposition 4.1) if and only if 𝑙𝑆 = 0
or 𝑡𝐸 is łtoo high,ž i.e., the fixed-price queue arising from 𝜎 =
−→𝑐 𝐹 has no state for which the
expected time until the next external preemption of a hypothetically starting spot job would be
more than 𝑡𝐸 .
(2) 𝜎∗ = (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵) otherwise.
Proof. Recall from Proposition 4.1 that 𝜎 = −→𝑐 𝐹 is the equilibrium user strategy profile when
no spot market is offered. We denote by (−→𝑥 ,−→𝑐 𝐹 ) a different strategy profile where any user of
class 𝑖 with waiting cost 𝑐 joins the spot market if 𝑐 < 𝑥𝑖 . We now look at different provider




trivially. Now assume that the fixed-price queue arising from 𝜎 = −→𝑐 𝐹 has no state for which the
expected time until the next external preemption of a hypothetically starting spot job would be
more than 𝑡𝐸 . Then, as long as almost all users (i.e., all besides at most a null set) play 𝜎 =
−→𝑐 𝐹 , the
provider would never start a spot job, even if a single user deviated to the spot market and 𝑙𝑆 > 0.
Consequently, it holds that
∫ 𝑥
0
𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝑑𝑐 = ∞. By Assumption D.2, it immediately follows that∫ 𝑥
0
𝑤 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, (−→𝑥 ,−→𝑐 𝐹 ))𝑑𝑐 = ∞ for any −→𝑥 and thus, in equilibrium, no user joins the spot market.
On the other hand, if 𝑙𝑠 > 0 and if the fixed-price queue arising from user strategy profile 𝜎 =
−→𝑐 𝐹
has a state for which the expected time until the next external preemption of a hypothetically
starting spot job would be more than 𝑡𝐸 , then users with waiting cost very close to 0 prefer the
spot market and by Proposition D.2 it holds that 𝜎∗ = (−→𝑐 𝑃 ,−→𝑐 𝐵). □
D.4 Well-behaved Settings: Increasing Provider Profit and User Welfare
We now show how the profit and welfare result from our main model translates to the alternative
model. First note that the bound from Lemma 5.1 on the number of saved fixed-price instances
per fixed-price user who moves to the spot market still holds, as the mechanics of the fixed-price
market did not change. Next, we translate Lemma 5.2 to the alternative model.
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Lemma D.4. The average running time in the spot market (i.e., the left-hand side of the following














1 − 𝜏 1
𝑡𝐸
(140)
Proof. Recall that 𝜓𝐼 (𝑦, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝑟 (S, 𝑦, 𝜌, 𝜎) denotes the number of internal preemptions a job











𝑟𝐼 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎) =𝜓𝐼 (𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝑟 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝜏
1
1 − 𝜏𝜓𝐸 (𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎)
(142)
≤𝜓𝐼 (𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝑟 (S, 𝑐, 𝜌, 𝜎)𝜏
1
1 − 𝜏 1
𝑡𝐸
, (143)
where (143) follows from (142) because, whenever a job starts to run, the expected time until the
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Given these bounds, we can now state a well-behavedness condition analogous to Definition 5.3
for our main model, where the new parameter 𝑡𝑤 corresponds to a lower bound on the strategy
variable 𝑡𝐸 (capturing the reliablity of the fixed-price instances):
Definition D.5. We say that a setting (𝑛, 𝑣, 𝜆, 𝜇, 𝐹 , 𝜏, 𝜅𝐹 , 𝜅𝐿,𝑇 ) is 𝑡
𝑤-well-behaved if 𝑡𝑤 is the
infimum over the 𝑡𝐸 for which the following holds:
1 + 𝜏𝜇






With this definition in hand, we can now show a profit and welfare result analogous to Theorem
5.4 for our main model.
Theorem D.6. Given a 𝑡𝑤-well-behaved setting (𝑛, 𝑣, 𝜆, 𝜇, 𝐹 , 𝜏, 𝜅𝐹 , 𝜅𝐿,𝑇 ) and any fixed-price strat-
egy 𝜌0 = (𝑝
0
𝐹
, 0,∞) that results in a positive profit and for which the queue arising from the corre-
sponding equilibrium user strategy profile 𝜎∗
0
has any state for which the expected time until the next
external preemption of a hypothetically starting spot job would be more than 𝑡𝑤 , then there exists a
strategy 𝜌 = (𝑝0
𝐹
, 𝑙𝑆 , 𝑡𝐸) with the same price 𝑝
0
𝐹
, with 0 < 𝑙𝑆 and with 𝑡𝐸 ≥ 𝑡
𝑤 that yields a higher
profit for the provider, i.e.,
Π((𝑝0𝐹 , 𝑙𝑆 , 𝑡𝐸), 𝜎
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and the same strategy also yields a Pareto improvement for the users, i.e.,
∀𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛} ∀𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝜇𝑣𝑖 ] : 𝜋
𝑐
𝑖 (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎




∃𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛} ∃𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝜇𝑣𝑖 ] : 𝜋
𝑐
𝑖 (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜌, 𝜎




Proof. By Proposition D.3, any such strategy 𝜌 = (𝑝0
𝐹
, 𝑙𝑆 , 𝑡𝐸) leads to some users joining the spot
market in equilibrium. The proof of the theorem is then equivalent to the proof of Theorem 5.4




Informally, Theorem D.6 says that if the provider’s current fixed-price market has some instances
that are sufficiently reliably idle, then she can obtain a profit increase and achieve a Pareto im-
provement for the users by offering a spot market alongside her existing fixed-price market (as in
our main model). Note that, in contrast to our main model, executing the provider’s strategy in
practice is now more difficult, because it will typically be intractable to exactly calculate, for every
possible state, whether 𝑡𝐸 would be satisfied when starting a new job. However, in this case, the
provider could still approximate 𝑡𝐸 (e.g., by using historical or simulated data).
While our analysis shows that offering idle fixed-price instances on the spot market can (in
principle) be advantageous for the provider, recall from Section D.1 that a provider typically only
has relatively few fixed-price instances that are sufficiently reliably idle. In contrast, instances from
other areas of the cloud computing center (e.g., long-term reserved instances, maintenance instances,
or capacity buffers intended for hardware failure) usually offer a better stock of idle capacity. We
therefore recommend using idle instances from the fixed-price market only to bolster the supply of
instances for the spot market when the utilization of the fixed-price market is particularly low and
to instead primarily use other sources of idle capacity for the spot market.

3 On the cluster admission problem for
cloud computing
The content of this chapter has previously appeared in:
Ludwig Dierks, Ian Kash and Sven Seuken (accepted and forthcoming in 2021)
On the cluster admission problem for cloud computing. Journal of
Artificial Intelligence Research;
Ludwig Dierks, Ian Kash and Sven Seuken (2019)On the cluster admission
problem for cloud computing. Proceedings of the 14th Workshop on the
Economics of Networks.
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Cloud computing providers face the problem of matching heterogeneous customer work-
loads to resources that will serve them. This is particularly challenging if customers, who
are already running a job on a cluster, scale their resource usage up and down over time.
The provider therefore has to continuously decide whether she can add additional work-
loads to a given cluster or if doing so would impact existing workloads’ ability to scale.
Currently, this is often done using simple threshold policies to reserve large parts of each
cluster, which leads to low efficiency (i.e., low average utilization of the cluster). We pro-
pose more sophisticated policies for controlling admission to a cluster and demonstrate
that they significantly increase cluster utilization. We first introduce the cluster admission
problem and formalize it as a constrained Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
(POMDP). As it is infeasible to solve the POMDP optimally, we then systematically design
admission policies that estimate moments of each workload’s distribution of future resource
usage. Via extensive simulations grounded in a trace from Microsoft Azure, we show that
our admission policies lead to a substantial improvement over the simple threshold pol-
icy. We then show that substantial further gains are possible if high-quality information is
available about arriving workloads. Based on this, we propose an information elicitation
approach to incentivize users to provide this information and simulate its effects.
1. Introduction
Cloud computing is a fast expanding market with high competition where small efficiency
gains translate to multi-billion dollar profits.1 Like many other markets (e.g., ridesharing
platforms, kidney exchanges, online labor markets, and display advertising), the efficiency
of this market relies on the performance of a matching algorithm (Ashlagi et al., 2019;
Ma & Simchi-Levi, 2019; Behnezhad & Reyhani, 2018; Assadi et al., 2017). In the cloud
computing case, the matching algorithm matches incoming requests for virtual machines to
the hardware that will be used to satisfy them.
Despite the importance of this matching, most cloud clusters currently run at low effi-
ciency. In the cloud domain, low efficiency means low average utilization of the cluster (i.e.,
only a relatively small fraction of resources are actually used by customers at any given
time). There are many reasons for this (Yan et al., 2016). These include technical limita-
∗. An early version of this work has appeared as a 6-page extended abstract in the proceedings of the 14th
Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon’19).
†. A substantial portion of this work was done while this author was employed by Microsoft.
1. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/Investor/earnings/FY-2018-Q2/press-release-webcast
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tions (such as the need to reserve capacity for node failures or maintenance), inefficiencies
in scheduling procedures (especially if virtual machines (VMs) might change size or do not
use all of their requested capacity), as well as factors that are external to the cluster (such
as fluctuations in overall demand). Another important cause is the nature of many mod-
ern workloads: highly connected tasks running on different VMs that should be run on one
cluster to minimize latency and bandwidth use (Cortez et al., 2017). In practice, this means
that different VMs from one user are bundled together into a deployment of interdependent
workload. When the workload of a user changes, his deployment can request a scale out in
the form of additional VMs or shut some of its active VMs down.
In this paper, we pay special attention to these size changes. Changing deployment
sizes mean that providers face the difficult problem of deciding to which cluster to assign
a deployment, as a deployment which is small today may, without warning, see a dramatic
increase in size that must be accommodated. To get a sense of the difficulty of this problem,
consider that, over time, the number of VMs needed by a specific deployment could vary
by a factor 10 or even 100, and a request to scale out should almost always be accepted on
the same cluster, as denying it would impair the quality of the service, possibly alienating
customers. Furthermore, once a deployment is running in one cluster, it would be error
prone to move it to a different cluster, making such migrations only feasible as a last resort
(e.g., because of hardware failure). Providers consequently hold large parts of each cluster
as idle reserves to guarantee that only a very low percentage of these scale out requests is
ever denied, leading to relatively low average utilization.
1.1 Cluster Admission Control
We reduce the problem of determining to which cluster to assign a new deployment to the
problem of determining, for a particular cluster, whether it is safe to admit a deployment,
or if doing so would risk running out of capacity if some deployments scale (Cortez et al.,
2017). While a lot of research has been done on scheduling inside the cluster (Schwarzkopf
et al., 2013; Verma et al., 2015; Tumanov et al., 2016; Zhao et al., 2016), the admission
problem has not been well studied before. Consequently, cloud providers are often still using
simple policies like rejecting all new deployments once a cluster passes a fixed utilization
threshold, effectively reserving a percentage of the cluster only for scale-outs.These may
seem reasonable at first glance, as the law of large numbers might seem to suggest that
with many jobs in a large cluster the current utilization would be a good guide to future
utilization. But as Cortez et al. (2017) have shown, a relatively small number of deploy-
ments account for most of the utilization. This suggests that the types of deployments (i.e.,
small/large, fast/slow scaling, short/long lived etc.) currently in a cluster have a larger
impact on the failure probability than is apparent, and policies that only take the current
utilization into account are suboptimal.
1.2 Overview of Contributions
We formalize the cluster admission problem as a constrained Partially Observable Markov
Decision Process (POMDP) (Smallwood & Sondik, 1973) where each deployment behaves
according to some stochastic process and the cluster tries to maximize the number of ac-
tive compute cores without exceeding its capacity. Since the exact stochastic processes of
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individual arriving deployments are not known to the cluster, it has to reason about the
observed behavior. The large scale of the problem as well as the highly complicated under-
lying stochastic processes make finding optimal policies infeasible, even for the underlying
(fully observable) Markov Decision Process and with limited look-ahead horizon.
Since optimally solving this POMDP is not feasible, we next propose a strategy for
constructing heuristic policies via a series of simplifying assumptions. These assumptions
reduce the highly branching look-ahead space down to the approximation of a random
variable using its moments. We then present the currently used threshold policy that
does not take probabilistic information into account as well as two new policies that take
successively higher moments into account. We fit our model to data from a real-world cloud
computing center (Microsoft Azure internal jobs (Cortez et al., 2017)) and, via simulations,
show that our higher moment policies produce a 30% improvement over current practice,
which would translate to hundreds of millions of dollars a year in savings for large cloud
providers.
In our basic model, relatively little is known about arriving deployments, so the perfor-
mance gains we observe from our more sophisticated policies are driven by being able to
better condition admission decisions on the current state of the cluster. We next examine
how the utilization of the cluster can be further increased if more precise prior information
about arriving deployments is available. Prior work has explored similar opportunities in
the context of resource planning and scheduling in analytics clusters (Jyothi et al., 2016;
Rajan et al., 2016). To study the value of prior information, we introduce a simple frame-
work which captures a notion of the quality of information available. Through additional
simulations, we quantify how our policies benefit from this additional information. De-
pending on the quality of information available, the resulting gains increase to 50%− 65%
relative to current practice.
Finally, given the importance of the quality of this information, we design a new in-
formation elicitation mechanism, with the goal of simultaneously improving the cluster’s
utilization as well as the customers’ utility. This requires care to find a design that allows
meaningful information to be elicited in an incentive compatible way while being simple
for customers to use. To this end, we propose that rather than explicitly asking users
to describe the behavior of their deployments, cloud providers instead provide them with
the opportunity to group their deployments into customer-defined categories with similar
characteristics. The cloud provider can then set a small portion of the fee for a deployment
using a pricing rule based on the variance of resource demands of deployments in a category.
We show that such variance-based pricing provides users with the right incentives to (a)
label their deployments properly (into, e.g., high and low variance deployments) and (b)
structure their workloads in a way that helps the cluster run more efficiently. We provide
additional simulations to quantify the benefits of an accurate labeling.
In practice, the magnitude of the gains from our approach will depend on many de-
tails our simulations elide. However, we believe that our simulations provide a persuasive
case that (a) there are substantial economic gains available from using our new admission
policies for the process of matching deployments to clusters and (b) there are substan-
tial further improvements possible by using our information elicitation approach to elicit
relevant information from customers.
3
While our work focuses on a specific problem faced by cloud providers, our overall
approach is fundamentally about managing the tail risks of a stochastic process. In our
case, these are the rare events where the cluster runs out of capacity. Thus, our approach
may also be of interest in other domains where the management of tail risks is important,
for example in finance.
1.3 Related work
There is a large literature on cluster scheduling and load balancing (Schwarzkopf et al.,
2013; Verma et al., 2015; Tumanov et al., 2016; Wolke et al., 2015). In addition, some
work addresses a different notion of admission control to a cluster, namely how to manage
queues for workloads which will ultimately be deployed to that cluster (Delimitrou et al.,
2013). In our work, however, while studying which deployments to admit to a cluster, we
abstract away from the question of exactly which resources should be used, so our research
is orthogonal to this prior work on scheduling and load balancing.
There is also a literature that views scheduling through the lens of stochastic online bin
packing (Cohen et al., 2019; Song et al., 2014). This literature also deals with issues of
changing workloads on possibly overcommitted resources. However, the models in these pa-
pers operate at smaller scales and shorter time horizons. At these scales, the key phenomena
we study are not present.
One of the core characteristics of the cluster admission problem is that the arrival of a
new deployment into the cluster causes an increase in scale-outs in the future (i.e., until the
deployment dies). This effect of “work creating more work” is also broadly reminiscent of
mutually-exciting (Hawkes) processes (see (Hawkes, 2018) for a recent survey). These have
also been studied in the context of queuing systems (Daw & Pender, 2018), though there
are some important differences (e.g., in our problem only accepted deployments cause scale
outs and the rate of additional scale-outs varies greatly for different types of deployments).
There is a large literature on market design challenges in the context of the cloud (Kash
& Key, 2016). Existing work has studied both queueing models where decisions are made
online with no consideration of the future (Abhishek et al., 2012; Dierks & Seuken, 2019)
and reservation models which assume very strong information about the future (Azar et al.,
2015; Babaioff et al., 2017). Our work sits in an interesting intermediate position where
users may have rough information about the types of their deployments. Furthermore,
this literature focuses on using prices to determine which jobs should be served and which
should not. While our problem is similarly about accepting or rejecting deployments, we do
not want to ration through price discrimination. This is because (nearly) every request is
ultimately served by the cloud computing provider and whether it goes into this or another
cluster is of little consequence for the user.
Other market design work has looked at how multidimensional resources can be fairly
divided among deployments. For example, Dominant Resource Fairness (Ghodsi et al.,
2011) is an approach that has proven useful in practice (Hindman et al., 2011) and has
inspired follow-up work more broadly in the literature on fair division (Parkes et al., 2015;
Dolev et al., 2012; Gutman & Nisan, 2012; Kash et al., 2014). In our work, we assume that
compute cores are the resource bottleneck and we do not model multi-dimensional resource
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requirements. Therefore, the considerations studied in the above papers are not present in
our work.
Solving POMDPs is a well-studied problem (Smith & Simmons, 2005; Russell & Norvig,
2016; Roy et al., 2005). Unfortunately, finding an optimal policy is known to be PSPACE-
complete even for finite-horizon problems (Papadimitriou & Tsitsiklis, 1987). Even finding
ǫ-optimal policies is NP -hard for any fixed ǫ (Lusena et al., 2001). In our case, the problem
is further exacerbated by the existence of side constraints. Constrained POMDPS are far less
well studied than unconstrained POMDPS. General (approximation) strategies proposed in
the past include linear programming (Poupart et al., 2015; Walraven & Spaan, 2018), point-
based value iteration (Kim et al., 2011), a mix of online-look ahead and offline risk evaluation
(Undurti & How, 2010), and forward search with pruning (Santana et al., 2016). None of
these approaches is efficiently applicable when the state space of the underlying MDP is
large or, as in our case, partly continuous. Khonji, Jasour, and Williams (2019) recently
proposed a fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for constant horizon
constrained POMDPs. While their algorithm is polynomial in the size of the observation
and action spaces, it is exponential in the number of time steps. This makes it not applicable
in domains with long time horizons like cluster admission control. While some work has
addressed continuous state space POMDPs (Porta et al., 2006; Duff & Barto, 2002; Brooks
et al., 2006), none of this prior work is directly applicable to a constrained problem of the
size we study in this paper.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we formally model the cluster admission problem and then introduce a
POMDP formulation to solve the provider’s control problem.
2.1 Formal Model
We consider a single cluster in a cloud computing center. A cluster consists of c cores
that are available to perform work, also called the cluster’s capacity. These cores are used
by deployments, i.e., interdependent workloads that use one or more cores. The set of
deployments currently in the cluster is denoted by X, and each deployment x ∈ X is
assigned a number of cores Cx. Any core that is assigned to a deployment is called active,
while the remainder are called inactive.2 We do not model the exact placement of cores
inside the cluster and in consequence we also do not model the grouping of cores into VMs.
A deployment can request to scale out, i.e., increase its number of active cores. Each
such request is for one or more additional cores and must be accepted whenever activating
the requested number of cores would not make the cluster run over capacity. Following
current practice, scale out requests must be granted entirely or not at all. Deployments
may shut down some of their cores over time and these cores then become inactive. A
deployment dies when its number of active cores becomes zero. This can happen in two
ways. First, it can die by successively shutting down one core after another until reaching
2. We assume that inactive cores can become active at any time. This means that features such as hardware
failure or capacity reserved for maintenance are not modeled. This is a reasonable simplification, as they
do not significantly affect the relative utilization of policies.
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zero active cores. Second, it can die spontaneously by shutting down all of its cores at once;
intuitively this models a decision by a user to kill the deployment.3
A deployment x is described by 4 deployment parameters (Cx, µx, λx, σx). We have
already introduced the size of a deployment Cx. The remaining three parameters are drawn
independently from population-wide distributions with PDFs fλ, fµ, fσ. We now explain
how these parameters govern the behavior of the deployment.
At a high level, we assume that the deployments are memoryless (i.e., the basic processes
governing a deployment’s behavior only depend on the current state, which results in all
processes following Poisson/exponential distributions). This is common in the literature
whenever arrival and departure processes are modelled (e.g., in queuing theory), and has
been used in previous models of cloud computing (Abhishek et al., 2012; Dierks & Seuken,
2019). Memorylessness is reasonable at cloud scale and simplifies some calculations, but it
is not essential for our approach and policies.
Specifically, we assume that each core’s lifetime is distributed according to an exponen-
tial distribution with parameter µx. The maximum lifetime of a deployment (i.e., the time
between arrival and it spontaneously shutting down all of its remaining cores) is distributed
according to an exponential distribution with parameter ∆µx, where ∆ is a (population-
wide) multiplicative factor. This effectively leads to an average maximum lifetime for the
deployment of 1∆ average core lifetimes. The number of scale outs per time unit for the
deployment x is distributed according to a Poisson distribution with rate parameter λxµ
ν
x,
where ν is a population-wide parameter. This form of the rate parameter captures the em-
pirical fact that deployments with longer-lived cores scale slower than those with short lived
cores. The size of a scale out is distributed according to one plus a Poisson distribution
with parameter σx. While this is an approximation on an individual level (VM sizes usually
come in powers of 2), it is reasonable at the level of a cluster.
New deployment requests arrive over time and are accepted or rejected according to an
admission policy.4 The policy must limit the admission of new deployments to ensure that
the cluster is not forced to reject a higher percentage of scale out requests than is specified
by an internal service level agreement (SLA) τ .5 If a scale out request cannot be accepted
because the cluster is already at capacity, one failure for the purpose of meeting the SLA
is logged. An optimal policy therefore maximizes the utilization of the cluster, i.e., the
average number of active cores, while making sure the SLA is observed in expectation.
2.2 The Provider’s Control Problem: POMDP Formulation
The problem the provider is facing when deciding whether to admit a deployment is that
the decision must be made under uncertainty regarding future arrivals and the future be-
havior of deployments. In addition, the provider cannot directly observe the parameters
of each deployment’s processes. To understand how a provider can find a policy given
3. We model death as permanent because with no active cores any future request could be assigned to a
different cluster.
4. A rejected deployment is only rejected from this cluster, not from the cloud computing center as a whole.
While outside of our model, in practice it then simply gets sent to the next cluster.
5. This is a cluster-level SLA and not a deployment-level SLA, as in practice, the probability of tail-events
such as scale out failures cannot feasibly be evaluated for a single deployment.
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this uncertainty, we model the problem as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
(POMDP)(S,A,R,T,Ω,O) whose policy is constrained to meet the SLA τ .
For the POMDP formulation, we assume that time is discrete6 and that the problem
has a finite time horizon7 denoted N. The state space, denoted S, describes the space of
all possible states of the cluster. A state s ∈ S contains all information about the cluster’s
active deployments X(s) (including, for each deployment x both its current size Cx and its
scaling process parameters λx, µx and σx) as well as the deployments that arrived during
the current time step. The action set A consists of individually accepting or rejecting each




is the number of active cores in a state s. The transition probability function is denoted
T(s′|s, a)∀s′s ∈ S, ∀a ∈ A. Given a state of the cluster and admission decisions, this function
captures the distribution over scale outs, core deaths, and arrivals of new deployments that
occur during the next time step. Ω is the set of possible observations and O : Ω×S → [0, 1]
an observation model. In our case, the observation model O is deterministic, but many
states share the same observation. For state s, we always observe ω ∈ Ω equal to the
sizes of all deployments that are in the cluster and those that arrived with the last state
transition.
As is standard, we further denote the cluster’s current knowledge about which state s
it is in via a belief state b ∈ B, i.e., a probability distribution over states. Specifically, a
belief state b specifies, for each deployment x that is in the cluster or arrived with the last




σ over its scaling




σ ), i.e., the provider’s belief
about the deployment x. A policy π can now be defined as a mapping from belief states to
actions.
Whenever the cluster obtains a new observation ω ∈ Ω in time step n + 1, the belief
state is updated according to the observation and transition models, i.e.,
bn+1(s





Given this, we can now define two auxiliary functions. We let gn,π,b denote the probability
density function of the distribution over the states sn and belief states bn of the system n
time steps in the future, given policy π and starting belief b. Furthermore, we let h(sn, π(bn))
denote the expected percentage of scale-outs that fail with the next state transition from a
given state-action pair. We can now formulate the provider’s control problem as finding an
optimal policy given an SLA.
Problem 1 (Cluster Admission Problem). The cluster admission problem is to find an
optimal policy π for the POMDP (S,A,R,T,Ω,O) subject to the following two constraints:
∫
(sn,bn)
gn,π,b(sn, bn)h(sn, π(bn))d(sn, bn) ≤ τ ∀ safe b ∀0 ≤ n < N (2)
π(b) = reject all arrivals ∀ unsafe b (3)
6. While deployments can arrive at arbitrary times, it takes time to make the acceptance decision. Thus,
there is little loss in discretizing time.
7. Our approach works for any choice of horizon (or even an infinite horizon with average or discounted
rewards).
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gn,π0,b(sn, bn)h(sn, π0(bn))d(sn, bn) ≤ τ ∀0 ≤ n < N (4)
and unsafe otherwise.
Intuitively, we would like our SLA constraint (2) to hold in every belief state. However,
even if we follow an optimal policy, we can reach belief states where (in retrospect) too many
deployments have been admitted, such that, even if no new deployments are admitted ever
again, the constraint (2) would be violated. Thus, if we would require Equation (2) to hold
in all belief states, we would have an infeasible problem. To address this, we do not enforce
Equation (2) in unsafe belief states (as defined in Problem 1). We instead require the policy
to reject all arriving deployments until it reaches a safe belief state.8
Note that the current time step is not referenced in Equation (2) or (4). This is in-
tentional to avoid horizon effects: a cluster should not aggressively start to accept new
deployments close to the end of its lifetime.
3. A Tractable Problem Formulation
Optimal policies for the cluster admission problem (i.e., Problem 1) cannot be calculated
in practice for three reasons. First, there is no simple closed form for the state transition
probabilities. Second, the state space of the the POMDP is very large: consider a cluster
with 20,000 cores. It usually has hundreds of deployments, each described by 4 parameters,
some of which are continuous. Even discretized, this results in a state space exponential in
the size of the cluster. Third, even disregarding unlikely state transitions, the branching
factor is large. This renders standard methods that rely on optimizing limited lookaheads
infeasible. Therefore, we now present three carefully chosen simplifying assumptions under
which we characterize an optimal policy. In Section 4, we use this characterization to design
practical admission control policies.
Assumption 1 (No Future Arrivals). No further deployments arrive after the current
timestep.
This assumption ensures that a policy does not reject deployments simply because better
behaved deployments might arrive in the future. In the cloud domain, this behavior is
desirable, as even customers with high demand variability must be served by some cluster
in the data center.
Assumption 2 (Relaxed Capacity Constraints). Deployments can scale out even if doing
so exceeds the cluster capacity c. For the purpose of defining h, a scale out is considered to
fail only if the cluster has already exceeded its capacity.
With no future arrivals, the cluster’s future state only depends on how the sizes of the
currently active deployments change. However, if a cluster is full, further scale out requests
8. The requirement to reject all deployments is a design decision we revisit in Section 6.
8
by deployments are denied, introducing correlations between the future sizes of different
deployments. Assumption 2 removes this correlation. In particular, let Lxn denote the
random variable that is the number of active cores of deployment x in time step n. With
the first two assumptions, Lxn is independent of L
x′
n′ for all x 6= x
′ and all n, n′. The same
holds for the random variable Lx̃n for the provider’s belief. This is reasonable because the
cluster being full should be rare if the SLA is being met.
Assumption 3 (At Most one Event per Timestep). In any timestep, at most one event
occurs (i.e., at most one deployment scales out, shuts down cores, or arrives to the cluster).
Since the probability that more than one event occurs in a single time step approaches
zero with increased granularity of the time discretization, it is reasonable to assume this.
Using these three assumptions, we can now simplify the problem of determining when




σ ) specifies the provider’s belief
over a deployment x. In the following, we denote by Aπ(b) the set of beliefs x̃ over the
active deployments in belief state b and the deployments that are accepted with policy π in
belief state b.
Proposition 1. For all policies π, under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the following holds:
∫
(sn,bn)
gn,π,b(sn, bn)h(sn, π(bn))d(sn, bn) = Pr(
∑
x̃∈Aπ(b)
Lx̃n > c) ∀b ∀0 ≤ n < N. (5)
Proof. To see the that Equation (5) holds, note the following: By Assumption 1, it suffices
to consider only the deployments that are currently in the cluster or arrive in the current
time step, i.e., x̃ ∈ Aπ(b). By Assumption 3, at most one scale out can fail per time step.
Thus the left hand side of Equation (5) captures the following: if a scale out occurs in time




Using this result, it is straightforward to characterize an optimal policy for the simplified
problem.
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, an optimal policy π accepts an arriving




Lx̃n > c) ≤ τ ∀0 ≤ n < N. (6)
Proof. By Assumption 3, it suffices to consider one arrival. By Assumption 1, if an arrival
could be accepted without violating the constraint, doing so is optimal. By Proposition 1,
the constraint is equal to Inequality (6).
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 show that to implement an optimal policy for the sim-
plified problem it suffices to evaluate the probability that a sum of independent random
variables exceeds a threshold. The remaining question now is how to compute or approx-
imate this probability for our complex processes fast enough to allow rapid responses to
customer requests.
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4. Designing new Admission Control Policies
In this section, we first define the complex random variables Lx̃n in terms of simpler random
variables that directly arise from the processes. The essence of our approach is to take
this definition of Ln and use it to compute approximate moments of Ln (i.e., approximate
summary statistics of the behavior of the random variable). We then use these approximate
moments to design new policies.
We can describe Lx̃n using the following random variables (which have a superscript x̃
which we generally omit for brevity):
• C is the variable denoting the number of active cores at time step 0.
• Yi is the random variable denoting the number of scale outs that occur between time
step i− 1 and time step i, assuming the deployment has not died.
• Si,l is the size the l’th scale out request would have, assuming at least l scale out
requests occur between time step i− 1 and time step i.
• Zn,i,k is the binary random variable denoting whether the k’th core activated between
time steps i − 1 and i would still be active in time step n, assuming at least k cores
were activated and the deployment has not died. For i = 0, this instead refers to
whether the k’th core that is active at timestep 0 is still active at time step n.
• Di is the random variable which is 1 if x would not have died due to a lack of active












• Bn is the random variable denoting the number of cores that were active at time step






• Qn is the random variable denoting the number of cores activated between time step










• Mi is the random variable which is 1 if the maximum lifetime of the deployment is at
least i and 0 otherwise.
• Finally, Ln can be calculated as Ln = MnDn(Qn +Bn).
We now turn to the design of our approximate policies.
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4.1 Baseline (Zeroth Moment Policy )
Before introducing our new policies, we state the baseline admission control policy that is
widely used in practice. It is a myopic policy that simply compares the current number
of active cores to a threshold. This policy does not use any information about the set of
deployments besides the total number of active cores. It can be we viewed as a degenerate
case of our approach, as it does not take any probabilistic information about the random
variables into account. We therefore also call it a Zeroth Moment Policy. Because it uses a
limited amount of information, it must be conservative in how many deployments it accepts,
since it does not know how often or fast they will scale out.
Definition 1 (Zeroth Moment Policy (Baseline)). Under a zeroth moment policy π with
threshold t, a newly arriving deployment is accepted if, after accepting the deployment, there
would be less than t cores active.
4.2 First Moment Policy
Our first policy approximates the probability of scale out failures (i.e., Equation (5)) by uti-
lizing the first moments, i.e. the expected value of the deployment processes. By Markovs’s
Inequality, for a non-negative random variable L and c ≥ 0, it holds that




Such a policy that utilizes Markov’s Inequality therefore rejects an arriving deployment
when the expected utilization lies above a chosen threshold and otherwise accept.
Definition 2 (First Moment Policy). Under a first moment policy π with threshold t, a
newly arriving deployment in belief state b is accepted if, after accepting the deployment,
the expected number of active cores would be less than t in all future time steps, i.e.
∑
x̃∈Aπ(b)
E[Lx̃n] ≤ t ∀0 ≤ n < N, (12)
where E[Lx̃n] is approximated, for example using the approach described in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Assuming all Mn, Di, Qn, and Bn are uncorrelated and Zi,j,k, Yi, and Si,l
are uncorrelated as constituents of Di, it holds:






E[Bn] = CE[Zn,i,k] (15)
E[Di] ≤ E[Di−1](1− (1− E[Zi,0,1])
(C)Πi−1j=1(1− E[Zi,j,1])
E[Y1]E[S1,1]) (16)
E[D1] = (1− (1− E[Z1,0,1])
(C)) (17)
The proof is provided in Appendix A. It works by direct calculation and applying
Jensen’s Inequality to Di. While ignoring some correlations introduces a nontrivial error
into the approximation, this is done to ensure that the expectation can be evaluated in
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linear time. Additionally, the tail bounds from Markov’s Inequality are relatively loose.
This makes it necessary to calibrate t, as simply setting t = τc would yield excessively
conservative policies. Nevertheless, as we will see in Section 5, this approximation still
carries enough information for our policies to work well once tuned.9
4.3 Second Moment Policy
First moment policies do not take much information about the structure of deployments
into account. In a sense they have to always assume the worst possible population mix and
run the risk of accepting deployments with low expected size but high variance when close
to the threshold. One way around this is to also take the second moment, i.e., the variance
of Ln, into account. To address this, we propose to use Cantelli’s inequality, a single-tailed
generalization of Chebyshev’s inequality, to approximate the probability of scale out failures
(i.e., Equality (5)). Cantelli’s inequality states that, for a real-valued random variable L
and ǫ ≥ 0, it holds that
Pr(L− E[L] ≥ ǫ) ≤
V ar[L]
V ar[L] + ǫ2
. (18)




n]), we obtain a bound for the probability of running
over capacity that takes more information into account than a first moment policy.
Definition 3 (Second Moment Policy). Under a second moment policy π with threshold ρ,
a newly arriving deployment in belief state b is accepted if, after accepting the deployment,















≤ρ ∀0 ≤ n < N (20)
where E[Lx̃n] is approximated using the approach described in Proposition 2 and V ar[L
x̃
n] is
approximated using the approach described in Proposition 3.
9. Similar observations have been made in the literature on the use of effective bandwidth for admission
control in queueing settings (Kelly, 1991; Berger & Whitt, 1998).
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Proposition 3. Assuming all Mn, Di, Qn, and Bn are uncorrelated, it holds:
V [Ln] = E[Mn]
2V [Dn(Qn +Bn)] + V [Mn]E[Dn(Qn +Bn)]
2 (21)
+V [Mn]V [Dn(Qn +Bn)] (22)
V [Dn(Qn +Bn)] = E[Dn]
2(V [Qn] + V [Bn]) + (E[Qn] + E[Bn])
2V [Dn] (23)
+V [Dn](V [Qn] + V [Bn]) (24)
V [Qn] = E[V [Qn|λ, σ, µ]] + V [E[Qn|λ, σ, µ]] (25)






2 +E[Yi|λ, µ]V [Si,l|σ])E[Zn,i,1|µ]
2 (26)
+E[Yi|λ, µ]E[Si,l|σ]V [Zn,i,1|µ]) (27)
V [Bn] = CE[V [Zn,i,k|µ]] + C
2V [E[Zn,i,k|µ]] (28)
V [Dn] = E[Dn]− E[Dn]
2 (29)
The proof is provided in Appendix A. It works by direct calculation. Note that, since the
expectation is approximated as given in Proposition 2, V [Dn] carries over any approximation
errors from E[Dn]. As with first moment policies, the bound given by the inequality is again
not tight enough to simply set it to ρ = τ and ρ has to be tuned.
Computational overhead.
The computational overhead of the second moment policy depends on the number of future
time steps it evaluates and the chosen prior distributions for the provider’s belief state. As
long as well-behaved priors are used (e.g., the Gamma priors we use in our simulations),
each single rule application is fast. For such priors, updating the estimate for the second
moment policy for a single deployment can be done in O(n) where n is the number of
evaluated time steps. Whenever a new deployment arrives, the estimate is updated for
every active deployment. This leads to a worst case runtime of O(|X|n) where |X| ≤ c is
the number of active deployments. For multiple clusters this is fully parallelizable at the
cluster level because each cluster has its own policy evaluation. Updating the prior of a
deployment during runtime has negligible complexity (O(1)). A cloud computing center
consisting of clusters of capacity c with an arrival rate of L new deployment requests per
hour therefore has a computation overhead of at most O(Lcn) each hour, parallelizable into
jobs of size O(n).10 This means that even relatively large look-ahead horizons n can easily
be implemented in practice.
5. Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our admission policies using a model fitted
to the real-world data trace of Cortez et al. (2017).
10. If further ML is (optionally) employed to obtain an individual prior for arriving deployments (as discussed
in Section 6), that computation time would need to be added and depends on the algorithm in question.
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Priors
µ ≈ Gamma(0.3107, 0.5778)
λ ≈ Gamma(0.4907, 0.4496)




Table 1: Fitted processes
5.1 Data Trace and Fitted Model
Cortez et al. (2017) published a data trace consisting of all deployments that populated
a Microsoft Azure datacenter in one month. Since the data set is of limited size and only
covers one month, we cannot directly evaluate the policies on the historical deployments.
One month is too short to fully evaluate cluster admission policies as many effects only show
up after months of usage. Instead, we fit processes to the data we do have, to simulate longer
time periods (3 years, in our simulations). We defer evaluations against real deployments
to future work.
An in-depth discussion of our fitting procedure can be found in Appendix B. The
resulting model utilizes Gamma priors, which are a very general distribution (containing
the Chi-squared, Erlang and Exponential distributions as special cases) and fit the data
well. The fitted parameters are shown in Table 1. The moment approximation resulting
from combining Propositions 2 and 3 with these priors is given in Appendix C. In the
following we present the results of our simulations.
5.2 Simulation Setup
We simulate clusters with capacity c = 20, 000 for a 3-year period with all three policies.
An average of 1 new deployment per hour arrives according to a Poisson process. The
parameters of each arriving deployment are drawn from the fitted distributions presented
in Table 1. We tune the threshold for each policy via binary search, subject to meeting an
SLA of 0.01%.11 We verify that the SLA is satisfied on average (over runs and months).
Evaluating our first and second moment policies with a three year time horizon and fine-
grained time steps is fast enough to be done in real time. However, doing so would take too
much computation power to simulate the thousands of years of cluster operation required
for our experiments. Therefore, we use the following approach to simulate clusters with a
three-year lifespan with a reasonable number of core-hours. We divide the first and second
moment policies into 5 subpolicies and only accept a deployment if all subpolicies accept
it. The subpolicies have increasingly fine-grained time steps, but each only evaluates a
limited look-ahead horizon: 3 years, 1 year, 1 month, 1 week, and 24 hours. Each subpolicy
discretizes its time into 600 timesteps. We performed 500 runs and report the average
utilization across all runs. Since failures to scale out are focused in the tail of the runs (e.g.,
with the tuned zeroth moment parameter only about 1% of runs contain any failures), we
employ importance sampling to obtain sufficient samples from the tail to guarantee SLA
satisfaction with high confidence. Details about the importance sampling can be found
11. This SLA is somewhat stricter than is typically used in practice, which helps counterbalance our model
abstracting away complexities such as fragmentation and node failure.
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Policy Threshold Utilization
Zeroth Moment t = 8, 864 50.45% (48.2, 52.7)
First Moment t = 14, 223 66.19% (63.41, 68.94)
Second Moment ρ = 0.112 67.32% (64.35, 70.26)
Table 2: Simulation results showing the performance of the three policies. 95% bootstrap
confidence intervals are shown in parentheses.
in Appendix D. To avoid misestimating confidence intervals with biased data, we report
95% bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap confidence intervals (following (Efron, 1987),
100000 re-samples) instead of standard errors.
5.3 Results
We now compare the utilization of our policies to the industry baseline zeroth moment
policy. The results are summarized in Table 2. The zeroth moment policy obtains its best
result with a threshold of t = 8, 864, i.e., new deployments are accepted whenever less than
8, 864 would be active in case of acceptance. This results in an average utilization of 50.45%
over the lifetime of the cluster. The first moment policy with threshold t = 14, 223 increases
the utilization by 15.74 percentage points to 66.19%. This constitutes a relative increase in
utilization of 31.2% over the zeroth moment policy. Similarly, the second moment policy
with threshold ρ = 0.112 achieves a utilization of 67.32%, a relative improvement of 33.44%.
At first sight, it may be surprising that the first and second moment policies achieve
similar utilization. However, this can be explained as follows. Under both policies, the
overwhelming number of simulated clusters never reject a scale out request. However, in
a few runs, too many large, long-lived deployments are accepted in the beginning of a
cluster’s lifetime. This leads to many rejections months or even years in the future. Since
this happens early in a cluster’s lifetime when not much is known about deployments, the
difference between the first and second moment policies is relatively small. This highlights
the value of obtaining additional (probabilistic) information about arriving deployments.
We study this in the next section.
6. The Value of Deployment-specific Priors
So far, we have assumed that the cluster does not have any information about arriving
deployments, except for the initial number of cores. The acceptance decision therefore had
to primarily depend on the state of the deployments that are already in the cluster.
Intuitively, a policy could more precisely control whether accepting a deployment would
risk violating the SLA if the policy had more information about the future behavior of the
specific deployment. One way to obtain such information would be to use machine learning
(ML) based on features of the arriving deployment and past deployment patterns of the
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submitting user (Cortez et al., 2017). While evaluating particular ML algorithms is beyond
the scope of this paper, we evaluate the effect that different levels of available information
have. To do this, we need to parameterize the level of knowledge. For this we assume that
the cluster simply gets passed some number of observations from each true scaling process
distribution of each arriving deployment.12
6.1 Improving the Handling of Short-lived Deployments
Our moment policies as defined so far cannot yet make optimal use of this additional
prior information. While an optimal policy with good prior information would balance the
admission of long-lived and short-lived deployments to keep the utilization more stable over
time, the moment policies always accept new deployments on a first-come first-served basis
until their constraints are violated. This means that if many very long-lived, slow-scaling
deployments arrive in the beginning, the cluster sometimes quickly reaches unsafe belief
states in which it stops accepting any new deployments, but for which the critical event
lies months or even years in the future. While stopping the admission of new deployments
in such a situation is reasonable when no prior information about arriving deployments is
available, with prior information the policy might know that some arriving deployments
will almost surely be dead by the time the cluster has filled up. To make use of this,
we now present a heuristic modification of our moment policies such that the resulting
policy is allowed to accept deployments that only have a marginal impact on the possible
SLA violation, even in unsafe states. As a simple condition for this, we call a deployment
marginal in timestep n if its expected size is smaller than 10−5, i.e., E[Lxn] < 10
−5.
Definition 4 (Marginal Heuristic). Under a first or second moment policy π with the
marginal heuristic, a newly arriving deployment x in belief state b is accepted if in each
future time step n < N , after accepting the deployment, either the underlying moment
policy’s condition is satisfied or the arriving deployment x is marginal, i.e., E[Lxn] < 10
−5.
Going forward, we use the marginal heuristic, unless explicitly noted. It should be
pointed out that this heuristic does not have any effect when the cluster does not have good
prior information about arriving deployments. With only the global prior, no deployment
is marginal for any future timestep n < N .
6.2 Simulation Results
In this section, we present simulation results to demonstrate the value of deployment-specific
priors. We simulate the first and second moment policies (with marginal heuristic), now
with four different levels of prior information: 0, 1, 5, and 50 observations. Otherwise, we
use the same simulation setup as in Section 5. The results are shown in Figure 1.13 We
see that having prior knowledge equivalent to even a single observation improves utilization
significantly, resulting in a utilization of 75% and 79.5% for the first and second moment
12. As we have used conjugate prior distributions in our model, this approach matches the standard inter-
pretation of parameters of the posterior distribution in terms of “pseudo observations.”
13. We also simulated our policies without the marginal heuristic (see Appendix E), and we observe the
same general patterns. As one would expect, without the marginal heuristic, the achieved utilization is
somewhat smaller (especially with good priors).
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Figure 1: Performance of different policies depending on prior information (error bars indi-
cate 95% bootstrap confidence intervals)
policies, respectively. Better priors lead to even better utilization, with the second moment
policy reaching a utilization of 83.8% with 50 observations.
While it is infeasible to calculate the utilization corresponding to an optimal solution
of the POMDP, we have derived an upper bound of 92.1% by analyzing policies that do
not have to satisfy any SLA. Thus, the second moment policy with good prior information
achieves more than 90% of the theoretically achievable as given by this (unreachable) upper
bound, while delivering a relative increase in utilization of 24.48% above the same policy
without prior information and a 66.1% increase over the baseline (i.e., zeroth moment)
policy. This shows both the power of our policies and the great importance of taking all
available prior information about arriving deployments into account.
7. An Elicitation Mechanism to Improve Priors
Given the importance of the quality of prior information that we established in the last sec-
tion, in this section, we use techniques from mechanism design to improve this quality. Our
approach assumes that users do not typically submit deployments with arbitrary parame-
ters. Instead, they may have a small number of different types of deployments. However,
the typical mechanism design approach of using a direct revelation mechanism, where cus-
tomers reveal their full type, seems problematic. First, it may be very cumbersome from a
user interface perspective. Second, customers may not have such a detailed understanding
of their deployments and thus would run the risk of being penalized for a “misreport.”
Instead, we seek a design that allows meaningful information to be elicited in an incentive
compatible way while being simple for customers to use. To this end, we propose that rather
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than explicitly asking users to describe the behavior of their deployments, cloud providers
instead provide them with the opportunity to group them into customer-defined categories
of roughly similar deployments. Learning priors for each individual category then results in
more precise priors and higher utilization. To incentivize such grouping, the cloud provider
can set a small portion of the fee for a deployment using a pricing rule based on the variance
of resource demands of deployments in a category. We now first present and analyze such
a variance-based pricing mechanism and then evaluate the potential utilization gains this
mechanism may produce via additional simulations.
7.1 Variance-based Payment Rule
Typically, users are charged a fixed payment per hour for each core their deployment uses.
With a variance-based payment rule, we add a small additional charge based on the variance
of the estimate for the deployment’s scaling process and allow users to label the type of their
deployments, resulting in an hourly variance-based payment rule q(x) of the form:
q(x) = κ1C
x + κ2V ar(x), (30)
where κ1 and κ2 are price constants and V ar(x) is an estimate of the variance of the
deployment. A payment rule of this form incentivizes users to assign similar labels to
similar deployments to minimize the estimated variance.
To see this, consider a user who has two types of deployment, x and y, with true
variances V ar(x) and V ar(y). He could now simply submit the deployments under a single
label. For the provider, this means that each submitted deployment is of either type with
a certain probability, which increases the variance of her prediction. But if the user would
label each deployment appropriately with either “x” or “y,” then the provider would know
for each arriving deployment which type it is, reducing variance and therefore the need
to reserve capacity. The following proposition, which is immediate from the law of total
variance, shows that, at least in the long run, labeling his deployments also reduces a user’s
payments.
Proposition 4. Let z be the mixture that results from submitting one of two types of
deployments x, y chosen by a Bernoulli random variable α ∼ Bernoulli(pα), i.e., such that
z is of type x with probability pα and of type y with probability 1− pα. Then it holds that
pαV ar(x) + (1− pα)V ar(y) ≤ V ar(z) (31)
Proof. Since z has finite variance, the law of total variance states:
V ar(z) = E[V ar(z|α)] + V ar(E[z|α]) (32)
≥ E[V ar(z|α)] (33)
= pαV ar(x) + (1− pα)V ar(y) (34)
Proposition 4 shows that the user would be better off by splitting the mixture and sub-
mitting the deployments under separate labels, directly resulting in the following corollary.
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Corollary 2. Under any variance-based payment rule q(x) of the form given in Equa-
tion (30) with κ2 > 0, it is a dominant strategy for users with multiple deployment types to
label deployments by type.
Note that this corollary abstracts away issues of learning and non-stationary strategic
behavior; but for reasonable learning procedures we expect a consistent labeling to lead to
lower variance than a mixture while learning. Further, this approach not only gives the user
correct incentives to reveal the desired information, but actually incentivizes him to improve
the performance of the system. In particular, another way he can lower his payment under
this scheme (outside the scope of our model) is to design his deployments in such a way
that they have lower variance in their resource use. Since more predictable deployments
would allow the policy to maintain a smaller buffer, this provides an additional benefit to
the system’s utilization.
Remark. The per core-hour payments of a user can be based on a-priori or a-posteriori
estimates of a deployment’s variance. With an a-priori estimate, the user knows his payment
(per core-hour) before he starts his deployment, which can be very important for certain
users. On the other hand, such a payment rule invites strategic deployment submissions:
a user could submit a number of small low-variance deployments before submitting a large
high-variance deployment, with the goal of reducing the provider’s estimate and thus his
payment for the large deployment. The provider could mitigate the potential gain of such a
manipulation by carefully choosing the estimation procedure, so it is unclear how frequent
and successful such manipulations would be in practice. With an a-posteriori estimate (i.e.,
the user’s hourly payment is based on the variance estimate of the deployment at the end
of the hour), such strategic deployment submissions could be made unprofitable. However,
now users do not know their exact payments in advance. To cater to users that require a
fixed price before submitting a deployment, the provider might want to set an upper limit on
prices and advertise lower prices as discounts. Thus, which type of estimate is optimal for
a given provider depends on the requirements of her user base.
How much any given user could ultimately save by labeling his deployments mostly
depends how different his deployment types are and on how high the provider sets the
charge for variance. A user whose deployments are quite uniform will not save much, while
a user with some deployments which never scale and some that scale a lot can potentially
save a lot. Note that how much the provider should charge is not immediately clear. While
she would want to set a high price to put a strong incentive on users, she also has to keep
the competition from other providers in mind. At what point the loss of market share
outweighs the gain in utilization is an intriguing problem we leave for future work.
7.2 Simulation Results
To illustrate the potential gains in utilization of such a variance-based payment rule, we
consider a setting where all users have two deployment types, drawn independently from
the same population distribution as in Section 5. We assume that each user only submits
a single deployment and then departs, but that the provider has 5 prior observations each
from every user’s two deployment types. Otherwise, the simulation setup is again the















No SLA upper bound
user does not declare type
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Figure 2: Performance of the second moment policy with two deployment types per user
and 5 observations (error bars indicate 95% bootstrap confidence intervals)
second moment policy with and without employing a variance-based payment rule. With
the variance-based payment rule (and users consequently declaring their type), the setting
becomes equivalent to the one presented in Section 6 with 5 observation. When the variance-
based payment rule is not used (and users consequently do not label their deployments),
we assume that the provider updates her belief for both types independently and evaluates
her second moment policy on the mixture.
As we can see in Figure 2, when users do not label their deployments, this yields a
utilization of 77%. In contrast, when users do label their deployments, then (as expected)
the utilization increases to 83%. This shows that, from a cluster point of view, employing
a variance-based payment rule leads to a sizable increase in utilization.
8. Conclusion
We have studied the problem of cluster admission control for cloud computing, where ac-
cepting demand now causes unrejectable demand in the future. The optimal policy is given
as the solution to a very large constrained POMDP, which is infeasible to solve. In practice,
simple threshold policies are employed for admission control. In contrast, we have proposed
multiple more sophisticated policies. Our results demonstrate that the utilization can be
increased by approximately 30% just from learning about deployments while they are active
in the cluster. Furthermore, we have shown that this can be improved to a 50− 65% gain
if better prior information about arriving deployments is available, for example through
learning or elicitation techniques. Even though the realized gains in practice are likely to
be somewhat lower due to practical engineering constraints (e.g., the need to handle node
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outages), they should still be sizable. At cloud scale, even savings of a few percent translate
to many hundreds of millions of dollars, and any dollar saved directly translates to a gross
profit increase for the cluster provider.
Our work points to a number of interesting future research directions. We have only
looked at cluster admission policies at the level of a single cluster, abstracting away the
question of which cluster should be chosen, implicitly assuming a first-fit or random-fit
heuristic. Future research should look at the question whether filling all clusters with the
same mixture of deployments is reasonable or if dedicating different clusters to different
types of deployments could be used to further increase utilization. A related direction
is that our model and policies assume that deployment behavior does not change during
runtime. While this is a reasonable approximation for many deployments, some long running
deployments might exhibit more involved life cycles in practice. One way for policies to
account for this is to discount past observations.
There are also open questions regarding mechanism design in the cloud domain. In
subsequent work, Dierks and Seuken (2020) have already analyzed the competitive effects
of employing the variance-based payment rule we proposed in this paper in a duopoly model.
They find that, in equilibrium, while using a variance-based payment rule weakly increases
welfare, the effects on the providers’ profits are ambiguous. However, their analysis does
not take into account that a variance-based payment rule can yield better priors about
submitted deployments and thus improve the efficiency of the provider’s admission policy.
Future work could explore an alternative economic design, where the provider offers a menu
of two alternatives to her users: the standard alternative, where deployments can always
scale out; and a cheaper alternative, where deployments are not allowed to scale out (or can
scale only with a “best effort” guarantee). Such an approach could be viewed as implicitly
selling finance-style options on the ability to scale out.
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Appendix A. Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. • If Mn, Dn, Qn and Bn are uncorrelated, it holds by linearity
and multiplicativity of the expected value for uncorrelated random variables:
E[Ln] = E[Mn]E[Dn](E[Qn] + E[Bn]) (35)

















































Si,l|λ, σ, µ]E[Zn,i,1|λ, σ, µ] (40)
= E[Y1|λ, µ]E[S1,1|σ]E[Zn,i,1|µ] (41)





Zn,0,k] = CE[Zn,0,k] (42)








































E[D1] = (1− (1− E[Z1,0,1])
C) (50)
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where the third line follows by the law of total probability and the 6’th by Jensens
Inequality.
Proof of Proposition 3. With Mn,Dn,Qn and Bn uncorrelated, it holds for the variance of
Ln:
V [Ln] = V [MnDn(Qn +Bn)] (51)
= E[Mn]
2V [Dn(Qn +Bn)] + V [Mn]E[Dn(Qn +Bn)]
2 (52)
+V [Mn]V [Dn(Qn +Bn)] (53)
(54)
and further:
V [Dn(Qn +Bn)] = E[Dn]
2(V [Qn] + V [Bn]) + (E[Qn] + E[Bn])
2V [Dn] (55)
+V [Dn](V [Qn] + V [Bn]) (56)
(57)
For the variance of Qn it holds:
V [Qn] = E[V [Qn|λ, σ, µ]] + V [E[Qn|λ, σ, µ]] (58)
and























2 + E[Yi]V [Si,l])E[Zn,i,1]
2 + E[Yi]E[Si,l]V [Zn,i,1]
)
(60)
by the law of total variance.
For Bn we can now use the law of total variance to obtain:














= E[CV [Zn,i,k|µ]] + V [CE[Zn,i,k|µ]] (63)
= CE[V [Zn,i,k|µ]] + C
2V [E[Zn,i,k|µ]] (64)
Lastly, for Dn, note that E[D
2
n] = E[Dn] because Dn ∈ {0, 1}. It follows
V [Dn] = E[Dn]− E[Dn]
2 (65)
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Appendix B. Data Trace
To have a better understanding of the scaling behavior of real deployments and to create a
model suitable for simulating clusters, we fitted the behavior of deployments to a real-world
data trace. The particular data trace we use was published by Cortez et al. (2017). This
dataset consists of one month of data of internal Microsoft Azure jobs. It contains 35,576
deployments,14 though only 29,757 of these deployments arrived during the observed time
period. Since we want to fit distributions with the goal of simulating arriving deployments,
only these 29,757 deployments can be used for most of our fitting. The deployments that
arrived before the beginning of the observed period of time cannot be used when making
maximum likelihood estimations, because for start times before the observed period of time,
only longer lived deployments survived to be observed. Including them would strongly skew
the fit. The 29,757 deployments activated 4,317,961 cores, out of which 4,211,926 became
inactive again during the observed month. The exact lifetime of the remaining cores (i.e.,
the length of time between becoming active and then inactive again) is not known; instead
we only have a lower bound on it (i.e., our observation is Type I censored: see for example
(NIST, 2012)). Thus, for cores where we only have a lower bound on the lifetime we use
the cdf in our likelihood function while for cores whose lifetime is known we use the pdf.
B.1 Fitting on the Deployment Level
We first fit arrival and departure processes for each individual deployment. In keeping with
the Markov assumption, we fit a Poisson distribution to the scale out rate of each deploy-
ment, while we fit an exponential distribution to the lifetime of cores for each deployment
for which at least one core became inactive during the observed time period. Note that
while we model the cluster admission problem as a discrete-time POMDP, the processes
are fit in continuous time. This is more general and avoids imprecisions introduced by time
discretization. To fit the size of a scale out, we also used a Poisson distribution (plus 1, as
scale outs must have at least one core).15 We further assume that each deployment, had it
lived forever, at some point would have made a scale out request for more than 1 core. Since
we did not observe these scale-outs and therefore cannot make a direct likelihood fit, we
introduce two parameters P1 and P2 to represent them. We assume that the scale out rate
of deployments that never scaled out (some because they died, but many simply because
the observation period of the dataset ended) is equal to the value for which not observing
a scale out has probability P1. We equivalently set the scale out size for deployments that
never increase their size by more than 1 core during one scale out event according to P2.
We calibrated P1 and P2 by minimizing the (discrete) Cramér-von Mises distance of the
size of deployments between samples drawn from our fitted model and the data set. The
optimal distance is 0.1585 and an overlay of both cumulative distribution functions can be
seen in Figure 3. Note that most of the remaining distance does not seem to be caused
14. In contrast to (Cortez et al., 2017) we did not consolidate all deployments a single user runs on a certain
day into one. This is because cores that get requested as a new deployment do not need to be accepted
on the same cluster.
15. As the Poisson distribution is single-parameter and its variance cannot be set independent of the average
size, this is not a particularly good fit for users with large but consistent scale out sizes. However, its
simplicity avoids overfitting on the often low number of samples per deployment and it results in a good
fit on the population level.
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Figure 3: CDF over number of
deployments of all sizes























Figure 4: CDF over utilization percentage
from deployments of all sizes
by limitations of our model or fitting procedure, but by limitations of the dataset. The
dataset, while relatively large, still does contain a somewhat small selection of deployments
from the tail. More importantly, it only contains internal Azure deployments, so the types
of workloads are limited. As such, it contains few deployments of sizes between 100 and
1500, but a relatively large number of deployments of sizes between 1500 and 2000. This
effect is visualized in Figure 4, which shows the CDF over the percentage of utilization in
the cluster coming from deployments of different sizes for both our model and the dataset.
B.2 Fitting on the Population Level
With the distributions for each deployment in place, we now fit Gamma distributions for the
population. The parameters of the processes for each arriving deployment are drawn from
these populations. As the data was skewed, positive, and not really heavy tailed, a Gamma
distribution is a natural and very general candidate (containing the Chi-squared, Erlang
and Exponential distributions as special cases), with the added benefit of being conjugate
prior to the deployment processes. The resulting model and parameters from our fits are
shown in Table 3. While the scale out size is fit directly to the samples, scale out rate
and core lifetime are highly correlated. The longer a deployment’s cores live, the lower the
rate at which new cores arrive, as can be seen in Figure 5. This shows that deployments
with long lived cores do not necessarily have more active cores. To account for this, we fit
the power law relationship ν between scale out rate and lifetime, i.e., we fitted the prior
distribution on scale out rates multiplied by the respective core lifetimes taken to the power
Priors
µ ≈ Gamma(0.3107, 0.5778)
λ ≈ Gamma(0.4907, 0.4496)




Table 3: Fitted processes
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Figure 5: Scale out rate as a function
of average core lifetime










Figure 6: Distribution of the core lifetime
rate parameter










Figure 7: Distribution of the scale out
rate parameter
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Figure 8: Distribution of the scale out
size parameter
of ν. We have chosen ν such that the mean absolute distance between normalized scale out
rate of each deployment and the average (normalized) scale out rate is minimized.
To visualize the fitted distributions, Figure 6 shows the CDF of the Gamma distribution
for the lifetime parameter, overlaid over the normalized cumulative histogram of the fitted
rates of the sample deployments.
Figure 7 shows the CDF for the normalized scale out rates over the relevant cumulative
histogram. The actual scale out rate of a sampled deployment is now simply the normalized
scale out rate multiplied by the average core lifetime. Figure 8 shows the fitted CDF for
the scale out size parameter over its cumulative histogram.
Deployment Shutdown. While most deployments in the dataset die because they have
zero active cores, 5,980 of the 22,241 deployments that both arrive and die during the
observed period seem to get actively shut down. By this we mean that they had at least 3
VMs that all shut down simultaneously. This would be highly unlikely if deployments only
die when cores or VMs become inactive independently. To capture such behavior we fit an
exponential distribution over the number of expected core lifetime deployments lived. The
30
maximal lifetime of deployments that did not get shut down was assumed to be censored
to their realized lifetime.
Appendix C. Moment Approximation with Gamma Priors
Proposition 5. When Yi ∼ Pois(λµ
ν), λ ∼ Gamma(a, b), Si,l ∼ Pois(σ), σ ∼ Gamma(α, β),
Zn,i,j ∼ Bernoulli(e
(i−n)µ) (Bernoulli over complementary CDF of an exponential distri-


























































































































































CE[V [Zn,i,k|µ]] + C


































































































Next we will calculate
V [Qn] = E[V [Qn|λ, σ, µ]] (92)
+V [E[Qn|λ, σ, µ]] (93)
(94)
Before we can do so, we need to collect a few easy supporting results:
V [Y1|λ, µ] = λµ
ν (95)








V [Zn,i,1|µ] = e
((i−n)µ)(1− e((i−n)µ)) (100)
= e((i−n)µ) − e2((i−n)µ) (101)
= E[Zn,i,1|µ]− E[Z2n,2i,1|µ] (102)
(103)
We also need













































This now allows us to calculate everything that is needed for the first half of the
variance of Qn, i.e., E[V [Qn|λ, σ, µ]]. First note that














2] =E[(λ)(σ + 1)2µνe(2i−2n)µ] (115)


































E[E[Yi|λ, µ]E[Si,l|σ]V [Zn,i,1|µ]] =E[λµ
ν(σ + 1)(E[Zn,i,1|µ]− E[Z2n,2i,1|µ])] (121)
=E[λµν(σ + 1)(e(i−n)µ − e(2i−2n)µ)] (122)
































































































































































Now we can write:














λµν(σ + 1)e(i−n)µ] (139)






























































































Inserting into Propositions 1 and 2 now yields the result.
• For Di note the following: As an exponential distribution whose rate is drawn from
a Gamma distribution with shape a and rate b is equal to a Lomax distribution with
scale b and shape a, a single Zi,j,k is equal to a Bernoulli trial over the complementary
CDF of the Lomax distribution.





















• It now directly follows
V [Zn,i,1] = E[V [Zn,i,1|µ]] + V [E[Zn,i,1|µ]] (151)
































CE[V [Zn,i,k|µ]] + C
2V [E[Zn,i,k|µ]] (156)















































Appendix D. Importance Sampling
Importance sampling is a technique that, instead of drawing samples r from the nominal
sampling distribution p in order to estimate the expected value of some feature of the
samples f , it draws the samples from an importance distribution q. These samples are then
weighted according to the ratio between both distributions in order to obtain an estimate
of E[f ] with a lower variance. This can vastly reduce the number of samples required to
make statements with high confidence. It is well known (see Kahn and Marshall (1953))






While calculating this exactly would require knowledge about the very value we want to
estimate, it can often be approximated reasonably well. In our case, where each simulation
run r depends on tens of thousands of random variables, we define a heuristic measure that
roughly indicates how likely a run is to fail and partition the set of all possible runs into
buckets using this measure. We then approximate the optimal q on the level of buckets.
As a first step, we now define the heuristic measure we use:
Definition 5. For a deployment x, denote by
ix = E[Lxn] +
√
(1− 0.01)/0.01 ∗ V ar[Lxn] (163)
the upper bound of the 99% confidence interval of a deployment’s size in timestep n as given
by Cantelli’s inequality. For a given run r, pre-draw the parameters of all deployments that
might arrive during the simulation run. Then consider the following extremely simplified
simulation:
1. On the first of each month, 730 new deployments arrive.
2. Deployments only die at the end of the month after their maximum lifetime is reached.
They do not die when they reach zero cores.
3. The cluster knows each deployment’s exact type.
4. Deployment always take exactly their expected size.




Denote by X(n), n ∈ [1, 36] the set of deployments in the cluster at the beginning of each






This is a reasonable (though highly heuristic) predictor of whether a run might produce
a very large number failures. Most importantly, because it assumes away all randomness
that occurs during the simulation run, it can be evaluated very quickly (< 1 second).
To properly utilize importance sampling, we now sort any simulation run r into one of
three buckets based on their BM value: I1 = {r : BM(r) ≤ 25000},
I2 = {r : 25000 ≤ BM(r) ≤ 30000}, I3 = {r : 30000 ≤ BM(r)}. Before we can apply im-
portance sampling, we calculate the probability for a given run to be in each of the buckets.
For this, we calculate BM for 100, 000 runs. The resulting probabilities can be found in
Table 4.
To sample runs from the different buckets with different weights, we employ a type of
rejection sampling: Before starting a simulation run r, we evaluate BM(r). Depending on
the bucket Ii the run would result in, we then redraw with some probability pr(Ii) (i.e.,
all deployment parameters are discarded and redrawn) and block off all lower buckets (i.e.,
automatically rejecting any further redraws that would result in Ij , j < i). The highest
bucket (in our case I3) never gets redrawn, i.e., pr(I3) = 0. This scheme continues iteratively
until we accept a run. This results in the following importance distribution.
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Probabilities I1 I2 I3
p(Ii) 0.5699 0.4121 0.018
p(Ii| ∩k≥i Ik) 0.88319 0.9582 1
pr(Ii| ∩k≥i Ik) 0.5369 0.8816 0
Table 4: Estimation of BM probabilities
Proposition 6. For a run r with nominal probability p(r) and BM such that r ∈ Ii, the
above rejection scheme results in importance distribution q with
q(r) = p(r|Ii)
p(Ii| ∩k≥i Ik)(1− pr(Ii| ∩k≥i Ik))
1− p(Ii| ∩k≥i Ik)pr(Ii| ∩k≥i Ik)
Πj<i
p(∩k>jIk| ∩k≥j Ik)
1− p(Ij | ∩k≥j Ik)pr(Ij | ∩k≥j Ik)
(165)
Proof. We first show this for two buckets I1 and I2. With only two buckets, since I2 is the
highest bucket, it has an acceptance probability of 1.
It follows that for a run that would be in I1, we redraw with probability pr(I1) and
otherwise accept. It thus holds
q(I1) = p(I1)((1− pr(I1)) + pr(I1)q(I1). (166)






















Iteratively applying this argument to more than two buckets by dividing the top bucket
into two buckets then yields
q(Ii) =
p(Ii| ∩k≥i Ik)(1− pr(Ii| ∩k≥i Ik))
1− p(Ii| ∩k≥i Ik)pr(Ii| ∩k≥i Ik)
Πj<i
p(∩k>jIk| ∩k≥j Ik)
1− p(Ij | ∩k≥j Ik)pr(Ij | ∩k≥j Ik)
(171)
Finally, by Bayes’ theorem it holds that q(r) = q(r|Ii)q(Ii) and since it further holds that
q(r|Ii) = p(r|Ii), the statement of the proposition follows.
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Figure 9: Ablation of policies with and without marginal heuristic (error bars indicate 95%
bootstrap confidence intervals)
To find good rejection probabilities pr that result in low sample variance, we did 500
runs for each bucket under the second moment policy with threshold 15000 to get a very
rough estimate of f (i.e. the scale out failure probability) for each bucket. The rejection
probabilities pr are then calculated by combining Equation (162) and Equation (165). The
resulting values can also be found in Table 4.
Appendix E. Ablation of Policies Without Marginal Heuristic
In this section, we ablate the simulation results for our policies with marginal heuristic
with the same policies without these heuristic. Note again that without individual prior
observations, no arriving deployment is ever marginal in the policy horizon. Thus, without
prior observations, the marginal policies are equivalent to the policies without marginal
heuristic.
We have simulated the policies without marginal heuristic for 1, 5, and 50 observations,
with the same setup as in Section 5. In Figure 9, we contrast those results with the results
for the marginal policies. We see that with just a few observations, the policies with and
without marginal heuristic have a very similar performance (though the marginal heuristic
still enables slightly higher utilization). This is not surprising, since relatively few arriving
deployments are marginal at this level of prior information. Consequently, the utilization
gap increases with more information. Both with 5 and 50 observations, the marginal second
moment policy obtains a sizable utilization increase of more than 3% compared to the second
moment policy without the heuristic.
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4 The Competitive Effects of
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Abstract. In many markets, like electricity or cloud computing markets, providers
incur large costs for keeping sufficient capacity in reserve to accommodate de-
mand fluctuations of a mostly fixed user base. These costs are significantly af-
fected by the unpredictability of the users’ demand. Nevertheless, standard mech-
anisms charge fixed per-unit prices that do not depend on the variability of the
users’ demand. In this paper, we study a variance-based pricing rule in a two-
provider market setting and perform a game-theoretic analysis of the resulting
competitive effects. We show that an innovative provider who employs variance-
based pricing can choose a pricing strategy that guarantees himself a higher
profit than using fixed per-unit prices for any individually rational response of
a provider playing a fixed pricing strategy. We then characterize all equilibria for
the setting where both providers use variance-based pricing strategies. We show
that, in equilibrium, the providers’ profits may increase or decrease, depending
on their cost functions. However, social welfare always weakly increases.
1 Introduction
In most markets with mostly fixed user bases, providers’ costs are largely driven by how
much buffer capacity they must keep in reserve. This, in turn, depends on the variance
of their users’ demand. However, the predominant pricing mechanisms employed in
practice do not take this effect into account. Instead, prices are typically set on a per-
unit basis, such that every user pays the same for the same product.
In electricity markets, for example, a provider has to make long-term supply deci-
sions. But in real-time, supply and demand always have to be perfectly balanced, which
requires a costly buffer infrastructure [Cramton, 2017]. If users would always consume
(almost) the same amount of energy, this buffer could be far smaller than with widely
varying user demands. Nevertheless, users pay simple per MW/h prices.
Next, consider the market for mobile data. Mobile network providers continuously
expand their cell tower infrastructure to be able to satisfy their users’ bandwidth needs
under peak demand [López-Pérez et al., 2009]. However, most end-users pay a fixed
per-gigabyte-price, independent of when they consume it or how variable their demand
is.1
Finally, consider cloud computing markets, where cloud providers must keep buffers
of idle capacity in each compute cluster to handle changing resource demands of al-
ready running jobs. Handling the variance of cloud users is particularly difficult given
1 Even in high-GDP countries, less than 10% of customers have unlimited data plans [Ericsson,
2017].
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that the resource needs of an individual job may vary by a factor of 10 or 100 over time
(see [Dierks et al., 2019]). In this domain, the mixture of user types (i.e., their average
demand variance) significantly affects the providers’ need to supply buffer capacity.
Nevertheless, most cloud resources are sold for a fixed price per core-hour, without
regard to the variability of the users’ demand.
Managing Demand via Sophisticated Pricing. Classic approaches for dealing with
varying demand include dynamic pricing and congestion-based pricing [Muratori and
Rizzoni, 2015, Rong et al., 2018, Truong-Huu and Tham, 2014]. These approaches
focus on flattening demand peaks. A big downside is that they make it unpredictable
for users whether they can obtain the product at a given price when they need it. This
puts providers who serve risk-averse users or users with relatively uniform but inelastic
demand at a competitive disadvantage. In some markets, like cloud computing, this ef-
fect is so strong that providers never consider dynamic pricing for their primary market
offerings [Dierks and Seuken, 2019]. The effect even greatly hinders the adoption of dy-
namic pricing in more suitable domains, like electricity markets [Joskow and Wolfram,
2012], where customers are instead often only exposed to fixed “time-of-use” tariffs
[Urieli and Stone, 2016, Celebi and Fuller, 2012].
Variance-based Pricing. In this paper, we study variance-based pricing, where part of
the price the users pay depends on the variance of their demand. Variance-based pricing
was recently proposed by [Dierks et al., 2019] to reduce costs by improving the demand
prediction ability of a monopolistic cloud provider. For a provider, in general markets,
variance-based pricing has the advantage that his low-variance users pay lower prices
and are thus impacted less by the buffer requirements (which are mainly caused by high-
variance users). This is not only fairer, but importantly, it incentivizes users to reduce
their variance, which in turn reduces the provider’s costs. In a monopolistic setting,
the provider can obviously use variance-based pricing to increase his profits. However,
in a competitive market environment, the effects are unclear, because the competitive
pricing pressure by other providers may limit what he can achieve with variance-based
pricing.
Overview of our Approach. We analyze a duopoly of providers who compete for a con-
tinuum of user types. We assume that the two providers consider the long-term effect
of their pricing strategies on their profits. Since each provider has to provision enough
capacity to guarantee service quality even during demand spikes, the cost per unit of a
product depends on the average variance of the users he attracts. Each provider either
conservatively employs constant per-unit prices or is willing to innovate and employ
per-unit prices that linearly depend on each user’s variance. We restrict ourself to lin-
ear prices here, because their simplicity makes them most plausible and marketable in
practice. We show that, as long as a provider’s costs are not far larger than the costs of
his competitor, unilaterally switching to variance-based pricing can be used to obtain a
higher profit for any reasonable constant response of the other provider. We then charac-
terize all equilibria that arise if both providers employ variance-based pricing. We also
show that, as long as providers are not symmetric in their cost functions, the profits of
both providers often increase, as they can attract user types which they can better serve
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due to their respective cost functions. Finally, we show that the welfare may decrease if
only one provider employs variance-based pricing, but that it at least weakly increases
if both employ variance-based pricing.
Related Work. Variance-based pricing is a type of price discrimination [Varian, 1989,
Mussa and Rosen, 1978]. However, in contrast to the classic price discrimination set-
tings [Moorthy, 1984, Blattberg and Wisniewski, 1989, Gallego et al., 2006], variance-
based pricing does not discriminate based on user preferences. Furthermore, in our
model, there is neither a fixed marginal cost of supplying a given user nor do costs de-
pend solely on the number of supplied products. As long as neither provider charges
for variance, they cannot price discriminate at all and the problem becomes similar to
a Bertrand competition [Baye and Kovenock, 2017]. In order to isolate the competitive
effects caused by variance-based pricing, we assume that both providers offer the same
product; thus, product differentiation (e.g., [Feng et al., 2013]) does not take place.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a market setting with two providers and a continuum of users to which
the providers want to sell their products. We study a simple two-period model: in the
first period, the providers choose their pricing strategies; in the second period, the users
choose a provider to buy the product from.
2.1 Formal Model
Each user is associated with a real-valued type t ∈ [0, tmax]. We keep this type general,
but in practice it can be assumed to encode the variance of a user’s demand. To keep
the notation simple, we normalize each user’s expected demand to 1. For a randomly
chosen user, her type is distributed as a continuous random variable with pdf f(t) and
cdf F (t). We do not model fluctuations in the mixture of user types over time.
Each provider’s strategy space consists of his choice of price function ρi. We re-




i) to a fixed price p
f
i per unit of the product (independent of the user
type) and a second linearly type-based charge pℓit per unit of the product.
2 The overall









innovative and those who do not adopt the new pricing scheme and restrict themselves
to pℓi = 0 as conservative.
Given the provider’s price functions, and depending on a user’s own type, each
user chooses to obtain the product either from provider 1 or 2. We denote a strategy
profile for all user types by σ(t) : [0, tmax] → {1, 2}. In this paper, we do not model
2 As supply decisions (and therefore costs) do not depend on a user’s true type but on the type
the provider predicts for a user, we assume that providers know each realized user’s type. In
practice, user bases are often mostly fixed, such that a provider can learn each user’s type over
time.
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the users’ values for product consumption.3 Consequently, the users’ utility function is
simply equal to their negative payments. Throughout the paper, given price functions
(ρ1, ρ2), we assume that users only play utility-maximizing (i.e., payment minimizing)
user strategy profiles. Formally, we assume that σ(t) = argmini {ρi(t)} for all t.
As we will see, it is often in a provider’s best interest to play essentially the same
strategy as their opponent, which makes tie-breaking rules for the user sub-game very
important. To avoid that tie breaking for ρ1 = ρ2 gives rise to arbitrary user strategy
profiles that would not arise in practice, we restrict user strategy profiles to those at
least one provider can enforce by deviating from (ρ1, ρ2) at only an infinitesimal profit
loss. Formally, we say that a user strategy profile σ is enforceable at (ρ1, ρ2) if for one
provider i ∈ {1, 2} there exists a sequence of pricing functions (ρki )
∞
k=1 such that σ is
the limit of the user strategy profiles that are uniquely (up to a null set) utility maxi-
mizing for each (ρki ,ρ−i). With linearly type-based prices, this limits the user strategy
profiles to any form where all users with type greater than some cutoff point t̂ join one
provider i and those with lower type join the other provider. To denote this, we also
write σ = [0, t̂]→i or σ = [t̂, tmax]→i. Note that this allows for the unique representa-
tion of any σ, as all other users choose the other provider. Further, we denote by µ(a, b)





F (b)−F (a) .
A provider’s costs for serving a given user do not only depend on how many units of
his product he sells to that user, but also on how many units the provider has to supply
for all users. Consequently, a provider’s cost function ci(σ) is a function of the whole
user strategy profile σ and cannot be separated into independent costs for individual
users. We assume that ci(σ) is strictly increasing in the expected type of a randomly
drawn user who joins provider i’s market under σ. Overloading notation, we also write
ci(a, b) for provider i’s cost if all users in [a, b] (and no other users) choose him.
In many applications, splitting a given population of users between two identical
providers causes higher overall costs than if one provider would obtain all users, as that
one provider could always provision for both sub-populations separately. We call such
cost functions that are convex in relation to splitting the market split-convex, i.e. ci() is
split-convex if for all t̂ ∈ [0, tmax] it holds that
F (t̂)c1(0, t̂) + (1− F (t̂))c1(t̂, tmax) ≥ c1(0, tmax).
If the inequality is strict for all t̂ ∈ [0, tmax], we call the cost function strictly split-
convex.
A provider’s utility is his expected profit πj per customer in a population, which is
given by




Given this model, we call a strategy ρi for provider i ∈ {1, 2} an individually ratio-
nal response to any given strategy ρ−i of the other provider if there exists an enforceable
utility-maximizing user strategy profile σ that gives provider i weakly positive profit,
i.e., πi(ρi, ρ−i, σ) ≥ 0.
3 In the markets we study, essentially every user is served by some provider, as costs are very
low compared to most users’ values and competition ensures that prices are close to costs.
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2.2 Equilibrium Concept
We primarily use the following equilibrium concept for our analysis.
Definition 1. A tuple (ρ1, ρ2, σ) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) if σ is utility max-
imizing for (ρ1, ρ2) and, for i ∈ {1, 2}, there exist no ρ̂i 6= ρi and σ̂ such that σ̂ is
utility maximizing for (ρ̂i, ρ−i) and
πi(ρ̂i, ρ−i, σ̂) > πi(ρi, ρ−i, σ). (2)
Note that when ρ1 = ρ2, users are indifferent between all user strategy profiles,
but our equilibrium definition mandates that tie breaking is done in such a way that no
provider has an incentive to deviate infinitesimally only to secure himself a different
user strategy profile. In practice, a combination of external factors and bounded ratio-
nality imply that providers do not move their prices to a tie or even infinitesimally close
to each other, at best achieving ǫ−BNEs. Essentially, price differentiations that are too
small are not marketable.
Unfortunately, as we will see in Section 4.1, when one provider is innovative and
the other is conservative, typically no Bayes-Nash-Equilibria exist. For any possible
tuple (ρ1, ρ2, σ), at least one of the providers wants to deviate. To nonetheless make
meaningful statements about these settings, note that an innovative provider typically
first commits to his strategy by moving to variance-based prices and the other provider
reacts to this innovation. We therefore introduce a second equilibrium concept, Stack-
elberg equilibria, that effectively views the game as a sequential move game: first one
provider, the leader, commits to his strategy, anticipating the other providers reaction.
The other provider, the follower, then reacts.
Because our model only contains 2 providers, after the leader has fixed his strategy,
the follower does not face any additional competitive pressure in such an equilibrium
concept. If the follower aims to maximize his profit, then this allows an innovative
leader i to entice a conservative follower −i to indirectly collude by setting a relatively
low fixed-price pfi but a very high linear component p
ℓ
i . A conservative follower −i,
being restricted to only setting one price for the whole market, then is best off also
setting a high price. This would partly circumvent the competitive price pressure be-
tween providers and lead to relatively high profits at the users expense. As practical
markets seldom contain exactly two providers, these profits would be overly optimistic.
To show that the advantages of variance-based pricing do not depend on this artifact of
the duopoly structure, we assume that the follower, instead of maximizing his profits,
maximizes his market share as long as it provides him weakly positive profits. This can
also be seen as implicitly modeling outside competitive pressure on the follower.
Definition 2. A tuple (ρ−i, σ) is a pessimistically competitive follower response to
leader strategy ρi if σ is utility maximizing for (ρi, ρ−i), results in non-negative profit,
i.e., πi(ρi, ρ−i, σ) ≥ 0, and there exists no ρ̂−i 6= ρ−i and σ̂ such that σ̂ is utility
maximizing for (ρi, ρ̂−i) and
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A tuple (ρ1, ρ2, σ) is a pessimistically competitive Stackelberg equilibrium (pcSE)
with leader i if (ρ−i, σ) is a pessimistically competitive follower response to ρi and
there exists no ρ̂i with pessimistically competitive follower response ( ˆρ−i, σ̂) such that
πi(ρ̂i, ρ̂−i, σ̂) > πi(ρi, ρ−i, σ). (5)
3 Profit Analysis with Conservative Providers
We first analyze the case where both providers are conservative, i.e., restricted to pℓ1 =
pℓ2 = 0. Since they cannot split the market through pricing differences, the resulting
game is similar to a classic Bertrand competition. Thus, if the providers’ costs for
the whole population are symmetric, they cannot extract any profit, while for non-
symmetric providers, the provider with lower costs for serving the whole market can
potentially extract the cost difference as a profit.
Proposition 1. Let both providers be conservative, i.e., pℓ1 = p
ℓ
2 = 0. W.l.o.g. assume
c1(0, tmax) ≤ c2(0, tmax). Then in any BNE (ρ1, ρ2, σ) the following holds:
pf1 = p
f
2 ∈ [c1(0, tmax), c2(0, tmax)] (6)
and
π1(ρ1, ρ2, σ) =p
f
1 − c1(0, tmax) (7)
π2(ρ1, ρ2, σ) =0 (8)




2 ∈ [c1(0, tmax), c2(0, tmax)] and
σ = [0, tmax]→1 is a BNE as neither provider has an advantageous deviation. All users
already choose provider 1, so decreasing his price only reduces his profit, while any
price increase makes him lose all users. Since all users choose him, his profit is simply
π1(ρ1, ρ2, σ) = p
f
1 − c1(0, tmax). Any lower price for provider 2 on the other hand
would lead to all users choosing him, but he would make a negative profit per user.
Increasing his price would have no effect on his profit, as no users choose him. Without
users, he trivially makes zero profit. As a special case, when c1(0, tmax) = c2(0, tmax),
then, by the same argument, pf1 = p
f
2 = c2(0, tmax) with σ = [0, tmax]→2 is an
additional BNE, with both providers obtaining zero profit.
We now show that these are the only BNEs, by showing that any other “potential
BNE” leads to a contradiction. First, note that when pf1 < p
f
2 , every user strictly prefers






2 for which every user still
strictly prefers provider 1, but with a higher payment. Therefore, pf1 = p
f
2 has to hold
in equilibrium. If pf1 = p
f
2 < c1(0, tmax), provider 1 would make a loss for every
user. On the other hand, if pf1 = p
f
2 > c2(0, tmax), then for any σ = [0, tmax]→i, the





2 . Taken together, this means that there can be no other BNE than those
characterized by the proposition.
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Going forward, we denote BNEs with two conservative providers as constant BNEs.
Note that, while all pf1 = p
f
2 ∈ [c1(0, tmax), c2(0, tmax)] are equilibrium prices, the
only reason why any pf1 = p
f
2 < c2(0, tmax) does not lead to a loss for provider 2 is
because he obtains no users. This makes pf1 = c2(0, tmax) the only non-pathological
BNE.
A provider publicly committing to a constant strategy also can not improve his profit
further.
Proposition 2. Let both providers be conservative, i.e., pℓ1 = p
ℓ
2 = 0. Then no pes-
simistically competitive Stackelberg equilibrium can result in a higher profit for the
leader than the non-pathological BNE.
Proof. W.l.o.g. assume provider 1 is the leader and assume the tuple (ρ1, ρ2, σ) is a
pessimistically competitive Stackelberg equilibrium with profit greater zero for provider
1. First note that for any pf1 , p
f








2 ) without changing σ
results in the same profit and market share for both providers. We can therefore w.l.o.g.
assume pf1 = p
f
2 . If p
f
1 < c2(0, tmax), provider 1 makes less profit than in the non-
pathological BNE. On the other hand, if pf1 > c2(0, tmax), then provider 2 would
undercut his price and provider 1 would obtain zero users and no profit. Therefore, in
any pessimistically competitive Stackelberg equilibrium provider 1 makes at most profit
c2(0, tmax)− c1(0, tmax).
4 Profit Analysis with Innovative Providers
In this section, we analyze the profit when one or both providers are innovative. As a
first step, we show that, given a strategy of one provider, the other provider’s profit is
upper bounded by the profit he could achieve if he would play the same strategy as the
first provider (and if he could select the utility-maximizing user strategy profile that is
most favorable to him).




i). Then, for all ρ−i 6= ρi,
ρ′−i = ρi, and all σ that are utility maximizing for ρ−i, ρi, it holds that π−i(ρ−i, ρi, σ) =
0 or π−i(ρ−i, ρi, σ) < π−i(ρ
′
−i, ρi, σ).
Proof. First note that for any ρ−i 6= ρi, by the linearity of the price function, there





i (note that t̂ can be outside [0, tmax]). For any utility-maximizing σ, users
with type below t̂ choose one provider and those above the other. Now consider some







i , then any utility-maximizing user strategy profile is of the form σ = [0, t̄]→−i
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for t̄ = min(t̂, tmax) and it holds that





















i − c−i(0, t̄))dt (11)
=π−i(ρi, ρi, σ). (12)







It directly follows that in all BNEs, both providers play the same strategy, even if
one provider is conservative.
Corollary 1. In all BNEs it holds that ρ1 = ρ2.
We now separately consider the cases where either only one or both providers are
willing to employ linear pricing.
4.1 One Provider is Innovative
For this section, assume that provider 1 is innovative, i.e., willing to employ variance-
based pricing, and provider 2 is conservative, i.e., only willing to play pℓ2 = 0. Corol-
lary 1 suggests that only one provider being innovative precludes the existence of a
BNE. In the following theorem we show that this is indeed true, unless one providers’
costs are “far lower” than the other providers.
Theorem 1. Let provider 2 be conservative, i.e., pℓ2 = 0, and provider 1 be innovative.
Then there exists a BNE if and only if there exists no t̂ ∈ [0, tmax] with
c1(0, tmax)− F (t̂)c1(0, t̂) (13)
<(1− F (t̂))(c1(0, tmax)− c2(0, tmax)). (14)
If a BNE exists then it is equal to a constant BNE.
Proof. By Corollary 1, in all BNEs, both providers use constant pricing functions and
for any constant pricing functions that are not part of a constant BNE there exist constant
deviations. By Proposition 3, any deviation of provider 1 from a constant BNE is worse
than him freely choosing the user strategy profile and not changing his pricing function.
He can enforce any user strategy profile where he only obtains users with types lower
than some t̂. Thus, if (ρ1, ρ2, [0, tmax]→1) is a constant BNE, then it is still a BNE when
provider 1 is innovative as long as there exists no t̂ < tmax such that [0, t̂]→1 leads to a
higher profit than taking the whole market, i.e.,
c1(0, tmax)− F (t̂)c1(0, t̂) (15)
<(1− F (t̂))(c1(0, tmax)− c2(0, tmax)). (16)
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Otherwise [0, tmax]→1 cannot be a BNE user strategy profile.
Finally, for all (ρ1, ρ2, [0, t̂]→1) with t̂ < tmax, the users that choose provider 2
have a higher average variance than the average variance of all users. Consequently,
c2(0, tmax) < c2(t̂, tmax). As prices are constant, provider 2 either makes negative
profit (and deviates) or he increases his profit by slightly decreasing his price and taking
the whole market.
Theorem 1 means that providers usually have an incentive to become innovative if
their competition is conservative. However, becoming innovative and myopically opti-
mizing profit can lead to non-existence of a BNE. In this case, an innovative provider
should consider the additional market power he has due to his larger strategy space
when choosing his strategy. Specifically, he should take a (myopically) non-optimal
action to restrict his competitor’s rational responses.
We now first show that, if provider 1 does so, he can guarantee himself strictly
positive payoff whenever there is an interval of users for which his costs are lower than
provider 2’s costs for all users.
Theorem 2. Let provider 2 be conservative, i.e., pℓ2 = 0. If there exists 0 < t̄ < tmax
with
c1(0, t̄) < c2(0, tmax) (17)
and c1(0, t̄) < c1(0, tmax) < 2c1(0, t̄), (18)
then there exists a strategy ρ1 with p
ℓ
1 > 0 that guarantees provider 1 a non-negative
payoff for any pf2 and a strictly positive payoff for any individually rational response of
provider 2.
Proof. Note that for any pf1 < c2(0, tmax), p
ℓ
1 > 0, provider 2 can only achieve a




1 for some t̂ > 0. To guarantee a positive payoff
for provider 1 with such a pf1 it therefore suffices that





1 − c1(0, t̂))dt > 0 (19)
for all t̂. For 0 < t̄ < tmax with c1(0, t̄) < c2(0, tmax) and
c1(0, t̄) < c1(0, tmax) < 2c1(0, t̄) (20)
choose ρ1 such that p
f







. Then it holds for t̂ ≤ t̄:
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For t̂ > t̄ it holds that























f(t)(2c1(0, t̄)− c1(0, t̂)dt (29)
>0 (30)
Therefore, ρ1 guarantees provider 1 positive profit for σ = [0, t̂]→1 for any t̂ ∈ (0, tmax].
In words, Theorem 2 says that provider 1 always has a strategy which is individ-
ually rational (independent of the other provider’s action) and that results in strictly
positive profit for all individually rational responses of provider 2. This is especially
attractive if provider 1 could only obtain zero profit as a conservative provider. As we






. While this strategy does neither constitute a BNE nor a pessimistically
competitive Stackelberg equilibrium (i.e., the leader might be able to do even better), it
gives us a lower bound for the profit achievable by an innovative leader in pessimisti-
cally competitive Stackelberg equilibria.
This still leaves the question whether a provider who obtains positive profit as a con-
servative provider should also become innovative. As the following proposition shows,
the answer is usually yes.
Theorem 3. Let provider 2 be conservative, i.e., pℓ2 = 0. If provider 1 obtains strictly
positive profit in some constant BNE then there exists a strategy ρ1 with p
ℓ
1 > 0 that, for
any individually rational response of provider 2, guarantees provider 1 greater profit
than in any constant BNE.
Proof. Recall that by Proposition 1, if provider 1 has positive profit in some constant
equilibrium then
c1(0, tmax) < c2(0, tmax). (31)
Let t̄ be a type such that
t̄ = argmint
c2(t, tmax)− c2(0, tmax)
t
. (32)
For any ǫ > 0 with ǫ < µ(0, tmax)
c2(t̄,tmax)−c2(0,tmax))
t̄












. Then for any pf2 provider 2 obtains no
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users or there exists a t > t̂ such that he obtains all users with type t > t̂ and his profit
is given by
π2(ρ1, ρ2, σ) =
∫ tmax
t̂
















− c2(t̂, tmax))dt (36)
=0− (F (tmax)− F (t̂))ǫ (37)
Therefore, provider 2 has no individually rational response for which he obtains
any users. It follows that for any individually rational response of provider 2 and any
ǫ < µ(0, tmax)
c2(t̄,tmax)−c2(0,tmax)
t̄
provider 1’s profit is






1 − c1(0, tmax))dt (39)
=c2(0, tmax)− c1(0, tmax)− ǫ (40)
+ µ(0, tmax)
c2(t̄, tmax))− c2(0, tmax)
t̄
(41)
>c2(0, t̂)− c1(0, t̂) (42)
By Proposition 1, the profit therefore is greater than the profit in any constant BNE.
Note that, in contrast to the strategies described by the proof of Theorem 2, the
strategies described by the proof of Theorem 3 are not guaranteed to be individually ra-
tional responses to every possible action provider 2 might play. However, they are guar-
anteed to be individually rational responses to every constant BNE strategy of provider
2 and again constitute a lower bound for the profit achievable by an innovative leader in
pessimistically competitive Stackelberg equilibria.
Taken together, it also follows from these two results that, under fairly mild condi-
tions, innovating to variance-based prices in the face of conservative competition will
increase a providers profit in any pessimistically competitive Stackelberg equilibrium.
Theorem 4. Let provider 2 be conservative, i.e., pℓ2 = 0. If provider 1 obtains strictly
positive profit in some constant BNE or there exists 0 < t̄ < tmax with
c1(0, t̄) < c2(0, tmax) (43)
and c1(0, t̄) < c1(0, tmax) < 2c1(0, t̄), (44)
then in any pessimistically competitive Stackelberg equilibrium (ρ1, ρ2, σ) with leader
1 it holds that provider 1 is innovative, i.e., plays pℓ1 > 0, and obtains higher profit than
in any constant BNE.
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Proof. From combining Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, it follows that the provider can
obtain higher profit than in any constant BNE by playing pℓ1 > 0. On the other hand,
Proposition 2 gives us that no strategy with pℓ1 = 0 can result in a profit that is higher
than the best constant BNE.
While the strategies presented by Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 are fully adequate to
achieve higher profit than any constant strategy could, they are typically not optimal and
do not result in pessimistically competitive Stackelberg equilibrium strategies. Finding
Stackelberg equilibria is generally hard, as they are defined as the solutions to the fol-













































How to best solve this depends on the specific forms the cost functions and the distri-
bution over user types take. As the problem only contains three variables, evolutionary
algorithms such as differential evolution can typically be employed to find near-optimal
solutions relatively quickly, though they lack optimality guarantees. A good overview
of potential solution methods can be found in [Sinha et al., 2017].
4.2 Both Providers are Innovative
Once one provider starts to employ linear pricing, the other provider might at some point
also want to follow. Consequently, we now look at the case where both providers are
innovative. When both providers employ linear pricing, the first provider loses much of
the additional power he had when the other provider stayed conservative. Consequently,
there is no general guarantee that he can still improve his profit. But as long as the cost
functions are strictly split-convex, he can still choose a strategy which guarantees him
that profits do not decrease compared to any constant BNE (for any individually rational
response of the other provider).
Proposition 4. Assume the cost function of provider 2 is strictly split-convex. Then
there exists a strategy ρ1 with p
ℓ
1 > 0 that, for any individually rational response of
provider 2, guarantees provider 1 greater or equal profit than in any constant BNE.
Proof. If provider 1 obtains 0 profit in all constant BNEs, nothing has to be shown.









|tmaxc2(0, t) and p
f
1 +
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pℓ1µ(0, tmax) = c2(0, tmax). By Proposition 3, we know that for all ρ2 with utility-
maximizing σ = [0, t̂]→2 it holds that π2(ρ1, ρ2, σ) ≤ π2(ρ1, ρ1, σ) and from strict






|tmaxc2(0, t)(µ(0, t̂)− µ(0, tmax)) (48)
=pf1 + p
ℓ
1µ(0, tmax) + p
ℓ




























The proof works analogously for σ = [0, t̂]→1. Therefore, any individually rational
response of provider 2 results in user strategy profile σ = [0, tmax]→1. For this strat-
egy profile, provider 1 has profit π1(ρ1, ρ2, σ) = c1(0, tmax) − c2(0, tmax), which by
Proposition 1 is the highest possible profit for any constant BNE.
Similarly to what we have seen with a conservative follower, this generic strategy
lower bounds the profit in any pessimistically competitive Stackelberg equilibrium with
a potentially innovative follower.
Theorem 5. If the cost function of provider 2 is strictly split-convex, then any pes-
simistically competitive Stackelberg equilibrium (ρ1, ρ2, σ) results in (weakly) higher
profit than any constant BNE.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 4.
Strictly higher profit can not be guaranteed. For example, if both providers are sym-
metric and their costs are split-convex, moving to linear prices still cannot lead to any
profit in equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Assume providers are symmetric, i.e., c1(·) = c2(·), and costs are split-
convex. Then there can be no BNE with strictly positive profit for either provider and no
pessimistically competitive Stackelberg equilibrium with strictly positive profit for the
leader.
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Proof. If, w.l.o.g., all users prefer provider 1 and he obtains strictly positive payoff,
provider 2 obtains zero profit but can deviate to pf2 = p
f




1 to obtain strictly
positive payoff for ǫ > 0 small enough. Therefore, in any potential BNE, the market
is split between providers or both obtain zero profit. Assume (ρ1, ρ2, σ) is a BNE and
w.l.o.g. σ = [0, t̂]→1 for some 0 < t̂ < tmax. By Corollary 1 we can assume ρ1 = ρ2.
Then, for any ǫ > 0 and ρ̂2 = (p
f
2 − ǫ, p
ℓ
2) all users prefer provider 2, resulting in profit




f(t)(pf2 − ǫ+ tp
ℓ













− (1− F (t̂))c2(t̂, tmax) + F (t̂)c2(0, t̂) (59)
=π2(ρ1, ρ2, σ) + π1(ρ1, ρ2, σ)− ǫ (60)
If π2(ρ1, ρ2, σ) > 0 or π1(ρ1, ρ2, σ) > 0, then it follows that for ǫ small enough,
π2(ρ1, ρ̂2, σ̂) > π2(ρ1, ρ2, σ), contradicting our assumption that (ρ1, ρ2, σ) is a BNE.
Thus, it must hold that π2(ρ1, ρ2, σ) = 0 and π1(ρ1, ρ2, σ) = 0. The equivalent argu-
ments also holds for the leader in a pessimistically competitive Stackelberg equilibrium,
as the follower will always take the whole market if he can do so without obtaining neg-
ative profit.
When cost functions are not split-convex, symmetric providers still always obtain
the same profit in any BNE, even though it can be positive.
Proposition 6. Assume providers are symmetric, i.e., c1(·) = c2(·). Then, in all BNEs
it holds that π1(ρ1, ρ2, σ) = π2(ρ1, ρ2, σ).
Proof. To see this, note that for symmetric providers, whoever has lower profits could
switch users with the other one by making an infinitesimal change to his price function.
By definition, whether a tuple (ρ1, ρ2, σ) is a BNE is decided via a three-dimensional
condition space, as the profit has to be better than the profit for any other tuple (ρ̂1, ρ̂2, σ̂).
This makes it very hard to evaluate whether a given tuple is a BNE. The following
theorem instead characterizes equilibria by a one-dimensional condition space, greatly
reducing the complexity of checking candidate equilibria.
Theorem 6. A tuple (ρ1, ρ2, [0, t̂]→i) is a BNE if and only if ρ1 = ρ2 and
F (t̂)ci(0, t̂)− F (a)ci(0, a) (61)
≤(F (t̂)− F (a)(pfi + µ(a, t)p
ℓ
i) (62)
≤(1− F (a))c−i(a, tmax)− (1− F (t̂))c−i(t̂, tmax) (63)
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for all 0 ≤ a ≤ tmax. If the providers are not symmetric, it also has to hold for all
0 ≤ a ≤ tmax that
F (a)(pfi + µ(0, a)p
ℓ
i − c−i(0, a)) (64)
≤(1− F (t̂))(pfi + µ(t̂, tmax)p
ℓ
i − c−i(t̂, tmax)) (65)
and
(1− F (a))(pfi + µ(a, tmax)p
ℓ
i − ci(a, tmax)) (66)
≤F (t̂)(pfi + µ(0, t̂)p
ℓ
i − ci(0, t̂)). (67)
The proof is provided in Appendix A.
While Theorem 6 fully characterizes all BNEs, it is a very technical characteriza-
tion. It can be used to check whether a given tuple (ρ1, ρ2, σ) is a BNE, but it does not
enable an easy search procedure for finding candidate BNEs. This is particularly im-
portant because a (ρ1, ρ2, [0, t̂]→i) that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 6 does not
always exist. Thus, even if both providers are innovative, there are cases where no BNE
exists. The following corollary addresses this issue, identifying a small subset of user
strategy profiles that can be part of a BNE and reducing the search for corresponding
provider strategies to a one-dimensional search.
Corollary 2. If a tuple (ρ1, ρ2, σ) with 0 < t̂ < tmax is a BNE and the cost functions
are differentiable, then it holds
d
dt
|t̂F (t)c2(0, t) (68)




|t̂ − (1− F (t))c1(t, tmax) (70)
Proof. Note that for t = t̂ it trivially holds
F (t̂)c2(0, t̂)− F (t)c2(0, t) (71)
=(F (t̂))− F (t)(pf1 + µ(t, t)p
ℓ
1) (72)
=(1− F (t))c1(t, tmax)− (1− F (t̂))c1(t̂, tmax). (73)
Theorem 6 further gives us that the three expressions have the same ordering for all t,
especially for all t in any small neighborhood around t̂. Therefore, all three expressions
need to have the same derivative in t at point t = t̂.
Given a cutoff point t̂, all potential BNE price functions lie on a line defined by
Equation (69). To find a BNE, all that remains to be done is to check whether t̂ with any
of the (pf , pℓ) on that line satisfy the conditions of Theorem 6.
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5 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we analyze the impact of variance-based pricing on social welfare. Since
all users always fulfill their demand, the social welfare is simply the negative sum of
the expected costs of both providers, i.e., w(ρ1, ρ2, [0, t]→i) = −F (t̂)ci(0, t̂) − (1 −
F (t̂))c−i(t̂, tmax). The social welfare in any constant BNE then follows directly from
Proposition 1.
Corollary 3. Let both providers be conservative and w.l.o.g. assume c1(0, tmax) ≤
c2(0, tmax). Then the social welfare in any BNE is w(ρ1, ρ2, σ) = −c1(0, tmax).
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 1.
If only one provider is innovative, then whether the social welfare increases or de-
creases depends on the relative cost functions of the two providers. This is because the
innovative provider typically employs his additional market power to force the conser-
vative provider to give up the low variance part of the market, even if the conservative
provider would be better suited to serve those users. But if both are innovative, he loses
this power and in BNE, the social welfare cannot decrease compared to any constant
BNE.
Proposition 7. W.l.o.g. assume c1(0, tmax) ≤ c2(0, tmax). When both providers are
innovative, then the social welfare in any BNE (ρ1, ρ2, σ) is higher than the social
welfare in any constant BNE, i.e., w(ρ1, ρ2, σ) ≥ −c1(0, tmax).
Proof. Recall that the social welfare is w(ρ1, ρ2.[0, t]→i) = (−1)
(
F (t̂)ci(0, t̂) +
(1− F (t̂))c−i(t̂, tmax)
)
. Thus, whenever all users choose provider 1, the social wel-
fare is the same as in any constant BNE, i.e., w(ρ1, ρ2, [0, tmax]→1) = −c1(0, tmax).
We now show the claim of the proposition by contradiction. Assume (ρ1, ρ2, [0, t̂]→i)
for i ∈ 1, 2 is an innovative BNE where the social welfare is strictly lower than the
social welfare in any constant BNE. Then the social welfare under (ρ1, ρ2, [0, t̂]→i) is
also strictly lower than under (ρ1, ρ2, [0, tmax]→1), i.e., the sum of the expected costs is
strictly higher; formally: F (t̂)ci(0, t̂)+(1−F (t̂))c−i(t̂, tmax) > c1(0, tmax). Addition-
ally, by Corollary 1, we can assume that ρ1 = ρ2. This means that the payment of any
user is independent of which provider he chooses, and therefore the sum of the revenues
of both providers does not change between (ρ1, ρ2, [0, t̂]→i) and (ρ1, ρ2, [0, t̂]→1). Taken
together, when going from the first profile to the second profile, the sum of the revenues
stay the same but the costs strictly decrease, which implies that π1(ρ1, ρ2, [0, tmax]→1) >
π1(ρ1, ρ2, [0, t̂]→i)+π2(ρ1, ρ2, [0, t̂]→i). Therefore, (ρ1, ρ2, [0, t̂]→i) can not be a BNE,
a contradiction.
6 Numerical Example
In this section, we illustrate our results via a simple numerical example. We assume that
user types are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and that the users’ value is v = 2. Further,
we assume provider 1 has cost function c1(a, b) = 0.0125 + µ(a, b)
2 and provider 2
has cost function c2(a, b) = 0.2 +
µ(a,b)2
4 , where µ(a, b) denotes the average type of
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provider 1
provider 2












Fig. 1: Profit of both providers for all conservative responses of provider 2 to provider 1 playing
(p
f
1 = 0.215, p
ℓ
1 = 0.5309) following Theorem 2.
provider 1
provider 2












Fig. 2: Profit of both providers for all conservative responses of provider 2 to provider 1 playing
the (approximate) pessimistically competitive Stackelberg strategy (p
f
1 = 0.2001, p
ℓ
1 = 0.2662).
all users in [a, b] (as previously defined in Section 2.1). Thus, provider 1 has a lower
cost for low types but a higher cost for high types than provider 2, and both providers
have the same cost for the whole user population. From Proposition 1, we know that
when both providers are conservative, there are only zero-profit BNEs. They occur at
pf1 = p
f
2 = 0.2625 with a welfare of −0.2625.
We now consider each provider unilaterally switching to linear prices. First, if
provider 1 innovates using a generic strategy as described in Theorem 2 (e.g., ρ1 =
(pf1 = 0.215, p
ℓ
1 = 0.5309)) then Figure 1 shows that he can obtain a sizable profit
increase of 0.1482 whenever provider 2 plays a profit-optimal best response. Social
welfare in this case improves to −0.2062, as each provider obtains a part of the market
he can more efficiently serve than his competitor. If provider 2 instead faces additional
outside competitive pressure or for some other reason plays a pessimistically competi-
tive response (marked “pc response” in the figure), then provider 1 at least still obtains
a profit of 0.027, while social welfare only improves to −0.2470. If provider 1 instead
already expects a pessimistically competitive response and aims to achieve a pessimisti-
cally competitive Stackelberg equilibrium, then he can further increase his worst case
profit. Applying a differential evolution search to the optimization formulation (45)
yields (pf1 = 0.200114, p
ℓ
1 = 0.266251) as an approximate equilibrium strategy for
the innovating provider 1. As can be seen in Figure 2, this results in an pessimistically
competitive equilibrium profit of 0.1067. Unfortunately, if the follower unexpectedly
does play a profit-optimizing best response, then provider 1’s profit is still only 0.1087.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the analogous results when provider 2 becomes inno-
vative instead. Contrasting Figure 3 with Figure 1, we see that, with the generic strate-
gies from Theorem 2, provider 1 innovating leads to the overall better result for both
providers. This is not surprising, considering that, with these strategies, the innovative
provider obtains the lower type portion of the market in which provider 1 has lower
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provider 2












Fig. 3: Profit of both providers for all conservative responses of provider 1 to provider 2 playing
(pf2 = 0.2506, p
ℓ
2 = 0.6188) following Theorem 2.
provider 1
provider 2












Fig. 4: Profit of both providers for all conservative responses of provider 1 to provider 2 playing
the (approximate) pessimistically competitive Stackelberg strategy (pf2 = 0.2019, p
ℓ
2 = 0.7424).
costs. Nonetheless, if provider 2 innovates, he still obtains a profit of 0.0276 at provider
1’s best constant response of pf1 = 0.3941 and a profit of 0.0135 at the pessimisti-
cally competitive response of pf1 = 0.3394. Since provider 2 uses the power of his
larger strategy space as an innovative provider to force provider 1 to obtain a high type
population interval (for which provider 1 has higher costs) social welfare unsurpris-
ingly decreases to −0.3846. This generic strategy is far from optimal for provider 2
though. If provider 2 instead aims for a pessimistically competitive equilibrium and
plays (pf2 = 0.2019, p
ℓ
2 = 0.7324), then we see in Figure 4 that he can force provider
1 completely out of the market. This leads to him obtaining a profit of 0.3106 and
restoring welfare back to −0.2625.
For the case where both providers are willing to employ linear pricing, Corollary
2 provides us with conditions on candidate equilibrium user strategy profiles. For our
example, we can use those conditions to find four cutoff points: σ = [0, 0.595]→1,
σ = [0.5431, 1]→1, σ = [0, 1]→1 and σ = [0, 0]→1. All of these except for σ =
[0, 0.595]→1 do not satisfy Theorem 6 and are eliminated. For σ = [0, 0.595]→1 any
pf1 = p
f







0.595 satisfy Theorem 6 and form equilib-
rium pricing strategies. To visualize an example BNE, Figure 5 shows the profit of both
providers for pf1 = p
f




2 = 0.4676 for different utility-maximizing
σ = [0, t]→1. We see that neither provider wants to deviate to enforce a different user
strategy profile σ = [0, t]→1 than σ = [0, 0.595]→1. Social welfare at this BNE is
−0.2055, which is even slightly better than when only provider 1 was innovative. How-
ever, the increased competition leads to a significantly lower profit for both providers
than when only provider 1 was innovative. This suggests that, as long as there is not
too much outside competitive pressure, a conservative provider who is forward-looking
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Fig. 5: Profit of both providers for different σ = [0, t]→1
and properly anticipates the possible BNEs may prefer to stay conservative if the other
provider is already innovative.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the competitive effects of providers utilizing linear variance-
based (or type-based) pricing rules in settings where a provider’s costs depend on the
average type of all his users. We have shown that, while a single provider innovating
often leads to non-existence of BNEs, the innovative provider can exert the additional
market power he has due to his larger strategy space to unilaterally set prices that in-
crease his profit for all individually rational responses of a conservative provider. We
have further characterized all equilibria where both providers employ linear pricing.
While much of the additional market power of an innovative provider is lost once the
other provider also adopts linear pricing, the increased strategy space allows providers
to split the market more closely along differences in their cost functions. This often
increases both providers’ profits and social welfare. While our general insights trans-
late to settings with more than two providers, the strategic considerations and the BNEs
quickly become too complex to provide useful insights. In future work, it would be
interesting to study secondary effects like incentivizing users to actively lower their
variance. Furthermore, to deploy variance-based pricing in practice, it would be impor-
tant to develop good machine learning algorithms to effectively learn the users’ types
over time.
A Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. A tuple (ρ1, ρ2, [0, t̂]→i) is a BNE if [0, t̂]→i is utility maximizing and no provider
has a profitable deviation. From Proposition 3 we know that any deviation with differ-
ent prices is worse than keeping the same prices and choosing the deviating provider’s
most-preferred utility-maximizing user strategy profile. Thus, the tuple is a BNE if and
only if moving to any different user strategy profile (weakly) decreases both providers’
profits. W.l.o.g. assume i = 2, and thus, in the candidate BNE we consider, provider 2
obtains the low-variance users. We first consider how profits change under different user
strategy profiles for which provider 2 still obtains the low-variance users. Changing to
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any [0, a]→2 with 0 ≤ a < t̂ yields a profit change for Provider 1 of






1 − c1(a, tmax))dt (75)
=(1− F (t̂))c1(t̂, tmax)− (1− F (a))c1(a, tmax) (76)
+ (F (t̂)− F (a))(pf1 + µ(a, t)p
ℓ
1) (77)
while with t̂ < a < tmax it yields a change of






1 − c1(t̂, tmax))dt (79)
=(1− F (t̂))c1(t̂, tmax) (80)
− (1− F (a))c1(a, tmax) (81)
+ (F (t̂)− F (a))(pf1 + µ(a, t)p
ℓ
1). (82)
Similarly, the profit change for provider 2 for a < t̂ is






1 − c2(0, t̂))dt (84)
=F (t̂)c2(0, t̂)− F (a)c2(0, a) (85)
− (F (t̂)− F (a))(pf1 + µ(a, t)p
ℓ
1) (86)
and for a > t̂ the profit change is given by







=F (t̂)c2(0, t̂)− F (a)c2(0, a) (89)
− (F (t̂)− F (a))(pf1 + µ(a, t)p
ℓ
1). (90)
Bounding all of these expressions above by zero yields the first half of the theorem.
Equivalently, we now consider how the profit changes when provider 1 obtains the











1 − c1(t̂, tmax))dt (92)
=F (a)(pf1 + µ(0, a)p
ℓ
1 − c1(0, a)) (93)
− (1− F (t̂))(pf1 + µ(t̂, tmax)p
ℓ
1 − c1(t̂, tmax)) (94)
≤0 (95)












1 − c2(0, t̂))dt (97)
=(1− F (a))(pf1 + µ(a, tmax)p
ℓ
1 − c2(a, tmax)) (98)
− F (t̂)(pf1 + µ(0, t̂)p
ℓ
1 − c2(0, t̂)) (99)
≤0 (100)
If the providers are symmetric, both providers would get the same profit if they
served the same segment of the market, and therefore the conditions (79) − (81) and
(84)− (86) do not have to be checked.
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Abstract. We study the revenue maximization problem of a publisher selling
consumer software. We assume that the publisher sells either traditional perpet-
ual licenses, subscription licenses, or both. For our analysis, we employ a game-
theoretic model, which enables us to derive the users’ equilibrium strategies and
the publisher’s optimal pricing strategy. Via extensive numerical evaluations,
we then demonstrate the sizable impact different pricing strategies have on the
publisher’s revenue, and we provide comparative statics for the most important
settings parameters. Although in practice, many publishers still only sell perpet-
ual licenses, we find that offering a subscription license in addition to a perpetual
license typically (but not always) leads to significantly higher revenue than only
selling either type of license on its own.
Keywords: Revenue Management · Pricing · Consumer Software· Subscription
· Product Differentiation
1 Introduction
Consumer software, particularly video games, is a multi-billion dollar industry [16,
10]. Originally sold on physical media like CDs or DVDs, the rise of fast network
connections has allowed software markets to become increasingly digital, eschewing
any physical medium. This has brought with it a proliferation of new business models
such as microtransactions (i.e., the sale of many mini-upgrades for small amounts of
money), lootboxes (i.e., randomized microtransactions [3]) or in-game advertisement
[1].
In this paper, we analyze the revenue maximization problem of a software publisher
who, while still focused on selling licenses for his product, is open to do this either
in the form of perpetual or subscription licenses. Whereas a classic perpetual license,
once bought, allows a user access to the product for as long as he desires (or, in some
more recent cases, as long as the publisher supports it), a subscription license only
allows access to the product for as long as the user pays a (typically monthly) recurring
fee.1 While in recent years, subscription licenses have become common for cloud-based
Software-as-a-Service offerings (where their main selling point is access to cloud hard-
ware), most products that do not come with significant cloud hardware are still only
1 This is distinct from subscription services that give access to constantly changing bundles
of products (e.g. Xbox Game Pass).
2 L. Dierks and S. Seuken
sold through perpetual licenses (though some publishers have recently experimented
with subscription models [11, 12]). Since we are interested in the revenue effects of sell-
ing the product itself (as opposed to additional cloud-based features), we exclude any
cloud-based synergy from our analysis.
For a publisher, offering a subscription model has a few obvious advantages com-
pared to perpetual licenses: the barrier of entry gets reduced and natural product
differentiation takes place between users depending on how long they are interested in
the product. This potentially allows the publisher to obtain far higher revenue from
some users than he could with perpetual licenses and may allow him to support the
product for a longer period of time through a continuous revenue stream.
On the other hand, offering a subscription model also comes with certain disadvan-
tages. Users may stop subscribing once a product’s novelty fades, while some users that
would use the product for a long time with low intensity may not be willing to pay a
recurring price at all. In addition, if the option to alternatively buy a perpetual license
is also offered, “market cannibalization” between both offerings may occur. And lastly,
but importantly, while publishers traditionally sell upgrades to keep their product up
to date or expand its features, with a subscription model it is typically assumed that
users always obtain access to the most recent version (not including optional micro-
transactions).
In this paper, we take a game-theoretic approach towards analyzing the merit of
offering subscription licenses instead of or in addition to perpetual licenses. Selling a
product over some time horizon is fundamentally a question of revenue management
[6, 4, 14] and it is important to take user behavior into account, as users for example
may delay a purchase to wait for a reduction in prices. In contrast to classic revenue
management problems, software as a purely digital good has neither a limited stock
nor marginal costs. Instead, the quality of the product in the eyes of users continuously
decays [7]. Furthermore, offering a subscription option and offering paid but optional
upgrades both constitute forms of product differentiation [9, 8, 5], though again with
very particular cost and utility structures that differ from the classic literature. In the
past, the revenue effects of subscriptions have been studied for some other domains
like ancillary services of a repeatedly sold core product (e.g., additional baggage for
airline tickets) [17] or professional Software-as-a-Service offerings (where, importantly,
subscriptions provide scalable hardware while buy options do not, and utilities take a
very different form than for consumer software) [13]. Chawla et al. [2] effectively studied
a kind of subscription service with a free trial period for software products, though they
restricted themselves to a single user type and evaluated their mechanism compared to
extracting all expected value from the user.
To properly analyze the problem and capture all its particularities, we introduce a
tailor-made model that takes the form of a two-step game. In the first step, the publisher
chooses his pricing strategy; in the second step, the users act inside of a discrete time
sub-game where they arrive and dynamically obtain and lose demand for the product.
We prove that there are only five distinct classes of user equilibrium strategies, which
significantly aids in our analysis. Based on this, we derive the publisher’s revenue as
a function of his pricing strategy and show that only offering a subscription option
can never be optimal. We show that depending on the setting, either only offering
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perpetual licences or offering a subscription option in addition to perpetual licenses can
be optimal, though for most software products, offering both options is likely to lead to
the best possible revenue. Through comparative statics we further evaluate the influence
different setting parameters have on the revenue of the various pricing strategies.
2 Model
We model the problem as a two stage game. First, the publisher commits to a pricing
strategy. Then, over nmax timesteps users arrive to the system. Once a user has arrived
to the system, he faces a game with multiple timesteps. We can model this as an infinite
time horizon Markov Decision Process (MDP) where he can take actions and obtains
rewards depending on the state he is in.
2.1 Publisher Model
The publisher wants to sell a digital product. After m timesteps, he offers an optional
upgrade to the product.2 The product has a base quality q1, which the upgrade ad-
ditively increases by q2. While the base product is always available, the upgrade only
becomes available from timestep m onwards. Because of the digital nature of the good,
we assume that the publisher has infinite supply and no marginal costs. The publisher’s
strategy space consists of his choice of price vector p = (p<m1 , p
≥m
1 , p2, pS). Thus, he
offers a menu of options to his users: (1) buy the base product for a one-time payment
pn1 = p
<m




1 (if bought in timestep
n ≥ m), (3) buy the upgrade for a one-time payment p2 (only offered in timesteps
n ≥ m), or (4) subscribe for price pS per time step. A product that is bought can
be used forever, but the upgrade needs to be bought separately. On the other hand, a
subscription gives immediate access to all available upgrades, but the user loses access
to the product when his subscription lapses.
A publisher can choose to not offer a buy or subscribe option by setting the corre-
sponding price to infinity. The publisher’s utility is equal to his expected revenue per
user.
2.2 User Model
Users are identified by their state and type. A user’s state is given by a tuple σ = (d, o).
While users arrive interested in obtaining access to the product, after using the product
for some time this interest may vanish. The demand d ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether the user
is still interested, i.e., whether he obtains any utility for having access to the product.
The ownership vector o ∈ {0, 1}
2
denotes whether a user owns the base product, i.e.,
o1 = 1 or the upgrade, i.e., o2 = 1.
A user’s type is a tuple τ = (na, δ, γ, v). na ∈ {1, . . . , nmax} denotes the timestep
the user arrives into the system, i.e., the earliest time he could buy the product and
2 We limit ourselves in the analysis to exactly one upgrade after exactly m time steps to
simplify the exposition. Turning m into a strategic variable, as well as extending our model
to more than one upgrade or multiple price changes is straightforward.
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is drawn from a distribution with pmf fa. δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the user’s long term
engagement factor with the product and is drawn from a distribution with pmf fδ.
While any arriving user starts with demand d = 1 for the product, in any timestep in
which he uses the product he has a probability of 1 − δ to become uninterested and
lose demand (setting d = 0). A user who has lost demand no longer obtains utility
from having access to the product. The release of the upgrade has the complementary
probability δ to rekindle a lapsed user’s interest and set d = 1. γ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the
quality decay factor of the user and is drawn from a distribution with pmf fγ . While
the product and the upgrade have qualities qi in the timesteps in which they become
available, the realized quality of the product for the users decreases every timestep as
hype and novelty fade and it slowly becomes outdated. The realized quality of having
access to o at time n is given by q(o, γ, n) = 1[o1=1](γ
nq1 + 1[o2=1]γ
n−mq2). Lastly,
v ∈ [0, vmax] denotes the value a user has for a product of quality 1, as long as he has
demand. v is drawn from a distribution with pdf fv.
A user’s action space in any timestep consists of whether he subscribes S ∈ {0, 1} or
buys the product or the upgrade b ∈ {0, 1}
2
. Subscription gives a user immediate access
to anything currently released, i.e., onS = [1, 0] if n < m and o
n
S = [1, 1] otherwise, while
buying b gives ownership of the bought product, i.e., changes the ownership vector from
o to o′ = max(o, b).
The normalized immediate reward wn of a user of type τ in timestep n and state
(d, o) is given by wn(S, b, τ, σ) = d ((1− S)q(max(o, b), γ, n) + Sq(o
n
S , γ, n)), while his
immediate payment is given by ρn(S, b, τ, σ, p) = pSS + p
n
1 b1 + p2b2. His overall im-
mediate utility in timestep n is therefore given by un(S, b, τ, σ, p) = vwn(S, b, τ, σ) −
ρn(S, b, τ, σ, p).
A strategy α(n, σ) : N×{0, 1}× {0, 1}
2
→ {0, 1}× {0, 1}
2
maps timesteps and user







P (σn = σ
′|α, τ, σ)wn(S, b, τ, σ), (1)
where P (σn = σ
′|α, τ, σ) denotes the probability of the user being in state σ′ during
timestep n given α, τ, σ. Similarly, the expected payment is given by






P (σn = σ
′|α, τ, σ)ρn(S, b, τ, σ, p). (2)
A user’s overall expected utility with strategy α is consequently given by u(α, τ) =
vw(α, τ)− ρ(α, τ, p).
3 User Equilibrium Strategies
Before we can analyze the publisher’s revenue, we first need to determine how users
would react to any given publisher strategy. Since the supply of software is unlimited
and since we do not model any social effects, the utility of a given user is independent
of the strategies of the other users. We can therefore find the equilibrium strategy of
each user by solving his individual MDP in isolation.
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For any given user type τ , we could directly do this through backward induction.
But doing so on a user’s full strategy space is computationally very costly, even for
one user. As we later need to compute the optimal strategies for each user type to
calculate the publisher’s revenue, we now show that the optimal strategies for each user
type can only come from a small set of possible strategies. Note that throughout this
section, most expressions depend on the price p. For the sake of readability, we keep
this dependency implicit and omit p wherever doing so does not cause confusion.
A first important observation for identifying potentially optimal user strategies is
that conceptually, the MDP for each user type can be seen to consist of two distinct
parts: anything that happens before the upgrade is released in timestep m and anything
that happens afterwards. For notational clarity and ease of exposition, we split user
strategies in this manner, i.e., setting α = (α1, α2), where α1 denotes a user’s strategy
before m and α2 denotes his strategy beginning from timestep m.
Before timestep m, a user’s actions are restricted to buying the base product, doing
nothing or subscribing. Note that subscribing in any timestep yields the same immediate
reward as owning the base product. Given this, we easily obtain the following result
that shows that there is only one potentially optimal strategy that involves buying
the product and one potentially optimal strategy that involves subscribing (though
possibly for zero timesteps). Overloading notation, we denote these by α1 = b and
α1 = s, respectively.
Lemma 1. 1. For a user of type τ = (na, δ, γ, v) that buys the base product before
timestep m, the optimal strategy α1 = b has him buy in the timestep na he arrives
and not subscribe in any timestep n < m.
2. For a user of type τ = (na, δ, γ, v) that does not buy the base product before timestep
m and plays some α2 from timestep m onwards, there exists n
α2,τ
1 such that the
optimal strategy α1 = s has him subscribe in any timestep n < n
α2,τ
1 where he has








if n < m
∞ if n = m
(3)
where τ ′ = (m, δ, γ, v) (i.e., ρ((αs, α2), τ
′, p) and w((αs, α2), τ
′) are the reward and
payment the user would obtain if he arrived in timestep m).
Proof. The first statement follows directly by noting that when buying in a later
timestep before m, a user’s additional realized value compared to subscribing or doing
nothing decreased, but his payment does not. He therefore buys in the first possible
timestep and afterwards can not obtain any additional reward through subscribing.
For the second statement, note that a subscribing user obtains immediate utility
vq([1, 0], γ, n) − pS in any subscribed timestep, which decreases in n. Thus, if he does
not subscribe in any timestep nα2,τ1 , then he will also not subscribe in any later timestep
before m. Additionally, while subscribed, he has probability (1− δ) to lose demand. If
he loses demand before timestep m, then he still has probability δ to regain demand
in timestep m. This means that subscribing in timestep n < m decreases the expected
utility he obtains after timestep m by a factor of δ2. As he does not buy before m, his
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utility from timestep m onward, if d = 1, is the same as if he had arrived in timestep
m, i.e., as if his type was τ ′ = (m, δ, γ, v). The overall change in expected utility for
subscribing in the largest timestep n he subscribes is thus given by




+ (1− δ)2ρ((αs, α2), τ
′
, p)
and nα2,τ1 is the first timestep for which this change would be negative.
Given Lemma 1 and a strategy α2 to play from timestep m onwards, there are only
two potentially optimal strategies before timestep m: buy in the timestep a user arrives,
denoted by α1 = b, or subscribe until timestep n
α2,τ
1 , denoted by α1 = s. To determine
which of these two strategies is optimal, we must next take the user’s strategy after the
upgrade release into account.
After the upgrade releases, the user’s space of potentially optimal strategies grows
slightly. In addition to buying the upgrade, and if not yet owned, the base product
(α2 = b) or not buying anything (α2 = s), a user might also decide to only buy the
base product, but not the upgrade (α2 = bb). This can for example happen if the base
product is heavily discounted after timestep m, but the price of the upgrade is set very
high. For such a user it might be optimal to first subscribe for a few timesteps, before
buying the base product.
Lemma 2. 1. For a user of type τ who buys the upgrade (and, if not yet owned, the
base product), the optimal strategy α2 = b is to buy as soon as possible (i.e., in
timestep max(na,m)) and to not subscribe in any timestep n ≥ m.
2. For a user of type τ with ownership vector o who does not buy anything after
timestep m, for the optimal strategy α2 = s there exists a timestep n
o,τ
2 ≥ m such
that he subscribes in any timestep n with m ≤ n < no,τ2 where he has demand d = 1
and subscribes in no timestep n ≥ no,τ2 . It holds that n
o,τ




q([1, 1]− o, γ, n)
. (5)
3. For a user of type τ that only buys the base product after timestep m (and never
buys the upgrade), for the optimal strategy α2 = bb there exists a timestep n
τ
3 such
that he subscribes in and only in any timestep n with m ≤ n < nτ3 where he has
demand and buys in timestep nτ3 (if he still has demand). It holds that n
τ
3 is the
smallest n ≥ 0 for which
v <
pS − (1− δ)p
≥m
1
q([0, 1], γ, nτ3)
. (6)
Proof. 1. and 2. follow analogously to Lemma 1. To see 3., note that a user who does
not buy the upgrade, but does buy the base product after timestep m, optimally does
so in the first timestep where he does not subscribe. Not doing so only decreases his
reward but not his payment. When subscribing in timestep n, such a user obtains
an additional value of q([0, 1], γ, n)v over just owning the base product and makes a
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payment of pS . He has a probability of (1− δ) to lose demand before the next timestep,
in which case he does not buy at all, saving (in expectation) (1 − δ)p≥m1 . Thus, a
user’s utility for subscribing in the highest timestep in which he subscribes is given by
q([0, 1], γ, n)v − pS + (1 − δ)p
≥m
1 . As this utility decreases in n, the user either does
not subscribe at all (i.e. buys in timestep m or when he arrives) or there exists a
smallest timestep nγ,v3 for which his added utility for subscribing becomes negative and
in which he buys. Note that when buying in timestep nγ,v3 is not rational, then playing
alpha2 = bb is dominated by α2 = s.
Given Lemma 2, there are only three potentially optimal strategies beginning in
timestep m: (1) buy the upgrade (and, if not owned yet, the base product) once the
upgrade releases in m (or once the user arrives if na > m), (2) not buy anything and
subscribe until timestep no,τ2 , or (3) subscribe before timestep n
τ
3 , then buy the base
product in time step nτ3 . We denote these by α2 = b, α2 = s and α2 = bb.
Taken together, Lemmas 1 and 2 describe all potentially optimal strategies for any
user.
Proposition 1. It maximizes the expected utility of a user of type τ to play strategy
α
∗
τ,p =argmaxα1∈{b,s},α2∈{b,s,bb}vw((α1, α2), τ)
− ρ((α1, α2), τ, p) (7)
Proof. Follows from combining Lemmas 1 and 2.
4 Publisher Revenue
Given the results for the optimal user strategies from Section 3, we can now give a
relatively simple expression for the publisher’s revenue.
Proposition 2. Given strategy p = (p<m1 , p
≥m
1 , p2, pS), the publisher’s expected rev-

















(na,δ,γ,v),p, (na, δ, γ, v), p
)
fv(v)dv (8)
where α∗(na,δ,γ,v),p is given by Proposition 1
Proof. Follows directly by taking the optimal user strategies α∗(na,δ,γ,v),p for each type
τ as given by Proposition 1 and taking the expectation over all types.
4.1 Optimality Results
We now state a few general theoretical insights. First, only offering a buy option is
optimal in at least some settings, i.e., also offering a subscription option can not always
be used to increase revenue. Secondly, only offering a subscription option can never be
as good as offering both options to users.
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Theorem 1. There exist settings where setting pS = ∞, i.e., only offering a perpetual
licenses, maximizes π(p). There exists no setting where setting p<m1 = p
≥m
1 = p2 = ∞,
i.e., only offering subscription licenses, maximizes π(p).
Proof. To see that only offering a buy option can be optimal, consider a setting without
a later upgrade (i.e., m = 1) and only a single user type τ . Since the expected reward
for owning is higher than the expected reward for subscribing up to any finite timestep,
users are willing to pay more for perpetual licenses than for subscribing. Since there
is only one user type and by Lemma 2 buying users buy in the timestep they arrive,
adding an additional subscription option can not extract additional revenue.
To see that only offering a subscription option can never be optimal, assume some




1 = p2 = ∞ is optimal. Given p, let τmax be the set
consisting of the user types that make the highest expected payment after timestep m.
Denote this payment by ρ>mmax. Since the reward for buying in timestep m is always
strictly higher than the reward for subscribing from m to any finite timestep, users of
type τmax would be willing to pay ρ
>m
max + ǫ for owning the product from timestep m
onwards. Setting p≥m1 = ρ
>m
max + ǫ, p2 = 0 for ǫ > 0 small enough therefore leads to
users in a neighborhood around τmax buying in timestep m and paying strictly more
than ρ>mmax, while no user pays less. Consequently, p = (ρ
>m
max+ ǫ,∞, 0, pS) yields higher
revenue for the publisher and only offering subscriptions cannot be revenue optimal.
Importantly, this does not make any statement about whether only offering an (opti-
mal) buy or subscription option would yield a better revenue and we can find settings
where either yields a higher revenue. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a simple
condition for deciding which option is optimal or by how much revenue could increase
for offering both options simultaneously without solving for the optimal pricing strategy
p.
4.2 Calculating Optimal Prices and Revenue
In this section we discuss how to effectively derive optimal pricing strategies and rev-
enue. Unfortunately, the publisher’s revenue is highly non-convex in p and has many
local maxima: Changing prices affects different users differently and usually increase
the payments of some users but reduces the payment of other users. Consequently,
first-order derivative tests are very bad indicators for whether a given price vector p is
close to optimal. To still obtain (approximately) optimal strategies, we therefore have
to employ global non-linear solvers. Fortunately, the search space is bounded: it is not
reasonable to allow publishers to set negative prices and any price above the highest
utility any user could obtain is effectively infinite.
While the expression for the publisher’s revenue given by Proposition 2 can already
be numerically evaluated, doing so is quite costly, making a search for the optimal
strategy practically infeasible. We take two steps to rectify this. First, we derive simple
closed form expressions for the normalized expected reward and the expected payment
for all potentially optimal strategies a given user could play. Due to space constraints,
these expression are found in Technical Appendix A.
Second, we get around having to do a numerical integration by noting that the
payments are piecewise constant in the value v.
Revenue Maximization for Consumer Software 9

























A formal proof, which also illustrate how to derive the vi, is given in Technical Appendix
B. Broadly, this follows from the fact that, for fixed δ, γ and na and α ∈ {b, s}×{b, s, bb},
the normalized expected reward and payment are piecewise constant in v.
As the expected revenue can now be evaluated relatively cheaply, an (approximately)
optimal solutions can easily be found by for example employing differential evolution
search [15], a stochastic method where a population of random candidate solutions is
stochastically mutated until convergence is archived. As a stochastic search, true global
optimality of the found solution cannot be guaranteed. While even single runs with
relatively small populations usually yield good results, there is a small probability to
end up in a local maximum. It therefore is sensible to repeat the search a few times to
minimize the optimality gap.
5 Numerical Evaluation
To better understand when offering subscriptions can increase a publisher’s revenue
and by how much it typically does so, we now present a number of numerical examples
and comparative statics. For each example, we give the optimal revenue for the optimal
prices for a publisher who either (1) only offers a buy option (Opt(Buy)), (2) only offers
a subscription option (Opt(Sub)), (3) offers both options (Opt(Both)), or (4) offers both
options, but restricts the buy prices of perpetual licenses to those that would be optimal
without subscription option (Opt(Both | Opt(Buy))).
5.1 Example Domain: Video Games
For our numerical analysis to have merit, we need to choose realistic settings parameters.
We chose the domain of video games for our numerics, because some user data as well
as pricing data is available for this domain, which we can use to inform our choice of
parameters and distributions.3 We base our distributions on a dataset obtained from
the website Steam Spy 4, which collects publicly available data from the large video
game storefront Steam5 to statistically estimate the number of owners of video games
over time and what percentage of them actively used the game recently. In the following,
we describe the distributions and parametrizations we choose based on insights from
3 To the best of our knowledge, no comprehensive study of how users in this domain are
typically distributed is available, which is why we have to base our parameter choices on a
rough analysis of some limited datasets that we have access to.
4 https://steamspy.com/about
5 https://store.steampowered.com/about/
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p<m1 p
≥m
1 p2 pS Revenue User Welfare Overall Welfare
Opt(Buy) 45.82 21.8 18.06 ∞ 31.42 33.23 64.65
Opt(Sub) ∞ ∞ ∞ 14.66 33.54 24.07 57.61
Opt(Both) 96.98 35.19 47.96 17.71 37.88 24.39 62.27
Opt(Both | Opt(Buy)) 45.82 21.8 18.06 18.4 31.82 33.89 65.71
Table 1. Results for four different publisher strategies for the base case
this dataset. A discussion of the data and how we determined our parameters can be
found in Technical Appendix C, while a snapshot of some representative games can be
found in Technical Appendix D.
We set the product’s base quality to q1 = 1 and the quality of the upgrade to
q2 = 0.5. We assume that the upgrade releases in timestep m = 6 and that the publisher
stops to actively sell the product in timestep nmax = 12 (after which only user’s that
have bought it can continue to use it).






if na = 1
1
xa+nmax−1
if 1 < na < nmax
(10)
While we vary xa for our comparative statics, we choose xa = 5 as the standard value
for most of the section.
We assume that γ ∈ {0.85, 0.9, 0.95}. We let xγ denote the probability that γ is 0.9
and set the γ distribution fγ to be fγ(0.9) = xγ and fγ(0.85) = fγ(0.95) =
1
2 (1− xγ).
While we vary xγ for our comparative statics, we choose xγ = 0.8 as the standard value
for most of the section.
We assume that 20% of users have a 90% probability to not lose demand in each
timestep, i.e., δ = 0.9. We therefore settle on a simple two-type distribution of long-
term and short-term users. Denoting the probability that a short-term user does not
lose demand after one timestep by xδ, we obtain fδ(xδ) = 0.8 and fδ(0.9) = 0.2. While
we vary xδ for our comparative statics, we choose xδ = 0.5 as the standard value used
for most of the section.
We assume that the user values are distributed according to a normal distribution
with mean µ = 25 truncated to [0, 50]. While we vary the standard deviation σ of fv
for our comparative statics, we choose σ = 10 as the standard value for most of the
section.
All optimal publisher strategies are calculated using a best-of-15 differential evolu-
tion search. While full optimality for all data points cannot be guaranteed, the magni-
tude of any remaining approximation error is insignificant for any general insights.
5.2 Base Case
In this section, we discuss the numerical results for the base case with xa = 5, xγ =
0.8, xδ = 0.5 and σ = 10. This parametrization roughly corresponds to a typical game
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based on our analysis of the Steam Spy data. The results for each type of publisher
strategy are summarized in Table 1.
The best attainable revenue for a publisher who only wants to sell perpetual licenses
without offering a subscription option (i.e., Opt(Buy)) is π(p) = 31.42. As this revenue
is attained with a relatively low price (that is further discounted roughly 50% once the
upgrade releases), the publisher ensures that most users buy his product. This leaves
the users with relatively high utility for owning the game and thus the users’ social
welfare (i.e., the expected utility of a randomly drawn user) is relatively high at 33.23.
If the publisher instead only offers a subscription option (i.e., Opt(Sub)), his ex-
pected revenue per user increases to π = 33.54, a substantial 6.7% increase over only
offering the buy option. This is possible because, when only offering a buy option the
publisher had to set a relatively low price to attract users that are only interested in
playing the game for a short time as well as users that want to play it for a long time.
The subscription option on the other hand automatically price discriminates between
those user types and extracts more revenue from long-term users. Consequently, this
revenue increase comes at the cost of the user welfare, which decreases substantially.
Unfortunately, this is not simply a transfer of utility from the users to the publisher,
as the users welfare decreases more than the publisher’s revenue increases. This loss is
caused because users whose perceived quality of the game decayed too much stop sub-
scribing, even though they would like to continue playing. They are simply not willing
to pay the subscription price anymore. This decreases the system’s overall welfare (i.e.,
the sum of revenue and user welfare) by 11%.
Offering both perpetual and subscription licenses (i.e., Opt(Both)), the publisher he
can increase his revenue to π = 37.87, an additional 12.9% increase over only offering a
subscription option and a staggering 20.5% increase over only selling perpetual licenses.
This revenue increase requires that all prices rise compared to when only one of the
two license types are offered. While the subscription price only moderately increases to
pS = 17.71, the buy prices roughly double to p
<m
1 = 98.98, p
≥m
1 = 35.19, p2 = 47.96.
Interestingly, with these prices, any user that subscribes for 3 or less timesteps before
the price change and then buys the discounted base product pays less overall than if
he would have bought the base product directly. Consequently, we 52.9% of the users
arriving in timestep 1 subscribe at first, but ultimately buy a perpetual licenses once
it is discounted (as long as they still have demand). Only 15.3% of users that arrive in
timestep 1 directly buy the game at its high starting price. This effectively splits the
user base in two. First there are casual users that subscribe for a few timesteps and
often pay less than they would when only perpetual licenses are offered. Then there are
power users that plan to use the game for a long time, often longer than they would be
willing to subscribe, that pay the increased buy price. Consequently, despite the notable
revenue increase, user welfare does not decrease further and, compared to only offering
a subscription option, even slightly increases to 24.4. While this is still notably lower
than the user welfare when only offering perpetual licenses, the system’s overall welfare
(i.e., the sum of revenue and user welfare) now is only about 3.7% lower, showing that
most of the user welfare gets transferred to the publisher instead of being lost.
Lastly, we analyze whether the publisher can increase his revenue by offering a
subscription option without changing the prices of perpetual licenses (i.e., Opt(Both|
12 L. Dierks and S. Seuken
























Fig. 1. Revenue for different long-term
engagement distributions (i.e., varying xδ)























Fig. 2. Revenue for different value
distributions (i.e., varying σ)
Opt(Buy))). This guarantees that no user is worse off than when only perpetual li-
censes are offered, an important consideration when there are competing products.
Any revenue increase under such a pricing model has to come from additional users
that do not buy perpetual licenses even when no subscription option is offered. Fixing
the buy prices at p<m1 = 45.82, p
≥m
1 = 21.8, p2 = 18.06, the optimal subscription price
is pS = 18.4. Considering that the publisher wants to attract additional users, it might
seem counterintuitive that pS here is even higher than what was optimal combined with
the far higher optimal buy price. This effect occurs because the lower the buy price,
the more users with low long-term engagement buy when no subscription option is of-
fered. But those same users readily switch to subscribing and pay even less when pS is
low, increasing market cannibalization. Consequently, the attainable revenue increase
is comparatively modest, with the publisher obtaining at most π = 31.82, an increase
of 1.3%. While this pales compared to the potential revenue increase with fully opti-
mized prices, it can still constitute an additional revenue of hundredth of thousands
or even millions of dollars for large releases. Importantly, since this pricing strategy,
by construction, leads to a Pareto improvement for the users, user welfare also slightly
increases.
5.3 Comparative Statics
We now study how varying the setting parameters xδ and σ affects the publisher’s
revenue under his four different strategies. In Figures 1 and 2, we present comparative
statics for how the optimal revenue of each type of pricing strategy changes in relation
to the revenue of only offering a buy option (which we normalize to 1). Due to space
constraints, similar comparative statics for xγ and xa can be found in Technical Ap-
pendix E. Both of them show a comparatively minor, but notable effect on the relative
revenue potential.
In Figure 1, we see that the subscription option is best when the spread between
short-term and long-term users is largest (i.e., xδ is small), as subscription inherently
differentiates users on how long they are interested in the product. For very high xδ,
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Fig. 3. Revenue for different levels of correlation (i.e., varying xc)
i.e., when every user in expectation has demand for many timesteps, the potential
revenue gain of offering a subscription alongside a buy option becomes very small (on
the magnitude of 0.5%). At that point, too many users stop subscribing despite still
having demand because their perceived value decayed below the subscription price.
This makes subscription options inherently unattractive and any subscription price
that could attract a large amount of additional users would cause too much market
cannibalization. Interestingly, for low xδ (< 0.36 when only offering a buy option, < 0.46
when offering both options), it is optimal to make the upgrade free (but increase the
base product’s price). This causes the sudden lage drop in attainable revenue increase
for adding a subscription option without changing the buy price, as users with relatively
high quality decay that were priced out of buying before that point (and thus got a
relatively expensive subscription for 1 or 2 time steps) afterwards switch to only buying
the base game.
In Figure 2, we see that the variance of the user values for the most part has a
relatively low impact on the relative revenue potential of the different strategies. But
since the optimal price when only offering a buy option for with the given parameters
is low enough that users with average valuation buy even if the have a low long-term
engagement factor δ and decay factor γ, the potential revenue advantage of offering a
subscription option without changing buy prices goes to zero with low σ.
5.4 Correlating Value and Long Term Demand
So far all type variables were assumed to be independent from each other. In practice
it is likely that some (but not all) users with high long term engagement factor δ have
lower values v, for example because they do not have much leisure time to use the game
in each timestep and therefore need to own it for longer to spend the same time using
it. In this example we want to study how introducing some correlation between δ and
v changes the publisher’s revenue. To that end, we let the value distribution depend on
δ. For a dependence factor of xc set the value distribution for a users with long-term
engagement factor δ to a normal distribution with mean µ = 25((1 − xc) + xc(1 − δ))
and standard deviation σ = 10, again truncated to [0, 50]. As we can see in Figure 3,
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while increasing the dependence between value and long-term engagement decreases
the revenue potential of a subscription option, offering both options is still markedly
better even when the mean of the normal distribution underlying a users value is fully
dependent on the user’s long-term engagement factor (i.e., xc = 1). Interestingly, this
dependence does not seem to have much, if any, effect on the revenue potential of
introducing a subscription option without changing the buy prices.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the revenue maximization problem of a publisher wanting to either
sell perpetual or subscription licenses for consumer software. In conclusion, combining
subscription and perpetual license is typically revenue optimal when selling consumer
software, realistically increasing revenue by 10% − 20% over only offering perpetual
license. Offering both types of licenses, it is often further possible to combine a revenue
increase compared to only offering perpetual licenses with a Pareto improvement for the
users, though the resulting revenue increase is then only on the magnitude of 1%− 2%.
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A Reward and payment with the potentially optimal strategies
In this section we derive expressions for the expected reward and payment for any of the
potentially optimal strategies that can be evaluated relatively cheaply. Towards this,
we first derive the following technical lemma.
Lemma 3. Assume a user of type τ with arrival time na < m that either, beginning
in timestep n′ = na, subscribes in any timestep before n
′′ ≤ m and takes no other
action or buys the product in timestep n′ = na (in which case n
′′ = m). The expected
normalized reward such a user obtains before timestep m is given by











The probability that such a user has demand d = 1 in timestep m is given by
κ(n′, n′′, o) = δn
′′−n′ + δ(1− δn
′′−n′) (12)
Similarly, assume a user of type τ with value v = 1 and ownership vector o that has
demand in timestep n′ = max(na,m) and subscribes from n
′ in any timestep before
n′′ ≥ m and takes no other action. The expected value such a user obtains after timestep
m is given by















A user of type τ that has demand d = 1 in timestep n′ and subscribes from n′ in
any timestep before n′′ ≥ m where he still has demand and takes no other action makes







Proof. Recall that the normalized reward of a user of type τ that follows some strategy







P (σn = σ
′|α, τ)wn(S, b, τ, σ
′). (16)
For a user with ownership vector o that subscribes from n′ = na to n
′′−1 and takes
no other action (i.e., o never changes), the expected normalized reward before timestep
m is consequently given by






P (σn = σ






P (dn = 1|α, τ)wn(S, b, τ, (1, o)). (18)
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For any timestep n in which the user subscribes, the probability to loose demand is
























Here, the last equality follows as a partial geometric series. Analogously, taking into










and the statement for w<m(n′, n′′, o1) follows.
The probability that such a user still has demand in timestep n′′ is given by δn
′′−n′ .
If he does, then he also still has demand in timestep m. If he on the other hand does
not have demand anymore in timestep n′′, then he still has a probability of δ to regain
demand with the upgrade release and price change in timestep m. The statements for
w≥m(n′, n′′, o) and ρS(n
′, n′′) follow by analogous arguments.
For all potentially optimal α, we can now easily derive a user’s reward and payment.
Proposition 4. For strategy α = (α1, α2) with α1 ∈ {b, s}, α2 ∈ {b, s, bb}, the normal-
ized expected reward for playing α is
w((b, b), τ) =
{
w<m(na, na, 1) + κ(na, na, 1)w
≥m(m,m, [1, 1]) if na < m
w≥m(na, na, [1, 1]) if na ≥ m
(24)
w((b, s), τ) =
{
w<m(na, na, 1) + κ(na, na, 1)w
≥m(m,n1,τ2 , [1, 0]) if na < m
w≥m(na, n
1,τ
2 , [1, 0]) if na ≥ m
(25)
w((s, s), τ) =
{
w<m(na, n1, 0) + κ(na, n
s,τ
1 , 0)w
≥m(m,n0,τ2 , [0, 0]) if na < m
w≥m(na, n
0,τ
2 , [0, 0]) if na ≥ m
(26)




1 , 0) + κ(na, n
b,τ
1 , 0)w
≥m(m,m, [1, 1]) if na < m






1 , 0) + κ(na, n
bb,τ
1 , 0)w
≥m(m,nτ3 , [1, 0]) if na < m
w≥m(m,nτ3 , [1, 0]) if na ≥ m
(28)
18 L. Dierks and S. Seuken
The expected payments are
ρ((b, b), τ) =
{
p<m1 + κ(na, na, 1)p2 if na < m
p≥m1 + p2 if na ≥ m
(29)
ρ((b, s), τ) =
{
p<m1 + κ(na, na, 1)ρS(nm, n
1,τ
2 ) if na < m
p≥m1 + ρS(na, n
1,τ
2 ) if na ≥ m
(30)








2 ) if na < m
ρS(na, n
0
2) if na ≥ m
(31)








1 + p2) if na < m
p≥m1 + p2 if na ≥ m
(32)

















nτ3−nap≥m1 if na ≥ m
(33)
Proof. The statement follows by combining the actions taken under each strategy as
described in Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 with Lemma 3 by noting that the player always either
subscribes, owns all the available products he plans to buy with his strategy or does
not have demand.
B Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. From Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 it follows that, for fixed δ, γ and na, the
normalized expected reward w(α, τ) and payments ρ(α, τ) for each potentially optimal
strategy α ∈ {b, s}×{b, s, bb} are piecewise constant functions in v. As this means that
the utility is differentiable and derivatives are constant, it follows that in each interval
where w for all strategies is constant in v, each strategy α can at most be optimal for
a single sub-interval. Starting at v = 0 and iteratively solving for the next point where
either the optimal strategy α∗ or w(α∗, τ) changes thus allows us to identify intervals
Ii = [v
i, vi+1) of values in which the optimal strategy and the expected payment do
not change in v.
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C Data Discussion
In this section, we describe discuss the steam spy data and how it influenced our choice
of distributions and parameters. We bought this dataset from the website Steam Spy 6,
which collects publicly available data from the large video game storefront Steam7 and
uses it to statistically estimate the number of owners of video games over time and what
percentage of them actively used the game recently (i.e., in the last two weeks). While
steam employs an overly aggressive pricing strategy that partly falls outside our model
and this data set is prone to estimation errors and only contains limited information
about those users that bought the games, it still allows us to make a number of general
observations to help find reasonable distributions. In the following, we describe the
general insights we have obtained from analyzing this data.8
1. For most games, while the game is supported, its monthly sales stay roughly con-
stant as long as the price of the game keeps decreasing and afterwards drops off
relatively slowly. This suggests that the arrival rate of new users is roughly con-
stant, though the quality decays, which in turn is counteracted by price drops. The
exception to this is the release month (+/- 1-2 weeks), which for big releases can
have 3−10 times as many sales, as many users effectively arrived before the game’s
release but could not buy it yet. Additionally, the release of bigger upgrades often
boosts sales of the base game, which can be explained by users in the system holding
off their purchase until the upgrade releases. Denoting the overall arrivals during





if na = 1
1
xa+nmax−1
if 1 < na < nmax
(34)
While we will later vary xa, we choose xa = 5 as the standard value for most of the
section.
2. While games on Steam usually do not change their base price, most games get
regularly (i.e., typically every few weeks) discounted for a limited period of time,
and most users buy during those discount periods. Taking this into account, the
price of most games effectively drops by 40% − 60% during the first year. As the
number of new owners per timestep stays roughly constant and assuming the arrival
rate of users is constant, this suggests that the quality of most games for users that
do buy on average decays at a rate around 10% per month, i.e., γ = 0.9. As not
much more distributional information is available, for simplicity we assume for our
numerics that γ ∈ {0.85, 0.9, 0.95}. We let xγ denote the probability that γ is 0.9
and set the γ distribution fγ to be fγ(0.9) = xγ and fγ(0.85) = fγ(0.95) =
1
2 (1−xγ).




8 The purpose of this exercise was to find reasonable parameter settings and distributions for
the comparative statics. A detailed empirical analysis (e.g., fitting a statistical model to the
data) is beyond the scope of this paper and would carry little value for this limited dataset.
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3. While Steam Spy does not contain data on whether a user played a game after a
certain date, it does contain data for the percentage of users who own the game
and have played it in the last two week. Using this as a proxy for the percentage
of users with demand d = 1, we see that the percentage of users who stop playing
after a month for most games varies between 40% and 80% percent. For most
games, once the percentage of active users has reached about 20%, it starts to only
fall very slowly. Accounting for the fact that there are constantly new users buying
the game, it is reasonable to assume that 20% of users have a 90% probability to
not lose demand in each timestep, i.e., δ = 0.9. We therefore settle on a simple
two-type distribution of long-term and short-term users. Denoting the probability
that a short-term user does not lose demand after one timestep by xδ, we obtain
fδ(xδ) = 0.8 and fδ(0.9) = 0.2. While we will later vary xδ, we choose xδ = 0.5 as
the standard value used for most of the section.
4. The dataset does not contain much information that would allow us to estimate the
distribution of user values. We therefore simply set the user values to be distributed
according to a normal distribution with mean µ = 25 truncated to [0, 50]. While
we will later vary the standard deviation σ of fv, we choose σ = 10 as the standard
value for most of the section.
Additionally, for the numerical analysis, we set q1 = 1, q2 = 0.5, m = 6 and nmax = 12.
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D Owners, Prices and Activity Data Examples
In this section, we discuss a few representative games and provide figures to illustrate
their data.
D.1 Stellaris, a 4X grand strategy strategy game
This is a so called 4X (Explore, Expand, Exploit, Exterminate) grand strategy game
with regular small updates (which we do not model) and optional paid upgrades. During
the observed timeframe, 4 large paid upgrades released, in October of 2016, April and
September of 2017 , as well as frebruary of 2018. Each coincides with an up-tick in
active players, though only the April upgrade seems to have lead to a large rise in sales.
This most likely happened because it brought the quality of the whole product above


















Fig. 4. Stellaris:Owners over time
Jul Oct Jan
2017


































Fig. 6. Stellaris: recently active owners in %
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D.2 Dark Souls III, an action RPG
This is a large, story driven game with a minor multi-player component. Famous for
being very challenging. There were two paid upgrades released, one in October 2017

















Fig. 7. Dark Souls III:Owners over time
Jul Oct Jan
2017
































Fig. 9. Dark Souls III: recently active owners
in %
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D.3 Slay the Spire, a rogue-like card deck building game
This is a relatively small game that user typically play with low intensity, but for a long
period of time. Additionally, in difference to the other two games, Slay the Spire had
an so called ’early access’ period during which an unfinished version was sold at a lower
price while obtaining regular free updates. In our model, this in roughly comparable to
increasing (instead of decreasing) the base products price when the upgrade releases,





























































Fig. 12. Slay the Spire: Recently active owners
in %
E Additional Comparative Statics
In Figure 13, we see that while increasing xγ , and therefore decreasing the population
variance of the quality decay factor γ, decreases the relative revenue potential of just
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Fig. 13. Revenue for different quality decay
distributions (i.e., varying xγ)
























Fig. 14. Revenue for different arrival
distributions (i.e., varying xa)
offering a subscription, it can still increase the revenue potential of offering both options
as market cannibalization decreases. In Figure 14, we see that how many users arrive
in timestep 1 also has a relatively low impact on the relative revenue of the different
strategies. Similarly to low σ, we again see that for very low xa, the potential revenue
improvement of offering a subscription option without changing the buy price goes to
zero. Here this is caused by the fact that the buy price keeps decreasing because late
arriving users become relatively more important for the publisher’s revenue, making
it harder and harder to offer a reasonably prices subscription option without loosing
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